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Abstract
This thesis considers three issues in microeconomic theory — two-sided matching, strategic
voting, and revealed preferences.
In the first chapter I discuss the strategic manipulation of stable matching mechanisms
commonly used in two-sided matching markets. Stable matching mechanisms are very
successful in practice, despite theoretical concerns that they are manipulable by participants.
The key finding is that most agents in large markets are close to being indifferent among
partners in all stable matchings. It is known that the utility gain by manipulating a stable
matching mechanism is bounded by the difference between utilities from the best and the
worst stable matching partners. Thus, the main finding implies that the proportion of agents
who may obtain a significant utility gain from manipulation vanishes in large markets. This
result reconciles the success of stable mechanisms in practice with the theoretical concerns
about strategic manipulation. Methodologically, I introduce techniques from the theory of
random bipartite graphs for the analysis of large matching markets.
In the second chapter I study the criminal court process, focusing on plea bargaining.
Plea bargains screen the types of defendants, guilty or innocent, who go to jury trial,
which affects the jurors’ voting decision and, in turn, the performance of the entire criminal
court. The equilibrium jurors’ voting behavior in the case of plea bargaining resembles
the equilibrium behavior in the classical jury model in the absence of plea bargaining. By
optimizing a plea bargain offer, a prosecutor, however, may induce jurors to act as if they
echo the prosecutor’s preferences against convicting innocent defendants and acquitting
guilty defendants. With reference to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), I study different
voting rules in the trial stage and their consequences in the entire court process. Compared
to general super-majority rules, we find that a court using the unanimity rule delivers more
vexpected punishment to innocent defendants and less punishment to guilty defendants.
In the third chapter I study collective choices from the revealed preference theory
viewpoint. For every product set of individual actions, joint choices are called Nash-
rationalizable if there exists a preference relation for each player such that the selected joint
actions are Nash equilibria of the corresponding game. I characterize Nash-rationalizable
joint choice behavior by zero-sum games, or games of conflicting interests. If the joint
choice behavior forms a product subset, the behavior is called interchangeable. I prove that
interchangeability is the only additional empirical condition which distinguishes zero-sum
games from general noncooperative games.
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1Chapter 1
Incentive Compatibility of Large
Centralized Matching Markets
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Overview
In this paper, we study the most popular class of algorithms, called stable matching mech-
anisms, used in centralized matching markets, such as the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP) and School Choice Programs in NYC and Boston. A matching is re-
garded as stable if no agent is matched with an unacceptable partner, and there is no
pair of agents on opposite sides of the market who prefer each other to their current part-
ners. A stable matching mechanism takes preference reports by participants and produces
a stable matching with respect to the submitted preferences. We ask how stable matching
mechanisms remain so successful, despite the fact that the mechanisms are easily manipula-
ble by the participants through misrepresenting their preferences. In particular, we analyze
whether large markets, i.e. ones consisting of a large number of participants, would mitigate
incentives to manipulate a stable matching mechanism.
Two-sided matching markets are markets with two kinds of agents, in which agents of
one kind match with agents of the other kind. Examples of such markets include firms and
workers in professional labor markets (Roth and Peranson, 1999), schools and students in
school choice programs (Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez, 2003), men and women in the mar-
riage market or dating sites (Choo and Siow, 2006; Hitsch, Hortac¸su, and Ariely, 2010),
2birth mothers and potential adoptive parents in the market for child adoption (Bernal,
Hu, Moriguchi, and Nagypal, 2007; Baccara, Collard-Wexler, Felli, and Yariv, 2010), and
cadets and branches in the military (So¨nmez and Switzer, 2011). Market designers seek-
ing to achieve desirable outcomes to these matching markets have introduced centralized
clearinghouses.
In market design, the concept of “stability” has been considered of central importance.
In practice, successful mechanisms often implement a stable matching with respect to sub-
mitted preferences (Roth and Xing, 1994; Roth, 2002). The best-known market design
examples, such as the NRMP and School Choice Programs in NYC and Boston, also use
a particular stable matching mechanism, called the doctor-proposing or student-proposing
Gale-Shapley algorithm.1 Table 1.1 below lists whether each clearinghouse produces a sta-
ble matching with respect to submitted preferences, and whether these clearinghouses are
still in use or no longer operating. With few exceptions, stable matching mechanisms have
been successful for the most part whereas unstable mechanisms have mostly failed.2
Still in use No longer in use
Stable
The NRMP: over 40 specialty markets and
submarkets for first year postgraduate posi-
tions, and 15 for second year positions
Specialty matching services: over 30 sub-
specialty markets for advanced medical resi-
dencies and fellowships
School choice programs: NYC, Boston
Canadian lawyers: multiple regions
British regional medical markets:
Edinburgh (≥‘69), Cardiff
Dental residencies: 3 specialties
Other healthcare markets:
Osteopaths (≥‘94), Pharmacists, Clinical
psychologists (≥‘99)
Dental residencies:
Periodontists(<‘97), Prosthodontists (<‘00)
Canadian lawyers:
British Columbia(<‘96)
Unstable
British regional medical markets:
Cambridge, London Hospital
British regional medical markets:
Birmingham, Edinburgh (<‘67), Newcastle,
Sheffield
Other healthcare markets:
Osteopaths (<‘94)
Table 1.1: Stable and unstable (centralized) mechanisms.
1 The algorithm is customized for each application. For details of the actual algorithms applied, see
Roth and Peranson (1999); Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, and Roth (2009); Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth, and
So¨nmez (2006).
2 Table 1.1 is reorganized from tables in Roth (2002) and McKinney, Niederle, and Roth (2003). The
clearinghouse for the gastroenterology fellowship market is a rare case in which a stable matching mechanism
started to fail in 1996, was abandoned in 2000, and then was reinstated in 2006 (Niederle and Roth, 2005;
Roth, 2008).
3From a theoretical perspective, however, stable matching mechanisms have a significant
shortcoming. While the mechanisms produce stable matchings by assuming that all partic-
ipants reveal their true preferences, in fact no stable matching mechanism is strategy-proof
(Roth, 1982).3 Participants may achieve a better matching by misrepresenting their pref-
erences, either by changing the order of the preference lists or by announcing that some
acceptable agents are unacceptable. Even the NRMP and School Choice Programs in NYC
and Boston, while widely acknowledged as a model of successful matching programs, can-
not rule out such incentives for strategic misrepresentation. Indeed, the possibility of such
manipulation is mostly unavoidable. Whenever there is more than one stable matching, at
least one agent can profitably misrepresent her preferences (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990),
and the conditions under which a preference profile contains a unique stable matching seem
to be quite restrictive (Eeckhout, 2000; Clark, 2006).4 Thus, markets are likely to have
agents with an incentive to manipulate a stable matching mechanism. In addition, Pittel
(1989) shows that the number of stable matchings tends to increase as the number of partici-
pants becomes large. Accordingly, when market designers deal with large markets, concerns
regarding strategic manipulation are heightened. As stable matching mechanisms are not
incentive compatible, the mechanisms may be manipulated by participants, thereby not
implementing the intended matchings. Moreover, each participant’s decision may become
hard to make since she needs to best respond to other agents’ strategic manipulations.
We consider matching markets that each firm hires one worker, a model which is known
as a one-to-one matching. We measure incentives to manipulate a stable matching mech-
anism by assuming that each firm-worker pair receives utilities, one for the firm and the
other for the worker, which in turn determine ordinal preferences. In order to study the
likelihood of an agent having a significant incentive to manipulate, we assume that utilities
are randomly drawn from some underlying distributions. The key finding of this paper is
that the proportion of participants who can potentially achieve a significant utility gain from
manipulation vanishes as the market becomes large. This result holds both when each agent
3 In fact, strategy-proofness is incompatible not only with stability but even with weaker conditions of
Pareto efficiency and individual rationality (Alcalde and Barbera`, 1994; So¨nmez, 1999).
4 It is an open question to characterize the complete set of preference profiles containing a unique stable
matching.
4knows the preferences of all other agents (complete information), and when an agent may
not know the preferences of other agents (incomplete information). Given the tangible and
intangible costs of strategic behavior in real life, we believe that this result may reconcile the
success of stable matching mechanisms with the theoretical concerns about manipulability.
In addition, based on this paper’s finding, market designers may more confidently advise
participants to submit their true preferences.
1.1.2 A Motivating Example
To understand the logic behind strategic manipulation, consider a simple labor market with
three firms and three workers. We illustrate how, in such a situation, an agent can achieve
a better partner by misrepresenting her preferences. In addition, we show that the best
achievable partner from manipulation must be a partner in a stable matching under her
true preferences.
Table 1.2 lists preferences of firms over workers, and of workers over firms which are
known to all participants. For instance, firm 1 most prefers worker 3, followed by worker 1
and worker 2. Similarly, worker 1 most prefers firm 2, followed by firm 3 and firm 1. Under
these preferences, there are two stable matchings: in one stable matching (marked by 〈·〉),
f1, f2, and f3 are matched with w1, w2, and w3, respectively; in the second stable matching
(marked by [·]), f1, f2, and f3 are matched with w2, w1, and w3, respectively.
f1 : w3  〈w1〉  [w2]
f2 : 〈w2〉  [w1]  w3
f3 : 〈[w3]〉  w1  w2
,
w1 : [f2]  f3  〈f1〉
w2 : [f1]  〈f2〉  f3
w3 : f2  〈[f3]〉  f1
Table 1.2: An example of a two-sided matching market with 3 firms and 3 workers.
Suppose that all agents submit their true preferences, and a stable matching mechanism
produces the second stable matching marked by [·]. In that case, suppose firm 1 misrepresent
her preferences and announces that workers 3 and 1 are acceptable, but not worker 2. For
the submitted preferences, there is a unique stable matching marked by 〈·〉. The stable
5matching mechanism, which produces a stable matching for submitted preferences, will
produce the matching marked by 〈·〉. Ultimately, firm 1 is better off because firm 1 is
matched with worker 1 rather than worker 2.
However, whichever preference list firm 1 submits, the firm will not be matched with
worker 3. The pair (f3, w3) would otherwise block the matching. For instance, if f1 declares
that only w3 is acceptable, then the only stable matching matches f2 with w2, and f3 with
w3, and firm 1 will remain unmatched. More broadly, whenever a stable matching mech-
anism is applied, participants cannot be matched with a partner who is strictly preferred
to all stable matching partners with respect to the initial preferences (Demange, Gale, and
Sotomayor, 1987). Since participants are guaranteed to be matched with one of their stable
matching partners, the gain from manipulation is bounded by the difference between the
most and the least preferred stable matching partners. Based on the above observation, we
mainly focus on the difference between the most and the least preferred stable matching
partners.
1.1.3 Outline of the Paper
Prior to describing the model in detail, we briefly discuss the outline of the model, our main
results, and the key idea behind the proof.
We consider a sequence of one-to-one matching markets, each of which has n firms
and n workers. Preferences of firms over workers, or of workers over firms are generated
by utilities, which are randomly drawn from some underlying distributions on R+.5 We
formulate utilities as the weighted sum of a common-value component and an independent
private-value component. That is, when a firm f is matched with a worker w, the firm
receives
Uf,w = λU
o
w + (1− λ) ζf,w (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1),
where Uow is the intrinsic value of w, which is common to all firms, and ζf,w is w’s value as
independently evaluated by firm f . In other words, any firm that is matched with a worker
w receives the same common-value of the worker w, but receives distinct private-value of
5 The only restrictions on distributions are bounded supports and some continuity conditions.
6the worker w. We similarly define the utilities of workers.
The common-value component introduces a commonality of preferences, which is preva-
lent in real matching markets. In the entry-level labor market for doctors, for instance,
the US News and World Report’s annual rankings are often referred to as a guideline to
the best hospitals. We also consider the pure private-value model (λ = 0) for theoretical
reasons. In matching theory, commonality drives the uniqueness of stable matchings (Eeck-
hout, 2000; Clark, 2006), a situation in which no agent has an incentive to manipulate a
stable matching mechanism (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). If a preference profile has several
stable matchings, commonality of preferences leads to smaller differences in utilities from
stable matchings (Samet, 2011), so agents have less of an incentive to manipulate a stable
matching mechanism. By including the pure private-value case in our model, we show that
commonality may be beneficial, but is not necessary for incentive compatibility of stable
matching mechanisms.
The main finding of the paper is that while agents in a large market typically have
multiple stable partners, most agents are close to being indifferent among the all stable
matching partners (Theorem 1).6 We observed in the motivating example that when a
stable matching mechanism is applied, the best an agent can achieve (by misrepresenting
her preferences) is matching with her best stable matching partner with regard to the true
preferences (Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor, 1987). As such, our main finding implies
that when a stable matching mechanism is applied and all other agents reveal their true
preferences, the expected proportion of agents who have an incentive to manipulate the
mechanism vanishes as the market becomes large.
Furthermore, we identify an -Nash equilibrium in which most participants report their
true preferences.7 In a large market, a small proportion of agents may still have large in-
centives to manipulate a stable matching mechanism. Under the identified equilibrium, we
6 The main theorem seems quite consistent with observations from real market applications. Pathak and
So¨nmez (2008) collect the data of students’ preferences over schools in the new Boston school choice program,
and show that the real market tends to have a very small number of stable matchings. (The preference data
is reliable as truthfully revealing their preferences is a dominant strategy for students.) Both suggest that
large matching markets tend to have small cores. In our theory of one-to-one matchings, we find small
differences in utilities from stable matchings, whereas in the data from a many-to-one matching market,
there is a small number of stable matchings.
7Under an -Nash equilibrium, agents are approximately best responding to other agents’ strategies such
that no one can gain more than  by switching to an alternative strategy.
7let those agents with significant incentives to manipulate do misrepresent their preferences.
Nevertheless, the rest of participants still have no incentive to respond to such manipula-
tions. More precisely, we show that for any  > 0 with high probability a large market has
an -Nash equilibrium in which most participants reveal their true preferences (Corollary 2).
From a methodological standpoint, our paper is the first to introduce techniques from
random bipartite graph theory to matching models. To prove the main theorem, we basically
need to count the number of firms and workers satisfying certain conditions. The theory
of random bipartite graphs provides techniques to count the likely numbers of firms and
workers satisfying the specified conditions. More precisely, we draw a graph with a set of
firms and workers whose common-values are above certain levels. We join each firm-worker
pair by an edge if one of their independent private-values is significantly lower than the
upper bound of the support. It turns out that every firm-worker pair where both the firm
and the worker fail to achieve certain threshold levels of utility in a stable matching must
be joined by an edge. Their private-values would otherwise both be so high that they would
prefer each other to their current partners, and thus block the stable matching. For each
realized graph, we consider the bi-partitioned subset of nodes, i.e. firms and workers, such
that every pair of nodes, one from each partition, is joined by an edge. It is known that the
possibility of having a relatively large such subset of nodes ultimately becomes infinitesimal
as the initial set of nodes becomes large (Dawande, Keskinocak, Swaminathan, and Tayur,
2001). That is, in terms of the matching model, the set of firms and workers, whose common-
values are high but who fail to achieve high levels of utility, will remain relatively small as
the market becomes large.
This paper mainly focuses on the case of complete information, in which all participants
are aware of all other agents’ preferences. Nevertheless, we can extrapolate its findings
to a market with incomplete information, in which each agent is partially informed about
other agents’ preferences. Various setups are conceivable: an agent may know (i) only
her own utilities from matching with agents on the other side; (ii) her own utilities and
common-values from matching with agents on the other side; (iii) her own utilities, common-
values from matching with agents on the other side, and her own common-value to agents
8matching with her; or (iv) her own utilities and all agents’ common-values. Regardless of the
information structure, the key finding from the complete information case still holds with
incomplete information. That is, most agents are ex-ante close to being indifferent among
all stable matchings in a large market (Theorem 4). This is because with high probability
agents are close to being indifferent among realized stable matching partners, which is this
study’s key finding in the context of complete information.
However, we do not find an equilibrium corresponding to the -Nash equilibrium under
complete information. If some agents manipulate a stable matching mechanism based on
the expected utility gain from manipulation, they may become worse off afterwards. This
may, in turn, expand the differences between utilities generated by stable matchings to other
agents. Consequently, other agents may misrepresent their preferences as a best response
to the manipulation.
1.1.4 Related Literature
Strategic manipulability has been a major concern in market design. Hence, a number of
studies have addressed the incentives to manipulate a stable matching mechanism (Roth and
Peranson, 1999; Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005; Kojima and Pathak, 2009). These studies
consider a particular stable matching mechanism, the worker-proposing Gale-Shapley algo-
rithm, which implements a stable matching favorable to workers. As truthfully revealing
their preferences is a dominant strategy for workers in this mechanism (Roth, 1982; Dubins
and Freedman, 1981), the papers focus on firms’ incentives to misrepresent their preferences.
Unlike the current paper, these studies assume that firms will manipulate a mechanism
regardless of how much benefit the firms can obtain by so doing. In particular, a firm has
no incentive to misrepresent its preferences if and only if it has a unique stable matching
partner (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990). Thus, the primary goal is to find conditions on a
preference profile in which most firms have a unique stable matching partner. As Roth
and Peranson (1999) also point out, a crucial assumption is that agents on one side (say
workers) consider only up to a fixed number of agents on the other side acceptable, even
when the market size has become large. Under this assumption, Roth and Peranson, based
9on a computational analysis, show that the proportion of firms who have more than one
stable matching partner converges to zero as the market becomes large. This convergence
is theoretically proven by Immorlica and Mahdian and extended to the case of many-to-one
matchings by Kojima and Pathak.
The main advantage of our approach is that we obtain non-manipulability of stable
matching mechanisms as a pure property of market size, without resorting to the assumption
of limited acceptability. In fact, the assumption of limited acceptability may lead to large
market models that do not match basic features of real applications. Even with a weak
commonality of preferences, the proportion of firms who are accepted by at least some
workers may become small as the market becomes large. In this case, most firms do have a
unique stable matching partner, but quite often the unique stable matching partner is only
the firm itself: i.e. a large proportion of agents remain unmatched.
Figure 1.1 presents this phenomenon with simulations in which each worker consid-
ers only up to 30 most preferred firms acceptable. The utility of a firm is defined as
Uf,w = λU
o
w + (1 − λ) ζf,w, and the utility of a worker is similarly defined. The value of
each component is drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Each graph depicts the
proportion of firms (or workers) unmatched in stable matchings averaged over 10 repeti-
tions.8 Even with modest levels of commonality of preferences, the proportion of unmatched
agents in stable matchings increases as the market becomes large. It is worth noting that
these simulations are based on preferences generated, not by the previous studies’ model,
but by our own. Thus, the simulations do not directly represent features of the previous
studies. However, we observe the similar effects of the limited acceptability assumption in
simulations based on the previous studies’ model. We provide additional simulation results
in Appendix A.5.
Another strand of literature on large matching markets considers a market where a finite
number of firms are matched with a continuum of workers (Azevedo and Leshno, 2011). It
is shown that generically each market has a unique stable matching, to which the set of
stable matchings in markets with large discrete workers converges. Based on this model,
8 Given a preference profile, the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings (McVitie
and Wilson, 1970).
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Figure 1.1: Proportion of agents unmatched in stable matchings.
Azevedo (2010) studies firms’ incentives to manipulate capacities to hire workers. The paper
also compares welfare effects between situations where each firm pays its employees equally
(uniform wages) and those where each firm may pay different wages to different workers
(personalized wages). While previous studies with fixed capacities suggest that a uniform
wage may induce inefficient matching and compress workers’ wages (Bulow and Levin, 2006;
Crawford, 2008), if firms can manipulate their capacities, the uniform wage may produce
higher welfare as they cause less capacity reduction.
The large market approach is not limited to the standard matching model. Ashlagi,
Braverman, and Hassidim (2011) and Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010), for instance, de-
velop models of large matching markets with couples. When couples are present, notwith-
standing the concerns about strategic manipulation, a market does not necessarily have a
stable matching (Roth, 1984). These studies show that the probability that a market with
couples contains a stable matching converges to one as the market becomes large. Moreover,
when a mechanism produces a stable matching with high probability, it is an approximate
equilibrium for all participants to submit their true preferences. The results are based on
the condition that the number of couples grows slower than the market size, with some
additional regularity conditions.9
9 Ashlagi, Braverman, and Hassidim (2011) considers a market where the number of positions offered
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In the assignment problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents, Kojima
and Manea (2010) study incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia
and Moulin, 2001). The probabilistic serial mechanism is proposed as a mechanism that
improves the ex-ante efficiency of the random priority mechanism: All agents have higher
chances of obtaining more preferred objects by using the probabilistic serial mechanism.
However, while the random priority mechanism is strategy-proof, the probabilistic serial
mechanism is not. Kojima and Manea show that for a fixed set of object types and an
agent with a given utility function, if there is a sufficiently large number of copies of each
object type, then reporting true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for the agent.10
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we introduce our model
– a sequence of matching markets with random utilities. In Section 1.3, we state the main
theorem informally and then formally, and find an equilibrium behavior which may reconcile
the conflicting features of stable matching mechanisms. In Section 1.4, we illustrate the
intuition of the proof using a random bipartite graph model. In Section 1.5, we study a
market with incomplete information. The conclusion of the paper is provided in Section 1.6.
All detailed proofs and simulation results are relegated to the appendix, which also includes
definitions and related theorems of asymptotic statistics. Lastly, we extend the model to
various directions in Appendix A.6.
1.2 Model
The model is based on the standard one-to-one matching model. We introduce latent
utilities, which in turn generate ordinal preferences.
by firms exceeds the number of workers. Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010) inherits the assumption from
Kojima and Pathak (2009) that agents on one side consider only up to a fixed number of agents on the other
side acceptable.
10 Che and Kojima (2010) show that the random assignments in the two mechanisms converge to each
other as the number of copies of each object type goes to infinity. More generally, Liu and Pycia (2011)
show that, including the two mechanisms, all sensible and asymptotically symmetric, strategy-proof, and
ordinal efficient allocation mechanisms coincide asymptotically.
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1.2.1 Standard Two-sided Matching Model (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990)
There are n firms and an equal number of workers. We denote the set of firms by F and
the set of workers by W . Each firm has a strict preference list f such as
f= w1, w2, w3, f, . . . , w4.
This preference list indicates that w1 is firm f ’s first choice, w2 is the second choice, and
that w3 is the least preferred worker that the firm still wants to hire. We also write w f w′
to mean that f prefers w to w′. We call a worker w acceptable to f if w f f , otherwise
we call the worker unacceptable. We define w similarly for each w ∈ W , and call
:= ((f )f∈F , (w)w∈W ) a preference profile.
A matching µ is a function from the set F ∪W onto itself such that (i) µ2(x) = x,
(ii) if µ(f) 6= f then µ(f) ∈ W , and (iii) if µ(w) 6= w then µ(w) ∈ F . We say a matching
µ is individually rational if each firm or worker is matched to an acceptable partner, or
otherwise remains unmatched. For a given matching µ, a pair (f, w) is called a blocking
pair if w f µ(f) and f w µ(w). We say a matching is stable if it is individually rational
and has no blocking pair.
For two stable matchings µ and µ′, we write µ i µ′ if an agent i weakly prefers µ to
µ′: i.e. µ(i) i µ′(i) or µ(i) = µ′(i). We also write µ F µ′ if every firm weakly prefers
µ to µ′: i.e µ(f) f µ′(f) for every f ∈ F . Similarly, we write µ W µ′ if every worker
weakly prefers µ to µ′: i.e. µ(w) w µ′(w) for every w ∈ W . A stable matching µF is
firm-optimal if every firm weakly prefers it to any other stable matching µ: i.e. µF F µ.
Similarly, a stable matching µW is worker-optimal if every worker weakly prefers it to
any other stable matching µ: i.e. µW W µ. It is known that every market instance has
a firm-optimal stable matching µF and a worker-optimal stable matching µW (Gale and
Shapley, 1962): i.e. for any stable matching µ, we have µF F µ and µW W µ. Moreover
if µ and µ′ are both stable matchings, then µ F µ′ if and only if µ′ W µ (Knuth, 1976).
Thus for any stable matching µ, it must be the case that µ F µW and µ W µF .
With some abuse of notation, we let µ denote a function 7−→ µ() from the set of
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all preference profiles to the set of all matchings. We call the function µ a matching
mechanism, and say that a mechanism µ is stable if µ() is a stable matching with
respect to preference profile . We also let µF and µW denote firm-optimal and worker-
optimal stable matching mechanisms. A matching mechanism induces a game in which each
agent i ∈ F ∪W states her preference list i. If for all i and −i,
µ(∗i ,−i) i µ(i,−i),
then we call ∗i a dominant strategy for the agent i. A mechanism µ is called strategy-
proof if it is a dominant strategy for every agent to state her true preference list.
1.2.2 Random Utilities
In order to measure incentives to manipulate a stable matching mechanism, we assume that
preferences are induced by underlying utilities. Moreover, in order to measure likely incen-
tives, we assume that the utilities are drawn from some underlying probability distributions.
We represent utilities by n × n random matrices U = [Uf,w] and V = [Vf,w]. When a
firm f and a worker w match with one another, the firm f receives utility Uf,w and the
worker w receives utility Vf,w. We let u and v denote realized matrices of U and V . For
each pair (f, w), utilities are defined as
Uf,w = λ U
o
w + (1− λ) ζf,w and
Vf,w = λ V
o
f + (1− λ) ηf,w (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1).
We call Uow and V
o
f common-values, and ζf,w and ηf,w independent private-values.
Common-values are defined as random vectors
Uo := 〈Uow〉w∈W and V o := 〈V of 〉f∈F .
Each Uow and V
o
f are drawn from distributions with positive density functions and with
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bounded supports in R+. Independent private-values are defined as n×n random matrices
ζ := [ζf,w] and η := [ηf,w].
Each ζf,w and ηf,w are randomly drawn from continuous distributions with bounded sup-
ports in R+.11 We assume that the utility of remaining unmatched is equal to 0.12
A random market is defined as a tuple 〈F,W,U, V 〉, and a market instance is denoted by
〈F,W, u, v〉. Each firm f receives distinct utilities from different workers with probability
1. Thus for each 〈F,W, u, v〉, we can derive a strict preference list f as
f= w,w′, . . . , w′′
if and only if
uf,w > uf,w′ > · · · > uf,w′′ .
We study properties of stable matchings in a sequence of random markets 〈Fn,Wn, Un, Vn〉∞n=1.
The index n will be omitted whenever to do so does not lead to confusion.
The model includes both cases of a commonality of preferences (λ > 0) and pure private-
values (λ = 0). The common-values introduce a commonality of preferences among firms
over workers, and among workers over firms. When λ > 0, firms with high level of common-
values tend to be ranked higher by workers, and vice versa. If λ = 0, all utilities are i.i.d,
so a firm’s ordering of workers are equally likely to be any permutation from the set of all
permutations of n workers. Similarly, a worker’s ordering of firms are equally likely to be
any permutation from the set of all permutations of n firms.
In practice, commonality of preferences is prevalent. In the NRMP, some hospitals are
considered prestigious and some doctors are considered very well-qualified. The common-
value component provides a way of taking into account such commonality of preferences,
while retaining the tractability of the model.
11 In general (λ > 0), we can relax this assumption so that each pair of ζf,w and ηf,w is jointly drawn from
a continuous joint distribution with a bounded support in R2+. In this setup, we can introduce a correlation
between firms’ preferences over workers and workers’ preferences over firms.
12 In terms of preferences induced by utilities, this assumption implies that all workers are acceptable to
firms, and all firms are acceptable to workers.
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Although the pure private-value case (λ = 0) hardly represents any real application,
it is theoretically valuable to include it in our model. Commonality drives the uniqueness
of stable matchings (Eeckhout, 2000; Clark, 2006), a condition in which no agent has an
incentive to misrepresent her preferences in a stable matching mechanism (Roth and So-
tomayor, 1990). Samet (2011) also proposes commonality as a source establishing a small
core: the small difference between utilities from the stable matchings favorable to firms, and
to workers. By including the pure private-value case in our model, we can highlight that
non-manipulability of stable matching mechanisms is a property solely derived from market
size. Commonality may contribute to, but is not necessary for, incentive compatibility of
stable matching mechanisms.13
1.3 Main Results
We informally state the main theorem, and then restate it with formal expressions. Later,
we find an equilibrium behavior of a game induced by a stable matching mechanism in
which most agents reveal their true preferences.
1.3.1 Stable Matchings in Large Markets
We first show that, while agents in a large market typically have multiple stable matching
partners, most agents are close to being indifferent among the stable matching partners.
Theorem For every  > 0, the expected proportion of firms (and workers) who have less
than  differences between utilities from µF and µW , converges to one as the market becomes
large.
Corollary For any positive cost of misrepresenting preferences, if other agents truthfully
reveal their preferences, the expected proportion of agents who have no incentive to manip-
ulate a stable matching mechanism converges to one as the market becomes large.
13 When preferences have a strong commonality, a stable matching mechanism may have a higher chance
to fail by unraveling instead of strategic preference misrepresentation (Halaburda, 2010). In any case, our
model includes all degrees of commonality of preferences.
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It has been known that no stable matching mechanism is strategy-proof (Roth, 1982).
For instance, when the worker-optimal matching mechanism (e.g. worker-proposing Gale-
Shapley algorithm) is applied, although it is a dominant strategy for every worker to state
her true preference list (Roth, 1982; Dubins and Freedman, 1981), there might be a firm
which can become better off by misrepresenting its preference list. Noting that a matching
mechanism is defined over all possible preference profiles, we may expect that a stable
matching mechanism is not manipulable in most cases of preference profiles. Unfortunately,
though, it turns out that whenever there is more than one stable matching, at least one
agent can profitably misrepresent her preferences (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990), and the
condition of a preference profile containing a unique stable matching seems to be quite
restrictive (Eeckhout, 2000; Clark, 2006).
However, the gain by manipulation is bounded even when agents form a coalition and
coordinate the members’ strategic behavior. Not all firms in the coalition will prefer the
new matching outcome to the firm-optimal stable matching with respect to the true pref-
erences, and not all workers in the coalition will prefer the new matching outcome to the
worker-optimal stable matching with respect to the true preferences (Demange, Gale, and
Sotomayor, 1987). Formally, let  be a true preference profile, and let ′ differ from 
in that some coalition S of firms and workers misstate their preferences. Then, there is
no matching, stable under ′, which is strictly preferred to every stable matching under
 by all members of S. If a coalition consists of a single firm, then the best the firm can
achieve is matching with the firm-optimal stable matching partner with respect to the true
preferences. Likewise, the best a worker can achieve is matching with the worker-optimal
stable matching partner. Since every firm and worker is guaranteed to be matched with a
stable matching partner without any strategic manipulation, the gain by manipulation is
bounded by the difference between utilities from the firm-optimal and the worker-optimal
stable matching partners.
As such, the main theorem implies that agents in a large market are most likely to have
only a slight utility gain by misrepresenting their preferences, given that all other agents
reveal their true preferences. For any given cost of misrepresenting preferences, if a market
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is large, participants are most likely to find no incentive to manipulate a stable matching
mechanism.
In order to see whether a real market is large enough to mitigate incentives to manipulate
stable matching mechanisms, we simulate our model with a market size of 26,000, roughly
the same size of the NRMP in 2011.14 We generate firms’ and workers’ utilities from
common-values and independent private-values, each of which is randomly drawn from the
uniform distribution over [0, 1]. Table 1.3 presents the proportion of firms whose differences
in utilities generated by stable matchings are less than 0.05 (upper table) and 0.01 (lower
table). The results show that for reasonable degrees of commonality of preferences, the size
of the NRMP is large enough such that most agents would not have a significant incentive
to manipulate a stable matching mechanism.
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Result 1 97.41% 98.83% 99.39% 99.93%
Result 2 97.44% 98.79% 99.42% 99.92%
Result 3 97.43% 98.67% 99.47% 99.95%
(Differences in utilities < 0.05)
λ 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Result 1 92.84% 96.64% 98.00% 99.44%
Result 2 93.04% 96.70% 98.10% 99.32%
Result 3 92.91% 96.52% 98.28% 99.48%
(Differences in utilities < 0.01)
Table 1.3: Proportions of firms with small differences in utilities (n=26,000)
Formal Statement Given a market instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and a matching µ, we let uµ(·)
and vµ(·) denote utilities from the matching outcome: i.e. uµ(f) := uf,µ(f) and vµ(w) :=
vµ(w),w. For each f ∈ F , we define ∆(f ;u, v) as the difference between utilities from firm-
optimal and worker-optimal stable matching outcomes: i.e.
∆(f ;u, v) := uµF (f)− uµW (f).
14 In 2011, there were 30,589 active applicants and 26,158 positions offered by 4,235 programs. See
http://www.nrmp.org/data/resultsanddata2011.pdf and http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/about_res/
impact.html.
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Then, for every  > 0, we have the set of firms whose utilities are within  of one another
for all stable matchings, which is denoted by
AF (;u, v) := {f ∈ F | ∆(f ;u, v) < } .
The previous theorem is an informal statement of the following theorem. We have
similar notations and a theorem for workers, which are omitted here.
Theorem 1. For every  > 0,
E
[∣∣AF (;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 1, as n→∞.
1.3.2 Equilibrium Analysis
Previously, we showed that most agents have no incentive to manipulate a stable matching
mechanism as a market becomes large. However, the result requires the condition that all
other participants reveal their true preferences. This condition is problematic since a small
proportion of agents may still have large incentives to misrepresent their preferences. We
may want to derive incentive compatibility as equilibrium behavior of a game induced by a
stable matching mechanism.
In fact, the main theorem implies that with high probability a large market has a natural
equilibrium in which most agents reveal their true preferences. We first state this finding
as a corollary, and then describe appealing aspects of the equilibrium behavior and the
intuition behind the proof.
Corollary 2. For any , δ, θ > 0, there exists N such that with probability at least (1 − δ)
a market of size n > N has an -Nash equilibrium in which (1 − θ) proportion of agents
reveal their true preferences.
This corollary is based on simple equilibrium behavior. Most agents simply reveal
their true preferences. Agents misrepresenting their preferences use truncation strategies:
an agent submits a preference list of the first k (k < n) in the same order as her true
preference list. Truncations are natural strategies. Agents do not need to carefully devise
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the order of the preference list. In addition, truncation strategies are undominated, or, in
other words, have “a best response property” (Roth and Vande Vate, 1991). If a stable
matching mechanism is applied, for any given submitted preferences by other agents, an
agent always has a best response that is a truncation of her true preference list.15
For each market instance 〈F,W, u, v〉, we consider an -Nash equilibrium in which some
(not necessarily all) agents, who have potential gains from manipulations larger than ,
submit truncations of their true preferences. If there exists a stable matching under the
true preferences remaining individually rational under the announced preferences, then for
all participants the difference between utilities from firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable
matchings decreases. Specifically, let  be a true preference profile and ′ differ from 
in that some coalition of firms and workers misstate their preferences using truncations. If
there exists at least one matching µ stable under  remaining individually rational under
′, then all stable matchings for ′ are also stable under . Thus, truncations by some
agents result in smaller differences in utilities from stable matchings for all participants.
This property follows because truncations do not create additional blocking pairs. If
a matching µ, which is stable under , remains individually rational under ′, then µ is
indeed stable under ′ since no blocking pair has been generated by truncations. Noting
that the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings (McVitie and Wilson
(1970)), all participants are matched in stable matchings under ′.16 Then, any stable
matching µ′ with regard to ′ is also stable under . If (f, w) is a blocking pair of µ′
with respect to , then it would have been a blocking pair of µ′ with respect to ′, which
contradicts that µ′ is stable under ′.
For any preference profile and for any coalition of participants, there exist truncations
by members of the coalition such that at least one stable matching under true preferences
15 Furthermore, when agents do not have complete information about the preference profile, truncation
strategies require less information to manipulate a stable mechanism (Roth and Rothblum, 1999).
16 Here, we use the condition that all participants are matched in stable matchings under . If some
agents are unmatched in stable matchings due to, for instance, unequal populations or unacceptable agents,
we need an additional condition that agents would truncate their preferences only when truncations are
strictly profitable. In particular, if an agent is unmatched in stable matchings under , the agent will
remain unmatched when she truncates her preference list. If these unmatched agents do not truncate their
preference lists, then we obtain the same result: all stable matchings under ′ are stable under , provided
that there exists a stable matching under  remaining individually rational under ′. The proof is easy to
derive, and thus we omit it here.
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remains individually rational, and those who truncate their preferences have no incentive to
truncate further. Then, participants who initially have smaller than  differences in utilities
from stable matchings will have even less differences in utilities from stable matchings under
the announced preferences. Thus, these participants have no incentive to respond to others’
truncations, thereby submitting their true preferences. Lastly, Theorem 1 guarantees that
most participants are the ones revealing their true preferences.17
1.4 Intuition Behind the Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we take distinct approaches for the pure common-value case (λ = 1),
the pure private-value case (λ = 0), and the general cases (0 < λ < 1).
For the pure common-value case (λ = 1), there exists a unique stable matching, so the
theorem follows immediately. A stable matching sorts firms and workers such that a firm
and a worker in the same rank will be matched with one another. Consider the firm-worker
pair with the highest common-values. The pair must be matched in a stable matching. If it
were otherwise, the firm would prefer the worker to its partner and the worker would prefer
the firm to her partner, and thus they would form a blocking pair. By sequentially applying
the same argument to pairs with the next highest common-values, we find that assortative
matching is a unique stable matching.
For the pure private-value case (λ = 0), we still derive the theorem relatively easily from
Pittel (1989). Pittel considers a model that is essentially the same as our pure private-value
model (λ = 0), and analyzes the sum of each firm’s partner’s rank number in the worker-
optimal stable matching.18 When each firm ranks workers in order of preferences (i.e. the
most preferred worker is ranked 1, the next worker is ranked 2, and so on), Pittel shows that
the sum of the rank numbers of firms’ partners in the worker-optimal stable matching is
17 We use an equivalent statement of Theorem 1. Note that |AF (;U, V )|/n is bounded above by 1
with probability 1. By using Theorem A.1.1 and Theorem A.1.2, we shall rewrite Theorem 1, written as
convergence in mean, as the following convergence in probability: for any , δ, θ > 0, there exists N such
that
P
(∣∣AF (;U, V )∣∣
n
> 1− θ
)
> 1− δ, for every n > N.
18 Pittel does not consider utilities, but a model with random preference profiles. As all preference profiles
are equally likely to occur, though, the model is essentially the same as our pure private-value model (λ = 0).
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asymptotically equal to n2 log−1 n. Then, the rank number of each firm is roughly n log−1 n
on average. In turn, as we normalize the rank number by the market size n, the normalized
average rank number is roughly equal to log−1 n, converging to 0. As the private-values are
randomly drawn from distributions with bounded supports, even the worst stable matching
gives utilities asymptotically close to the upper bound. Therefore, all stable matchings yield
only slightly different utilities.
For the general cases (0 < λ < 1), however, the probability distribution over preference
profiles becomes complicated and intractable. Accordingly, we directly analyze the asymp-
totic utilities rather than referring to the corresponding preference rank numbers. Basically,
we want to count participants whose utilities from all stable matchings are slightly different
from each other. We therefore need techniques of counting for which we use the bipartite
graph theory. We interpret the set of firms and workers as a bi-partitioned set of nodes
and draw a graph based on the realized utilities. Then, since the utilities are random, the
theory of random bipartite graphs provides us with techniques to count the likely numbers
of nodes, i.e. firms and workers, meeting specified conditions. Since the theory of ran-
dom bipartite graphs has not been used before in the matching literature, we describe the
techniques in greater depth in the following subsection.
We relegate detailed proofs for the cases of λ = 0 and 0 < λ < 1 to Appendix A.2 and
Appendix A.7, respectively.
1.4.1 A Random Bipartite Graph Model
A graph G is a pair (V,E), where V is a set called nodes and E is a set of unordered
pairs (i, j) or (j, i) of i, j ∈ V called edges. The nodes i and j are called the endpoints
of (i, j). We say that a graph G = (V,E) is bipartite if its node set V can be partitioned
into two disjoint subsets V1 and V2 such that each of its edges has one endpoint in V1 and
the other in V2. A biclique of a bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) is a set of nodes U1 ∪ U2
such that U1 ⊂ V1, U2 ⊂ V2, and for all u1 ∈ U1 and u2 ∈ U2, (u1, u2) ∈ E. In other
words, a biclique is a complete bipartite subgraph of G. We say that a biclique is balanced
if |U1| = |U2|, and refer to a balanced biclique with the maximum number of nodes as a
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maximum balanced biclique.
Given a partitioned set V1 ∪ V2, we consider a random bipartite graph G(V1 ∪ V2, p). A
bipartite graph G = (V1 ∪ V2, E) is constructed so that each pair of nodes, one in V1 and
the other in V2, is included in E independently with probability p. We use the following
theorem in the proof.
Theorem 3 (Dawande, Keskinocak, Swaminathan, and Tayur (2001)). Consider a random
bipartite graph G(V1 ∪ V2, p), where 0 < p < 1 is a constant, |V1| = |V2| = n, and β(n) =
log n/ log 1p . If the maximal balanced biclique of this graph has size B ×B, then
P (β(n) ≤ B ≤ 2β(n))→ 1, as n→∞.
1.4.2 Intuition of the Proof (0 < λ < 1)
Roughly stated, we observe that stable matchings become assortative-like matchings as a
market becomes large: firms with higher common-values become more likely to match with
workers with higher common-values. We illustrate this assortative-like feature of stable
matchings by introducing a 3-tier market. In a 3-tier market, firms and workers are par-
titioned into three tiers, and endowed with tier-specific common-values. Then, most firms
and workers in the same tier are matched with each other in assortative-like stable match-
ings. In this situation, the expected proportion of firms in tier-1, which fail to achieve
high levels of utility converges to 0 as the market becomes large. We demonstrate how to
use techniques from the theory of random bipartite graphs as we prove this observation
formally.
In a 3-tier market, F is partitioned into F1, F2, and F3; and W is partitioned into W1,
W2, and W3. For simplicity, we assume that all tiers are of equal size:
|Fk| = |Wk| = n/3 (k = 1, 2, 3).
If f ∈ Fk and w ∈Wl are matched with one another, then they receive utilities
Uf,w = u
o
l + ζf,w and Vf,w = v
o
k + ηf,w.
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Common-values are uniquely determined by tiers such that
uo1 > u
o
2 > u
o
3 and v
o
1 > v
o
2 > v
o
3.
Private-values, ζf,w and ηf,w, are randomly drawn from uniform distributions over [0, u¯]
and [0, v¯], respectively. In other words, the firm receives tier-specific common-value corre-
sponding to the worker’s tier added to independent private-value, and the worker receives
tier-specific common-value corresponding to the firm’s tier added to independent private-
value. We, without loss of generality, ignore λ and (1−λ) by incorporating the weights into
the tier-specific common-values and the distributions of independent private-values.
We find an asymptotic lower bound on utilities that tier-1 firms receive in a stable
matching mechanism. The lower bound is defined as the level arbitrarily close to the
maximal utility that a firm can achieve by matching with tier-2 workers: i.e. uo2 + u¯ − .
That is, firms in tier-1 achieve high levels of utility by levering on the existence of tier-2
workers. Although not necessarily being matched with tier-2 workers, firms in tier-1 would
otherwise make blocking pairs with workers in tier-2. Formally, we define the set of tier-1
firms that fail to achieve the specified utility level in the worker-optimal stable matching as
F¯ := {f ∈ F1 | uµW (f) ≤ uo2 + u¯− } ,
and show that
E
[ |F¯ |
n/3
]
→ 0, as n→∞.
Given realized private-values, we draw a bipartite graph with the set of firms in tier-1,
and workers in tiers up to 2 (i.e. tier-1 and tier-2) as a bi-partitioned set of nodes (see the
left figure in Figure 1.2). Each pair of f ∈ F1 and w ∈W1 ∪W2 is joined by an edge if and
only if one of their private-values is low:
ζf,w ≤ u¯−  or ηf,w ≤ v¯ − (vo1 − vo2).
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We define the set of workers in tiers up to 2 matched with non tier-1 firms as
W¯ := {w ∈W1 ∪W2 | µW (w) /∈ F1} .
Then, F¯ ∪ W¯ is a biclique: i.e. every firm-worker pair from F¯ and W¯ is joined by an edge
(as illustrated by the right figure in Figure 1.2).
F W
T1
T2
T3
F W
T1
T2
T3
F¯
W¯
Figure 1.2: For each realized utility, we draw a bipartite graph with firms in tier-1 and workers in
tiers up to 2 as the partitioned set of nodes (left). Firms in tier-1 receiving low utilities (F¯ ) and
workers in tiers up to 2 matched with non tier-1 firms (W¯ ) form a biclique (right).
To see why F¯ ∪ W¯ is a biclique, suppose that f ∈ F¯ and w ∈ W¯ are not joined. Since
f ∈ F¯ ,
uµW (f) ≤ uo2 + u¯− .
Since w ∈ W¯ , the worker is not matched with a tier-1 firm, and thus
vµW (w) ≤ vo2 + v¯.
That is, f and w mutually fail to achieve high levels of utility.
On the other hand, since they are not joined by an edge,
ζf,w > u¯−  and ηf,w > v¯ − (vo1 − vo2),
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and therefore
uf,w > u
o
2 + u¯−  and vf,w > vo1 + v¯ − (vo1 − vo2) = vo2 + v¯.
In other words, the firm-worker pair’s private-values are mutually so high that they would
have achieved high utilities by making a blocking pair. This contradicts that µW is a stable
matching.
This construction of a bipartite graph fits into a random bipartite graph model. Given
that the tier-structure specifies a bi-partitioned set of nodes, we draw a bipartite graph
based on the realized private-values. Since the private-values are i.i.d, each firm-worker
pair is joined by an edge independently and with an identical probability. By Theorem 3, if
the bi-partitioned set of nodes has a size on the order of n, and each pair of nodes is joined
by an edge independently with a fixed probability, then the maximum balanced biclique
has a size on the order of log(n) with a sequence of probabilities converging to 1 as n gets
large. In addition, W¯ contains at least n/3 workers, since there are 2n/3 workers in tiers
up to 2, but only n/3 firms in tier-1: i.e. W¯ has a size on the order of n. Therefore, F¯ must
have a size, at most, on the order of log(n) with a sequence of probabilities converging to
1. The biclique F¯ ∪ W¯ would otherwise contain a balanced biclique with a size bigger than
on the order of log(n), violating the Theorem 3. Lastly, E
[ |F¯ |
n/3
]
→ 0 follows immediately
from log(n)/n→ 0.
For the main theorem (without tier structure), we begin the proof by partitioning the
supports of distributions for common-values. Suppose the common-values are drawn from
the uniform distribution over [0, 1]. We partition the unit interval into K subintervals with
equal lengths. Workers and firms are, in turn, grouped into tiers where firms or workers
in the same tier have common-values in the same subinterval. Basically, we continue the
proof as if we have a model with a finite number K of tiers. The tiers, though, need to be
handled with care. This time, because the common-values are random, the tier structure is
random. Moreover, agents in adjacent tiers may have arbitrarily close common-values.
As we increase the number of partitions K, the asymptotic lower bound on the utilities
of firms in tier-k becomes close to the maximal utility achievable by matching with a worker
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in tier-k. With a similar exercise, we find an asymptotic lower bound on utilities of workers
in each tier. Then, workers in tiers significantly higher than k are most likely to match with
firms in tiers higher than k. This assortative-like feature of stable matchings induces an
asymptotic upper bound on utilities of tier-k firms. As we finely partition the supports of
the distributions of common-values, the differences in the common-values of firms or workers
in similar tiers become slightly distinct from each other. Therefore, the asymptotic upper
bound on utilities of firms in tier-k also becomes close to the maximal utility achievable by
matching with a worker in tier-k. That is, we can find an asymptotic lower bound and an
asymptotic upper bound, which are arbitrarily close to each other.
1.5 Market with Incomplete Information
We have so far considered a market with complete information. Agents are assumed to
be able to assess the exact gain by misrepresenting preferences. It is a strong assumption,
especially when we consider large markets. More realistically, we may want to consider
a market with incomplete information, where each agent is only partially informed about
the preferences of other participants. Nevertheless, we have mainly focused on the case of
complete information since we can extrapolate its findings to show that the incentive to
misrepresent preferences vanishes under incomplete information.
In relaxing the complete information assumption, we may consider various information
structures. Each agent may know only the probability distributions in addition to either (i)
her own utilities; (ii) her own utilities and the common-values of the other side; (iii) her own
utilities, the common-values of the other side, and her own common-value evaluated by the
other side; or (iv) her own utilities and all agents’ common-values. The following results
in the context of incomplete information correspond to the main theorem and its direct
corollary for the model with complete information. As before, we first state the theorem
informally, and then restate it with formal expressions.
Theorem Regardless of information structure and for every  > 0, the expected proportion
of firms (and workers) who have less than  expected differences between utilities from µF
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and µW , converges to one as the market becomes large.
Corollary For any positive cost of misrepresenting preferences, if other agents truthfully
reveal their preferences, the expected proportion of agents who have no incentive to manip-
ulate a stable matching mechanism converges to one as the market becomes large.
The intuition behind the theorem is clear. An expectation is a convex combination of
all realizations. The expected difference between utilities from firm-optimal and worker-
optimal stable matchings under incomplete information is simply a convex combination
of the differences between utilities from the two stable matchings in all realized market
instances. The differences between utilities are most likely to be insignificant (Theorem 1).
Therefore, the expected difference in utilities is most likely to be negligible as well. We
relegate the detailed proofs to Appendix A.4.
There are two advantages of showing the result in the context of complete information
first, and then deriving the same result in the context of incomplete information. First,
the results are robust to the information structure. The intuition of showing the results
with incomplete information by using convex combinations remains valid regardless of the
details of the information structure. Secondly, we can stress that non-manipulability of
stable matching mechanisms is a property of the two-sided matching market itself, rather
than stemming from insufficient information to manipulate the mechanism. Even when an
agent can obtain complete knowledge of a preference profile at a small cost, it is not worth
incurring that cost since the gain from manipulation will be small.
Formal Statement Let Πf denote what f knows about a preference profile, and let pif
denote its realization. Then, the various incomplete information structures are denoted by
(i) Πf = 〈Uf,w〉w∈W ; (ii) Πf = 〈Uf,w, Uow〉w∈W ; (iii) Πf = 〈Uf,w, Uow〉w∈W ∪ {V of }; and (iv)
Πf = 〈Uf,w, Uow〉w∈W ∪〈V of ′〉f ′∈F . Given a market instance 〈F,W, u, v〉, we define ∆E(f ;u, v)
as the expected difference between utilities from firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable
matchings conditioned on pif . That is,
∆E(f ;u, v) := EU,V [uµF (f)− uµW (f) | pif ] ,
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where the expectation is applied to firm-optimal and worker-optimal stable matchings. For
every  > 0, we correspondingly have the set of firms, whose expected differences in utilities
from all stable matchings are less than , which is denoted by
AFE(;u, v) := {f ∈ F | ∆E(f ;u, v) < } .
The previous theorem is an informal statement of the following theorem. We have
similar notations and a theorem for workers, which are omitted here.
Theorem 4. For any given information structure and for every  > 0,
E
[∣∣AFE(;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 1, as n→∞.
Equilibrium Analysis Unfortunately, we do not obtain an equilibrium corresponding to
the -Nash equilibrium in the context of complete information by using convex combinations.
The obstacle to obtaining an equilibrium is that truncations by some agents may increase
the differences in utilities generated by stable matchings for other participants. When
preferences are known to all participants, truncations can preserve a stable matching under
true preferences as individually rational under the announced preferences. The following
example shows that this condition is necessary for truncations by some agents to decrease
the differences in utilities from stable matchings for other participants.
f1: 〈w1〉  w2  w3
f2: 〈w2〉  w3  w1
f3: w1  w2  〈w3〉
f1: 〈w1〉  [w2]  w3
f2: 〈w2〉  w3  [w1]
f3: w1  w2
,
w1: f2  〈f1〉  f3
w2: f1  〈f2〉  f3
w3: f1  f2  〈f3〉
w1: [f2]  〈f1〉  f3
w2: [f1]  〈f2〉  f3
w3: f1
Table 1.4: True preferences (upper) and their truncations (lower).
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Table 1.4 lists true preferences of firms and workers (upper tables) and their truncations
(lower tables). In the example, there is a unique stable matching (marked by 〈·〉) under
the true preferences. When f3 and w3 truncate their preferences, however, there are two
stable matchings (marked by 〈·〉 and [·]). If some agents announce that all stable matching
partners are unacceptable, other agents may have larger differences in utilities from all
stable matchings.
Given incomplete information of a preference profile, an agent may submit a truncation
of her true preference list based on the expected utility gain by manipulation. She may then
remain unmatched afterwords depending on the realized preference profile. In this case,
truncations may expand differences in utilities from stable matchings of other participants.
Although most agents initially have small differences in utilities from stable matchings,
participants may want to misrepresent their preferences as a best response to other agents’
truncations.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates an asymptotic similarity of stable matchings as the number of
participants becomes large. Our measure of similarity is based on utilities, by which ordinal
preferences are determined. As the utilities are drawn from some underlying probability
distributions, one can analyze the likely differences in utilities from all stable matchings. We
show that the expected proportion of firms and workers who are close to being indifferent
among all stable partners converges to one as the market becomes large.
The result also implies that the expected proportion of agents who have a significant
incentive to manipulate the mechanism vanishes in large markets. This is because the gain
from manipulation of a stable matching mechanism is bounded above by the difference be-
tween utilities from the firm-optimal and the worker-optimal stable matchings. In addition,
we show that with high probability a large market has an -Nash equilibrium in which most
agents reveal their true preferences. We prove our results using techniques from the theory
of random bipartite graphs, which is a new approach in the matching literature.
This paper is one of many recent studies exploring how the popularly used matching
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mechanisms really work in practice. It is essential to have a better understanding of stable
matching mechanisms as market design applications expand from the NRMP and the School
Choice Programs to many other markets, including dental residencies, various medical spe-
cialty matching programs, and labor markets for law clerks. Of particular relevance here is
the fact that market designers are hoping to investigate the desirability of a clearinghouse
in the market for economics Ph.D.s (Coles, Cawley, Levine, Niederle, Roth, and Siegfried,
2010). As such, understanding stable matching mechanisms in real applications becomes
not only a market designers’ question in theory, but is of concrete interest for economists
in general.
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Chapter 2
Plea Bargaining: On The Selection
of Jury Trials
2.1 Overview
2.1.1 Introduction
Plea bargaining is a pre-trial stage in which a defendant is allowed to plead guilty. Consid-
ering what he would receive if he was convicted after a jury trial, a defendant pleads guilty
primarily in exchange for a lesser charge.1 Plea bargaining is prevalent in U.S. criminal
court. Amongst the 89.7% convictions out of 83,391 cases in federal courts in 2004, 96%
were achieved through plea bargaining, and the rate increased from 87% in 1990 to 96% in
2004 for felony offenses.2
The fact that the vast majority of cases end in plea bargaining may lead one to suspect
that trials are not important. The current paper certifies that such a conclusion is inaccu-
rate; plea bargaining and jury trials closely interact with each other. Innocent defendants
have less incentive to plead guilty, and jurors incorporate this selection bias into their ver-
dict. Conversely, although most cases are settled before jury trials begin, participants in
plea bargains anticipate possible outcomes of jury trials in the event that they fail to reach
an agreement. In this sense, the primary role of a jury trial is to allocate bargaining power
to participants in the plea bargain.3
1 In this paper, prosecutors and defendants are all referred to as male, and jurors are all referred to as
female.
2 See Table 4.2 in Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2004, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau
of Justice Statistics, available online at: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cfjs04.pdf.
3 Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) call this effect, “Bargaining in the shadow of the law.”
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The interaction between plea bargaining and a jury trial is a challenging issue for legal
scholars who want to evaluate various institutions in a criminal court system. A model
of either plea bargaining or a jury trial often fails to capture the real dynamics; when
defendants and prosecutors actively participate in pre-trial stages, the implications of a
jury trial model may not be directly applicable to the entire court process. Similarly,
a separate empirical analysis undertakes endogeneity problems. Cases in jury trials, for
instance, may tell us how the jury delivers verdicts for those cases, but they are silent on
how institutional changes in the trial affect the cases going to trial.4
The current paper, building on the standard strategic voting model, develops a model of
the criminal court process unifying plea bargaining and a jury trial. We first show that plea
bargaining influences the jurors’ (identical) belief about the proportion of guilty defendants,
and consequently jurors may vote as if they have the prosecutor’s preferences. Based on
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), we also study different voting institutions in trial stage,
and find that inferiority of the unanimity rule persists with the addition of plea bargaining.
In detail, a judicial process starts with a prosecutor indicting a defendant, who is either
guilty or innocent with equal ex-ante probabilities. Given the level of just punishment for the
charge, the prosecutor initiates a plea bargain by making a take-it-or-leave-it punishment
offer to the defendant. If the defendant pleads guilty, then the case terminates with the
offered punishment; otherwise, a jury trial follows. In a jury trial, each juror receives
either a guilty or an innocent private signal during the testimonies, and votes either for
conviction or acquittal. If a super-majority of jurors vote for conviction (such as two-thirds
majority), the jury returns a verdict of guilty, and the defendant receives the original just
punishment; otherwise, the jury acquits the defendant. The prosecutor and jurors have
distinct preferences over mistakenly delivered (or undelivered) punishments to innocent
defendants (or guilty defendants).5
We first show that, by internalizing plea bargaining into their belief, jurors may vote
4 Priest and Klein (1984) first raise such challenges in the context of civil court.
5 In this paper, a prosecutor may not single-mindedly pursue convictions, ignoring possible convictions of
innocent defendants. Instead, we consider how different prosecutor’s preferences affect court performance.
This assumption is justified on realistic grounds. In practice, mismanaged cases may later become public,
and such exposure will affect a prosecutor’s future career. Even a self-interested prosecutor will be concerned
with false prosecutions.
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as if they have the prosecutor’s preferences. While the prosecutor controls the punishment
level of guilty pleas, the optimal level is ultimately determined by how it will influence
jurors’ behavior. This is because the ex-ante punishment levels (i.e. the expected punish-
ment level upon pleading guilty) are eventually determined in equilibrium by the conviction
probabilities in the jury trial.
To see the intuition, consider the following lines of reasoning. If the plea bargain offer
is acceptable for the ‘guilty’ defendants, compared to the jury trial outcome, guilty defen-
dants will plead guilty. Jurors subsequently update their belief, accounting for the lower
proportion of guilty defendants arriving at jury trials. Accordingly, conviction probabilities
are lowered, and this feeds back to plea bargaining. The previously acceptable offer will
become un-acceptable for ‘guilty’ defendants. On the other hand, if the bargain offer is
un-acceptable, the opposite story follows. ‘Guilty’ defendants will plead not guilty. As the
jurors believe that a higher proportion of defendants who come to trial are guilty, the jurors
tend to vote for conviction. When this occurs, the bargain offer, previously unacceptable,
becomes now acceptable for the ‘guilty’ defendants. Thus, in equilibrium guilty defendants
will be indifferent between receiving a guilty plea punishment or undergoing a jury trial.
As a result, the ex-ante punishment for ‘guilty’ defendants will be equal to the expected
punishment in a jury trial. Meanwhile, ‘innocent’ defendants are less likely to be convicted
in trial than guilty defendants. When guilty defendants are indifferent between pleading
guilty and not guilty, ‘innocent’ defendants are better off pleading not guilty and going to
trial. Consequently, the ex-ante punishment for innocent defendants is also determined by
the conviction probabilities in the jury trial.
The prosecutor chooses a plea offer such that its effects on jurors’ beliefs render the ideal
levels of conviction probabilities. The prosecutor cannot force a particular voting behavior
on jurors, who will be best responding. Instead, the jurors’ voting behavior that is ideal
for the prosecutor will be induced when the jurors’ preference combined with the altered
belief coincide with the prosecutor’s preference. For instance, suppose the prosecutor cares
more than the jurors about mistakenly delivering punishment to innocent defendants. As
the prosecutor lowers guilty plea charges, a higher proportion of guilty defendants plead
34
guilty, and a defendant in a jury trial is more likely to be innocent. Consequently, jurors
are more careful when voting to avoid mistakes of convicting innocent defendants, and the
influenced jurors’ behavior follows the prosecutor’s preference.
However, such influence is possible only in one direction: leading jurors to vote more
frequently for acquittal. Because guilty defendants are more likely to take the bargain offer,
plea bargaining can only decrease the proportion of guilty defendants in trial. When the
prosecutor cares less about convicting innocent defendants, and is more averse to acquitting
guilty defendants, plea bargaining is of no use to the prosecutor.
The combined model of plea bargaining and a jury trial allows us to re-examine some
of the implications derived from the classical strategic voting literature. In particular,
we revisit the comparison of two voting mechanisms, the unanimity rule and arbitrary
super-majority rules, which are studied in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). Feddersen
and Pesendorfer find that the unanimity rule is inferior in terms of the probabilities of
convicting innocent defendants and acquitting guilty defendants. If the rule is unanimous,
the probabilities do not vanish as the number of jurors grows, whereas the probabilities
vanish under any non-unanimous rule. The results in our paper suggest that jurors’ voting
behavior resembles the voting behavior in the separate jury model, though it may reflect
the prosecutor’s preference. Therefore, from the viewpoint of expected punishments either
by plea bargaining or a jury trial, inferiority of the unanimity rule persists with the addition
of plea bargaining.
Note that the game proposed in this paper is effectively that of signaling. While previous
literature mainly views plea bargaining as an instrument to save trial costs (see Grossman
and Katz (1983); Reinganum (1988)), we intentionally ignore all costs in order to highlight
the signaling effect.6 A defendant, as a sender, signals his type by pleading either guilty
or not guilty. Afterwards the jurors, as receivers, update their belief on the sender’s type
and determine conviction probabilities. From the prosecutor’s viewpoint, plea bargaining
allows the court to screen out some guilty defendants before going to a jury trial. Since the
accused know whether they are guilty, plea bargaining serves as a self-selection mechanism.
6 Not only are explicit costs such as time and effort excluded, we also assume that prosecutors and
defendants are risk neutral. They bear no cost of uncertainty from a jury verdict.
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As such, plea bargaining may contribute to the accuracy of the jury trial, on which the
entire court process hinges.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Priest and Klein (1984) is one of the studies closest to our paper, as they clarify the relation-
ship between litigation behavior and jurors’ behavior in the jury trial. The set of disputes
settled and the set litigated are not necessarily the same. Their important assumption is
that the potential litigants produce rational estimates of the likely decision by affecting
the belief of the jurors. As in our paper, Priest and Klein consider interactions between
the pre-trial process and the jury trial. However, while Priest and Klein informally model
how biased jurors’ belief affects the jury decision, we explicitly capture the dynamic by
employing a strategic voting model.
Collective decision-making under uncertainty is first studied in Condorcet (1785). As-
suming two possible true states, Condorcet models a situation in which a group of people,
each of whom is imperfectly and privately informed, makes a decision by voting for one alter-
native. Condorcet shows that the group can more efficiently aggregate private information
with simple majority rule than if each member acts as a dictator.
The Condorcet theorem assumes that each juror votes by following her private informa-
tion. However, a juror’s vote affects a group decision only when that juror is pivotal. A
strategic juror incorporates this fact in her voting decision, and in some cases her pivotality
convinces her to follow other jurors’ votes against her private information (see Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996); Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996)). Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
apply the strategic voting behavior to jury trials, and find inferiority of the unanimity
rule. The current research departs from Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) by including
plea bargaining.7
Much of the literature on plea bargaining approaches the process via a ‘bargaining’ model
7 Although we adopt Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) as a benchmark, different voting institutions can
be applied in the jury trial stage. Some examples from the literature include Coughlan (2000); Austen-Smith
and Feddersen (2005, 2006), and Gerardi and Yariv (2007) studying jury deliberation. Accordingly, as the
model of jury trial process changes, the results on the voting rule comparison in our model may change. For
experimental tests on jury deliberation, see Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) and Goeree and
Yariv (Forthcoming).
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(for a brief summary, see, e.g., Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989)). A jury trial contains explicit
costs, time, and effort; if participants in a plea bargain do not want to bear additional risks,
uncertainty regarding trial outcomes is an additional cost. Given such costs, participants in
the plea bargain phase can share a surplus if they reach an agreement. This surplus division
is a ‘bargaining’ problem. A typical model allows either a prosecutor, a defendant, or both
to make bargaining offers. Prosecutors know the deliverable punishments of the crime in
trial, while the defendant knows whether he is guilty. It is undeniable that plea bargaining
initially becomes popular as a way of avoiding jury trial costs.8 However, what we focus on
in this paper are the welfare effects of plea bargaining due to factors other than trial costs,
a subject that has received less attention.
Grossman and Katz (1983) show that plea bargaining serves as an insurance and a
screening device. As insurance, plea bargaining protects innocent defendants and society
against cases where a trial produces incorrect findings and delivers severe punishments.
Although innocent defendants may falsely plead guilty due to the threat of conviction, the
sentence will be lenient in such cases. As a screening device, plea bargains sort guilty
and innocent defendants like a self-selection mechanism. Since the mechanism ensures that
violators of the law are indeed punished, it may contribute to the accuracy of the legal
system. The first role is irrelevant to our model, since we assume that prosecutors and
defendants are risk neutral, and consequently need no insurance. The second role shares
the same motivation as ours. In contrast to the current paper, Grossman and Katz (1983)
does not consider interactions between plea bargaining and the jury trial. They assume
that plea bargaining is a screening device affecting, but never affected by, the jury trial.
2.2 The Model
There are three types of agents in a criminal court process: a prosecutor, a defendant, and
jurors. The process begins with a prosecutor indicting a suspect on a charge. We normalize
the potential punishment to be equal to 1 and assume that the defendant is either guilty (G)
or innocent (I) with equal probabilities. We consider the following timed process, composed
8 For the historical background of plea bargaining, see, e.g., Rabe and Champion (2002, p. 306 - 308).
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of two phases:
At t=1, a plea bargain occurs.
The prosecutor makes a take-it-or-leave-it plea bargain offer, θ ∈ [0, 1] level of punish-
ment. The defendant pleads either guilty or not guilty. If the defendant pleads guilty,
the case terminates and the punishment θ is delivered. Otherwise, the plea bargain is
withdrawn, and the case proceeds to the second phase described below.
At t=2, a jury trial occurs.
A jury consists of n (n > 1) jurors and a voting rule kˆ (1 ≤ kˆ ≤ n). Each juror
receives a private signal g or i, which is positively correlated with the true states G
or I, as given by
Pr[g|G] = Pr[i|I] = p, Pr[i|G] = Pr[g|I] = 1− p (2.1)
where p ∈ (.5, 1); a juror has a probability p of receiving a correct signal, and a
probability 1− p of receiving an incorrect signal.9
The jury reaches a decision by casting votes simultaneously. Each juror votes for
either conviction or acquittal. If the number of conviction votes is larger than or
equal to the voting rule kˆ, the defendant is convicted (C). Otherwise, the defendant
is acquitted (A). We call a rule requiring kˆ = n votes for conviction the unanimity
rule, and others general super-majority rules.
Each type of agents has a utility function defined as follows:
• A defendant:
Utility changes negatively by the amount of punishment: −1 if he is convicted, 0 if he
is acquitted, and −θ if he pleads guilty. A defendant is assumed to be risk neutral.10
9 During the testimonies by the witnesses, each juror may have a different interpretation due to her
personal background. The private signal (g or i) captures such interpretation.
10 If a defendant perceives that he will be convicted with probability s, then the ex-ante utility of going
to trial is −s · 1− (1− s) · 0.
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• Jurors:
We normalize the utility of correct judicial decisions such that u[C|G] = u[A|I] = 0.
Given this normalization, convicting innocent defendants or acquitting guilty defen-
dants incur utility losses, u[C|I] = −q and u[A|G] = −(1−q), respectively. We assume
that q ∈ [.5, 1), and term q as “the threshold level of reasonable doubt.” 11, 12
• A prosecutor:
The prosecutor has a preference defined on [0, 1] × {G, I}. Much like the jurors’
utilities, when a punishment h ∈ [0, 1] is delivered to a defendant, the prosecutor’s
utility is given by
v[h|I] = −q′ h , v[h|G] = −(1− q′)(1− h)
where q′ ∈ [0, 1]. The prosecutor loses utility if punishments are delivered to innocent
defendants, or guilty defendants avoid their just punishments.
Figure 2.1 summarizes the timing of the model: (i) A prosecutor offers θ in a plea bargain
and a defendant pleads either guilty or not guilty. (ii) If the defendant pleads guilty, a judge
respects the bargain and pronounces sentence θ, and the case terminates. If the defendant
pleads not guilty, the case goes to a jury trial. (iii) The jury determines whether to convict
or acquit.
We denote by φG the probability that a guilty defendant pleads guilty; φI is defined
similarly for an innocent defendant. Jurors have an identical belief pi that the defendant is
guilty conditional on the case proceeding to a jury trial. For each level of belief pi, a pair
(σjg, σ
j
i ) in [0, 1] × [0, 1] represents a strategy of juror j. Juror j votes for conviction with
probability σjg when she receives a signal g, and she votes for conviction with probability
11 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) term q as “the threshold level of reasonable doubt,” from the following
motivation. Suppose a juror believes that the defendant is guilty with probability q˜. The expected utility
from a guilty verdict, −q(1 − q˜), is greater than or equal to the expected utility of an innocent verdict,
−(1− q)q˜, if and only if q˜ ≥ q. Therefore, when jurors vote for conviction, they use q as the threshold level
of belief that the defendant is guilty.
12 We can easily allow q < 0.5, and the analysis in this paper is qualitatively intact. However, we focus
on the case of q ≥ 0.5 for simplicity, since q < 0.5 requires additional assumptions to ensure that jurors are
more likely to vote for conviction when they receive signal g.
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Time
Arrest
Plea
Bargaining
Jury Trial
Nature selects G or I
Prosecutor offers θ
Defendant pleads
Jurors receive signals
Jurors vote
Convict Acquit
Deliver θ
Guilty
Not Guilty
Figure 2.1: A criminal court process.
σji if the signal is i. Apparently, a defendant’s strategy (φG and φI) is a function defined
on θ, and jurors’ strategies (σjg, σ
j
i ) are functions defined on pi. We omit the arguments of
strategies where no confusion arises.
We find a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with additional refinements: one in jurors’ voting
behavior and the other in jurors’ belief. For jury trials, we consider symmetric equilibrium
voting behavior in which all jurors adopt the same strategy. Accordingly, a symmetric
strategy profile is denoted as (σg, σi), without specifying a particular juror.
13 We then find
a symmetric voting behavior which gives all jurors the highest expected payoff. Since all
jurors have the same preference over judicial decisions, this is a natural way of refining
the symmetric voting behavior. We call this refined behavior the most efficient symmetric
equilibrium voting behavior, or succinctly the efficient equilibrium voting behavior.14 When
13 Since the jury trial is modeled as a symmetric game, there exists at least one symmetric equilibrium
voting behavior. The existence of symmetric equilibrium voting behavior follows very much like the result
that a symmetric finite normal form game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. We formally show the existence
in Appendix B.1.
14 In Appendix B.3, we show that other notions of equilibrium refinement motivated by trembling hand
perfection in Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005) or weakly undominated strategies in Gerardi and Yariv
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no defendant goes to trial, we will refine jurors’ belief that a defendant coming to the trial
must be innocent. Such refinement is equivalent to imposing D1 by Cho and Kreps (1987)
over the signaling game, which is induced by assuming that the jurors follow the most
efficient symmetric equilibrium.
In the spirit of backward induction, we first study jury trials and find jurors’ efficient
equilibrium voting behavior, and then study equilibrium behaviors of a prosecutor and a
defendant in plea bargaining. The following section on jury trial is a part of the backward
induction, but at the same time the results also serve as a baseline of comparison about the
effects of plea bargaining on jury trials.
2.3 A Jury Trial
Jurors’ behavior in any jury trial that does take place hinges on the outcome of plea bargain-
ing. Recall that pi denotes the jurors’ (identical) belief about a defendant’s type conditional
on the case going to trial. We assume that a guilty defendant is less likely to go to trial
than an innocent defendant (pi ≤ .5). This assumption turns out to be innocuous, as guilty
defendants are more likely to generate guilty signals g, each juror is more likely to vote for
conviction when she receives a signal g, and thus, guilty defendants have a higher chance
of being convicted.15 As defendants anticipate such jury behavior, guilty defendants tend
to plead guilty, and are therefore less likely to go to trial, relative to innocent defendants.
As is standard in strategic voting models, a juror understands that her vote affects the
verdict only when she is pivotal. Thus, in addition to her private signal (g or i), the juror
takes into account in her voting decision that she is pivotal (piv) and the defendant in the
trial could have pleaded guilty (belief pi).
Let P [G|piv, g, pi] denote the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty, condi-
tional on receiving signal g, belief pi, and being pivotal:
Pr[G|piv, g, pi] := pi · p · Pr[piv|G]
pi · p · Pr[piv|G] + (1− pi) · (1− p) · Pr[piv|I]
(2007) are insufficient to get a well-behaving equilibrium voting behavior, satisfying properties in Proposition
2.3.2.
15 We formally prove this reasoning in Proposition 2.3.2.
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Convicting the defendant changes her expected utility by −q · Pr[I|piv, g, pi], and ac-
quitting changes her utility by −(1− q) ·Pr[G|piv, g, pi]. The expected utility from a guilty
verdict is greater than or equal to the expected utility of an innocent verdict if and only if
Pr[G|piv, g, pi] ≥ q. In other words, given all the information available, Pr[G|piv, g, pi] ≥ q
indicates that evidence of guilt is clear enough to exceed the level of reasonable doubt (q).
In such a case, the optimal outcome from the juror’s viewpoint is to convict. Whereas,
Pr[G|piv, g, pi] ≤ q indicates that the optimal outcome for the juror is to acquit. When
these terms are equal, jurors are indifferent between conviction and acquittal.
Thus, jurors’ best response is voting for conviction (or acquittal) if and only if
Pr[G | piv, g, pi ]
Pr[ I | piv, g, pi ] ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q if the signal is g.
When they are equal, the juror will use a mixed strategy.
By expanding the above expression, we obtain the following voting criterion that a juror
will vote for conviction (or acquittal) if and only if
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
p
1− p
pi
1− pi ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q if the signal is g. (2.2)
A similar argument is applied to a juror receiving signal i, and we obtain
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
1− p
p
pi
1− pi ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q if the signal is i. (2.3)
The left hand side (LHS) is the likelihood ratio of guilty to innocent given that a juror
is pivotal, multiplied by the likelihood ratio inferred from private information (g or i),
times the ratio of beliefs on the defendant’s type; the right hand side (RHS) is the ratio of
reasonable doubts.
To state the probabilities of being pivotal precisely, let rG denote the probability of
voting for conviction when the defendant is guilty, and rI be the same probability when the
defendant is, instead, innocent. Since a guilty defendant and an innocent defendant send
the signal g with probability p and 1− p, respectively, we obtain
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rG = pσg + (1− p)σi, rI = (1− p)σg + pσi. (2.4)
When a voting rule requires kˆ (1 ≤ kˆ ≤ n) number of conviction votes for a guilty
verdict, a juror becomes pivotal when kˆ−1 other jurors vote for conviction. Assuming that
0 < rI < 1, we obtain from (2.2) that a juror votes for conviction (or acquittal) if and only
if
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)n−kˆ
p
1− p
pi
1− pi ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q if the signal is g, (2.5)
and we obtain from (2.3) that a juror votes for conviction (or acquittal) if and only if
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)n−kˆ
1− p
p
pi
1− pi ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q if the signal is i.
16 (2.6)
These expressions show the main restrictions of jurors’ equilibrium behavior in the jury
trial.
To understand how jurors’ belief affects the equilibrium voting behavior, it is convenient
to introduce a function p¯i defined as
p¯i(l ; p, q) :=
1
1−q
q
( p
1−p
)l
+ 1
, ∀l ∈ N
In order to see the motivation behind the definition of p¯i, we rearrange and obtain
(
p
1− p
)l p¯i(l)
1− p¯i(l) =
q
1− q . (2.7)
p¯i maps a number of guilty signals (l) to the level of belief (pi), which gives the minimum
amount of evidence for a conviction vote. In other words, if a juror becomes a dictator,
p¯i(l) is the threshold level of the juror’s belief, such that once the juror gathers l number of
guilty signals, the juror votes for conviction.
16 When rI = 0 or rI = 1, (2.5) and (2.6) are not defined. When we find the most efficient equilibrium
voting behavior in Appendix B.2, we treat these cases separately.
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We state the equilibrium voting behavior in Proposition 2.3.1, and relegate details of
computing the equilibrium behavior to Appendix B.2. A voting behavior is called responsive
if the conviction probability with signal g is strictly higher than the probability with signal
i.
Proposition 2.3.1. (Equilibrium voting behavior) If pi > p¯i(kˆ), the most efficient symmet-
ric equilibrium voting behavior is responsive. Otherwise, if pi ≤ p¯i(kˆ), the most efficient
symmetric equilibrium involves an equilibrium in which no juror votes for conviction.
In all, Proposition 2.3.1 states that, if the belief is above a certain threshold level, there
exists a responsive equilibrium voting behavior. Moreover, if there exists an equilibrium
voting behavior which is responsive, it must be more efficient than the equilibrium in which
jurors vote either always for conviction or always for acquittal. This is quite intuitive,
since jurors use the private signals for their voting decisions in a responsive equilibrium
voting behavior. The only special case is that, when pi = p¯i(kˆ) under the unanimity rule
(kˆ = n), efficient equilibrium involves both responsive equilibrium voting behavior and
non-responsive equilibrium voting behavior, in which no juror votes for conviction.
Equilibrium voting behavior is mainly derived from voting criteria (2.5) and (2.6). Note
that LHS of (2.5) is strictly larger than the LHS of (2.6). Unless the denominators are equal
to zero, a juror receiving signal g has a greater probability of voting for conviction than a
juror receiving a signal i (σg > σi). Suppose jurors vote for conviction with probabilities
rI and rG, where 0 < rI < rG < 1. That is, jurors do not always vote for acquittal
(0 < rI < rG) and do not always vote for conviction (rI < rG < 1). Since σg > σi,
three classes of strategies are consistent with such jury behavior: (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0),
(σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), and (σg = 1, σi = 0).
For instance, under a voting rule requiring kˆ (kˆ > n2 ) conviction votes, (σg = 1, σi = 0)
is not an equilibrium behavior for pi < p¯i(2kˆ− n). To see this, suppose that a juror receives
signal g and she turns out to be pivotal; kˆ − 1 other jurors vote for conviction and n − kˆ
jurors vote for acquittal. Considering that other jurors act (σg = 1, σi = 0), kˆ−1 conviction
votes indicate the same number of guilty signals, and n− kˆ acquittal votes indicate the same
number of innocent signals. Thus, being pivotal is equivalent to observing 2kˆ−n− 1 guilty
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signals, which results in 2kˆ − n guilty signals combining the juror’s own guilty signal.17
When pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n), 2kˆ − n guilty signals provide insufficient evidence of guilt. Thus,
σg = 1 is not a best response, and (σg = 1, σi = 0) must not be an equilibrium voting
behavior.
When jurors receiving signal g use a mixed strategy (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), they are
necessarily indifferent between conviction and acquittal. In such an instance, the voting
criterion (2.5) holds with equality, from which we obtain an expression for σg and the
consistent range of pi. When a juror receiving signal i uses a mixed strategy (σg = 1, 0 <
σi < 1), we obtain σi and the range of pi from the equality of voting criterion (2.6). If jurors
receiving a signal g vote for conviction and with signal i vote for acquittal (σg = 1, σi = 0),
the juror receiving a guilty signal has enough evidence to vote for conviction; whereas, a juror
receiving an innocent signal lacks evidence, and thus votes for acquittal. The corresponding
inequalities of voting criteria (2.5) and (2.6) allow us to find the range of pi consistent with
such a strategy profile.
We denote conviction probability of a guilty defendant and an innocent defendant by
PG and PI , respectively. For a pair of conviction voting probabilities, rG and rI ,
PG =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkG (1− rG)n−k , PI =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkI (1− rI)n−k . (2.8)
For each level of belief pi, when jurors follow the efficient equilibrium voting behavior, we
denote the pair of corresponding conviction probabilities of guilty defendants or innocent
defendants as {(PG, PI)|pi}. We also define fG(pi) = {P ′G| ∃P ′I , (P ′G, P ′I) ∈ {(PG, PI)|pi}}
and fI(pi) = {P ′I | ∃P ′G, (P ′G, P ′I) ∈ {(PG, PI)|pi}}: correspondences of the conviction proba-
bilities of guilty defendants and innocent defendants, respectively. Remember that efficient
equilibrium voting behavior is almost always unique except when the voting rule is unani-
mous and pi = p¯i(n).18 Therefore, fG(.) and fI(.) are almost always single valued.
Proposition 2.3.2. (Properties of the efficient equilibrium voting behavior)
1. Convicting the guilty is more likely than convicting the innocent: PG ≥ PI for all pi.
17 We use the fact that signals have a symmetric structure: P [g|G] and P [i|I] are equal.
18This observation was discussed after Proposition 2.3.1.
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2. Efficient equilibrium voting behavior (σg, σi) is non-decreasing in pi and kˆ.
3. Conviction probabilities are non-decreasing in pi : for all pi < pi′, fG(pi) ≤ fG(pi′) and
fI(pi) ≤ fI(pi′). 19
The above properties are intuitively derived from voting criteria (2.5) and (2.6). First,
the LHS of (2.5) is larger than the LHS of (2.6); a juror receiving a guilty signal is more
likely to vote for conviction (σg ≥ σi). Since guilty defendants tend to send guilty signals,
jurors are more likely to vote for conviction when the defendant is guilty: i.e. rG ≥ rI .
Thus, guilty defendants have a higher chance of being convicted (PG ≥ PI). Second, for
every level of rG and rI (i.e. for every given other jurors’ voting behavior), the value of
LHS of both criteria are increasing in belief pi and voting rule kˆ. Thus, a juror has more
incentive to vote for conviction when belief pi is higher and voting rule kˆ is larger. Lastly,
the conviction probabilities are strictly increasing functions of σg and σi, which are in turn
increasing correspondences of pi. Thus the conviction probabilities, PG and PI are increasing
correspondences of pi. However, it is worth noting that the conviction probabilities, PG and
PI , may not be increasing correspondences of kˆ. Considering (2.8), depending on the level
of rG and rI , the conviction probabilities may decrease as kˆ gets larger.
Figure 2.2 depicts the efficient equilibrium voting behavior under a general super-
majority rule (1 ≤ kˆ < n) and the unanimity rule (kˆ = n). Solid lines represent the
probability of voting for conviction with signal g; dashed lines represent the probability of
voting for conviction with signal i. Mostly, we have a unique equilibrium voting behavior,
except when pi = pi(kˆ) under unanimity rule. The corresponding conviction probabilities are
described in Figure 2.3. Solid lines show the conviction probabilities if the defendant is truly
guilty; dashed lines show the conviction probabilities of innocent defendants. Again, we cer-
tify that conviction probabilities inherit the properties of conviction voting probabilities;
guilty defendants have a higher chance of being convicted and the conviction probabilities
are non-decreasing in pi.
19 Suppose A and B are sets in R. If a ≥ b for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B, we denote A ≥ B.
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(b) The unanimity rule (kˆ = 12).
Figure 2.2: Efficient symmetric voting behavior with n = 12, p = 610 , and q =
1
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(b) The unanimity rule (kˆ = 12).
Figure 2.3: Conviction probabilities with n = 12, p = 610 , and q =
1
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2.4 Plea Bargaining
A prosecutor offers the defendant an opportunity to plead guilty and undergo the penalty θ ∈
[0, 1]. A guilty defendant compares θ with the conviction probability of guilty defendants PG;
an innocent defendant compares θ with the conviction probability of innocent defendants
PI . If θ is larger than PG, no guilty defendant pleads guilty; similarly, no innocent defendant
pleads guilty when θ is larger than PI .
20
Recall that pi denotes the jurors’ belief that the defendant is guilty conditional on a case
proceeding to a trial. When some cases reach jury trials (φG < 1 or φI < 1), jurors update
their belief pi by
pi =
1− φG
(1− φG) + (1− φI) . (2.9)
If all defendants plead guilty, φG = φI = 1, we assume that the jurors update their belief
by setting it equal to 0.21
The relationship between the pleading decisions, φG and φI , and the conviction proba-
bilities, PG and PI , captures the main interaction between plea bargaining and jury trials.
One direction, how pleading decisions affect jury behavior, is explicit. The pleading de-
cisions lead jurors to update their belief about the guilt of the defendant (updating pi).
As we have shown in the previous section, this belief is taken as part of the evidence of
guilt in the jury’s behavior, {(PC , PI)|pi}. The converse direction, how jury behavior affects
the pleading decisions, is implicit. The conviction probabilities are taken into account in
pleading decisions through the defendants’ anticipation: comparing θ and PG, or θ and PI .
Equilibrium behavior ensures that these interactions must be consistent with each other;
20 Such pleading decisions presume that defendants know the conviction probabilities of guilty or innocent
defendants. In practice, defendants get advice from defense attorneys, who are aware of whether their
previous clients were truly guilty and who can recall the corresponding judicial decisions. It has been also
observed that participants in plea bargaining foresee the outcomes of jury trials, and consequently, previous
trial outcomes significantly influence the parties’ bargaining power. Among others, see, e.g., Bibas (2004)
and Stuntz (2004).
21 This assumption is equivalent to applying an equilibrium refinement, D1 by Cho and Kreps (1987),
to the signaling game, induced by assuming that the jurors follow the most efficient symmetric equilibrium
behavior. When jurors follow such equilibrium behavior, guilty defendants are more likely to be convicted
for every jurors’ belief pi. Especially, if pi > p¯i(kˆ), guilty defendants are strictly more likely to be convicted.
Therefore, given an equilibrium outcome with φG = φI = 1 and for any level of θ > 0, whenever guilty
defendants are weakly better off by going to trials, innocent defendants are strictly better off by going to
trials. Hence it should be accorded by jurors that a deviator from φG = φI = 1 is more likely to be innocent.
In such a case, D1 refines jurors belief pi equal to 0.
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the belief pi is consistent with pleading decisions φG and φI , and the anticipated conviction
probabilities are consistent with pi: (PG, PI) ∈ {(P ′C , P ′I)|pi}. Proposition 2.4.1 summa-
rizes this equilibrium restriction of the pleading decisions and jurors’ voting behavior. We
relegate the proof to Appendix B.5.
Proposition 2.4.1. (Pleading decisions and voting behavior)
Suppose the jury follows the efficient equilibrium voting behavior. For each prosecutor’s
offer θ, one, and only one, of the following holds.
1. Some guilty pleas: Guilty defendants are indifferent between pleading guilty and
undergoing a jury trial (PG = θ); innocent defendants prefer to plead not guilty (PI ≤
θ). θ = PG ∈ fG(pi) for every equilibrium belief pi.22, 23
2. No guilty plea: PG, and necessarily PI , are no more than θ. All defendants plead
not guilty (φG = φI = 0). Thus, pi = .5 and PG ∈ fG(.5).
In general, guilty defendants are indifferent between pleading guilty and pleading not
guilty (θ = PG), and innocent defendants prefer to go to trial (PI ≤ θ). To see why this
holds, suppose we have θ < PG. Guilty defendants will plead guilty, and depending on
θ and PI , only innocent defendants may go to trial. These pleading decisions will lead
jurors to believe that all defendants in trials are innocent, and they will vote for acquittal:
{(PG, PI)|pi} = {(0, 0)}. Therefore, θ < PG must not be an equilibrium outcome. On the
other hand, θ > PG can be an equilibrium outcome only when the prosecutor offers a high
level of punishment for guilty pleas. In that event, all defendants will go to trial, the induced
conviction probabilities (PG and PI) are still lower than θ, and such pleading decisions will
turn out to be the best response.
The prosecutor wants to offer punishment θ for a guilty plea that yields his highest ex-
pected equilibrium payoff. Using the equilibrium restrictions on pleading decisions and jury
22 The equilibrium belief pi may not be unique. For instance, suppose that θ is equal to the conviction
probability of a guilty defendant under σg = 1 and σi = 0. Any pi inducing σg = 1 and σi = 0 as equilibrium
voting behavior can be an equilibrium pi. However, all fG(pi) contains θ = PG, and lead to the same level of
equilibrium punishment.
23 Lemma B.5.1 in Appendix B.4 shows that fG(pi) is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence with non-
empty convex values. Thus for any θ in [0, sup fG(pi = .5)], by Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists pi
such that θ = PG ∈ fG(pi).
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behavior, the prosecutor’s problem is summarized by the following optimization problem.
max
θ∈[0,1]
−1
2
q′
(
φIθ + (1− φI)PI
)
− 1
2
(1− q′)
(
φG(1− θ) + (1− φG)(1− PG)
)
(2.10)
s.t.
(a.1) φG ∈ arg minφ′∈[0,1] φ′θ + (1− φ′)PG
(a.2) φI ∈ arg minφ′∈[0,1] φ′θ + (1− φ′)PI
(b) pi =
 0 if φG = φI = 11−φG
(1−φG)+(1−φI) otherwise.
(c) (PG, PI) ∈ {(P ′G, P ′I)|pi}.
The objective function is the prosecutor’s expected utility. The prosecutor’s utility is
decreasing with q′ if innocent defendants are mistakenly punished. The mistake is either
as a result of a guilty plea, with probability φI and punishment θ, or of conviction in jury
trial, with probability (1 − φI)PI with punishment 1. When guilty defendants go without
being fully punished, the prosecutor’s utility is decreased by (1− q′). Such a case is either
as a result of a guilty plea, with probability φG and undelivered punishment (1− θ), or of
acquittal in a jury trial, with probability (1− φG)(1− PG) and undelivered punishment 1.
The defendants will best respond in pleading decisions and the jurors will follow the equi-
librium voting behavior. Such equilibrium behavior restricts the prosecutor’s optimization:
(a.1) and (a.2) represent that guilty and innocent defendants plead in order to minimize
their expected punishment, respectively; (b) captures that jurors rationally update their
belief pi following the defendants’ pleading decisions; (c) states that jurors will follow the
efficient equilibrium voting behavior. The following proposition presents the prosecutor’s
optimal behavior, and the consequent jurors’ voting behavior. In the proposition, some
guilty pleas and no guilty plea refers to the two classes of equilibrium outcomes in Proposi-
tion 2.4.1 the prosecutor can induce. We leave the proof to Appendix B.6.1.
Proposition 2.4.2. (Equilibrium outcomes of plea bargaining and jury trials)
1. If q′ > q, the prosecutor induces some guilty pleas. Induced jury behavior resembles
the behavior in the jury model without plea bargaining. But, jurors act as if they have
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the prosecutor’s preference parameter, q′.
2. If q′ ≤ q, the prosecutor induces no guilty plea. The jury behavior is the same as
the behavior in the jury model without plea bargaining.
The motivation behind the prosecutor’s optimal level of θ is quite intuitive. To illustrate
the main idea, we first show that the prosecutor is primarily concerned with how plea
bargaining affects jurors’ belief pi.
To begin with, the prosecutor only needs to focus on equilibrium outcomes with some
guilty pleas in Proposition 2.4.1. Suppose that an equilibrium outcome has no guilty plea.
That is, the punishment following a guilty plea is so high that all defendants proceed to jury
trials. The prosecutor can achieve the utility corresponding to the no guilty plea equilibrium
outcome by offering θ = θ¯ where θ¯ := sup fG(.5). Although some guilty defendants may
change their mind to pleading guilty, the prosecutor achieves the same utility gain or loss,
regardless of whether the guilty defendants plead guilty or not guilty.
Without loss of generality, we simplify the prosecutor’s objective function in (2.10)
using the case of some guilty pleas in Proposition 2.4.1. In general, we have θ > 0, and thus
θ = PG > 0.
24 The equilibrium voting behavior becomes responsive (PG > PI), and all
innocent defendants go to trial (φI = 0). Then the prosecutor’s objective function becomes
− 1
2
q′PI − 1
2
(1− q′)(1− PG). (2.11)
We now see that the prosecutor’s main concern is to influence jurors’ belief pi, thereby
leading jurors’ best responding behavior to be most preferable to the prosecutor. One thing
to note here is that the prosecutor is not allowed to ‘force’ jurors to take a certain voting
strategy. That is, he can at best lead them to one of the most efficient equilibrium voting
behaviors.
To see how the prosecutor should influence the jurors’ belief pi, we revisit the jurors’
voting criteria. By modifying (2.5) and (2.6), we obtain
24 We will also obtain (2.11) when θ = 0; nevertheless, we treat the case separately in Appendix B.6.1,
because the voting criteria (2.5) and (2.6) will not be well-defined.
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Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
p
1− p
.5
1− .5 ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
if the signal is g,
and
Pr[ piv |G]
Pr[ piv |I]
1− p
p
.5
1− .5 ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
if the signal is i.
The voting criteria above lead to the same voting behavior as the voting criteria (2.5)
and (2.6); jurors receiving signal g or i vote for conviction if confronted with the former pair
of criteria if and only if the jurors receiving signal g or i vote for conviction if confronted
with the latter pair of criteria. That is, the jury behavior with a belief pi and the ratio of
reasonable doubts q1−q is equal to the jury behavior with belief .5 and the ratio of reasonable
doubts equal to q1−q
1−pi
pi . As a result, we can reinterpret the prosecutor’s effort to influence
the jurors’ belief as an effort to change the level of the jurors’ reasonable doubts, while
fixing the belief at the prior pi0 = .5. The question, “How to influence the jurors’ belief?”
is then the same as, “Which level of the jurors’ influenced reasonable doubt is the most
preferable to the prosecutor?”
Intuitively, the prosecutor prefers to have the jurors’ induced reasonable doubt to per-
fectly coincide with his weights on mistakenly delivered or undelivered punishments: i.e.,
q′
1−q′ =
q
1−q
1−pi
pi . However, the prosecutor can affect the jurors’ reasonable doubt in only one
direction; he can only increase the reasonable doubt by inducing pi ≤ .5. When the jurors,
rather than the prosecutor, care more about punishing innocent defendants (q > q′), the
prosecutor has no incentive to use plea bargaining, and so he induces pi = .5 by offering
θ ≥ sup fG(.5).
Figure 2.4 illustrates prosecutor’s optimal offer of guilty plea punishment, for each level
of prosecutor’s parameter q′ and under various voting rules kˆ. As Proposition 2.4.2 states,
the optimal offer is divided into two classes. Compared to jurors, when the prosecutor is
less cautious about punishing innocent defendants (q′ ≤ q = 12), the prosecutor offers a high
level of punishment and induces no guilty plea. Otherwise, the prosecutor offers a lower
level of punishment and induces some guilty pleas. As the guilty plea punishment becomes
more lenient, the number of guilty defendants pleading guilty increases. Such pleading
52
Some Guilty PleasNo Guilty Plea
k
`
=6
k
`
=8
k
`
=10
k
`
=12
0.25 0.5 0.75 1.
q'
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.
Plea Offer HΘL
Figure 2.4: Optimal offer of guilty plea punishment given n = 12, p = 610 , and q =
1
2
decisions yield a lower level of belief pi and consequently lower chances of convicting innocent
defendants. Therefore, the optimal offer θ is a decreasing function of prosecutor’s utility
parameter q′. The optimal plea bargain offer is not a monotone function of the voting rule
kˆ. This is because conviction probabilities are not monotone functions of kˆ, as mentioned
in the discussion of Section 2.3.
2.5 Comparison of Alternative Voting Rules
As a direct application of Proposition 2.4.2, we re-examine a previous finding of the standard
jury model (without plea bargaining).
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) find that the unanimity rule is inferior to general
super-majority rules. As the number of jurors gets large, the chance of convicting innocent
defendants and the chance of acquitting guilty defendants do not converge to zero under
the unanimity rule; whereas, both converge to zero if the voting rule is non-unanimous.25
Assuming that the jury trial employs either the unanimity rule or a super-majority rule, we
confirm that the previous results are robust to the addition of plea bargaining. We relegate
25 These are asymptotic properties, rather than results with a finite number of jurors; for example, jury
size 12 is common in the U.S. criminal court. In spite of that, when p is not close to 1
2
, the asymptotic
properties closely approximate the properties with a finite number of jurors. For instance, when p = 2
3
,
q = 1
2
, and pi = 12, the limit of conviction probabilities for a guilty or an innocent defendant is 1 or 0 under
any non-unanimous rule, and 0.5 or 0.25 under the unanimity rule, respectively. On the other hand, a jury
with 12 jurors convicts a guilty or an innocent defendant with probability 0.90 or 0.03 under a non-unanimous
rule kˆ = 8, and 0.57 or 0.17 under the unanimity rule, respectively. Moreover, asymptotic properties are
also mathematically more tractable.
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the proof to Appendix B.6.4.
Corollary 5. (Comparing Voting Rules)
1. If a jury trial uses the unanimity rule, the expected punishment of guilty defendants
converges to 1 −
(
(1−q˜)(1−p)
q˜p
) 1−p
2p−1
as n → ∞, where q˜ = max{q, q′}; for innocent
defendants, it converges to
(
(1−q˜)(1−p)
q˜p
) p
2p−1
.
2. If the jury trial uses a non-unanimous rule, the expected punishment for guilty defen-
dants converges to one; the expected punishment for innocent defendants converges to
zero.
Corollary 5 is from Proposition 2.4.2 and asymptotic properties of the jury’s behavior
in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998).26 Proposition 2.4.2 states that the induced jury
behavior in a court with plea bargaining is similar to the equilibrium behavior in the jury
model without plea bargaining. If q ≤ q′, we can mimic the jury behavior using a jury model
without plea bargaining by assuming that jurors echo the prosecutor’s preference. If q > q′,
the behaviors are exactly the same. Concerning jury behavior under the unanimity rule and
general super-majority rules, plea bargaining does not change the qualitative findings, but
only affects the quantitative analyses: i.e. the probability limits. Therefore, the inferiority
result in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) is robust to the addition of plea bargaining.
However, it is worth stressing that while the previous literature considers jury trial
outcomes, or conviction probabilities, we treat the outcomes of the entire judicial process:
punishment by guilty pleas as well as conviction probabilities. Therefore, Corollary 5 com-
pares expected punishments, rather than conviction probabilities, under either unanimity
rule or super-majority rules.
2.6 Discussion
Plea bargaining is the most common method of resolving cases in U.S. criminal court, though
studies on collective decision making have largely ignored plea bargaining. Whereas, jury
26 Propositions 2 and 3 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) state the asymptotic properties of the jury’s
behavior under the unanimity rule and general super-majority rules.
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trials have been rigorously studied, while in practice only a small portion of criminal cases
reach jury trial. The current paper bridges such a gap between the practice and the theory
by studying a combined model of plea bargaining and a jury trial. We highlight that plea
bargaining and jury trials interact with one another during a criminal court process. By
influencing the jurors’ belief, plea bargaining may induce the jury’s behavior to reflect the
prosecutor’s preference rather than the jurors’.
The results in this paper raise an important issue, especially for empirical analysis
of criminal court process and of its effects on society. Most of our practical knowledge
on jury trials is essentially based on the cases handled in trials. Yet, such knowledge
lacks fundamental understandings and tells little about the potential effects of institutional
changes on society. As jury trials are chosen through plea bargaining, the cases in jury trials
do not represent the entire population of criminal cases. Moreover, institutional changes
will alter the characteristics of the cases coming to trials. As such, it is appropriate to
employ a structural model, combining both plea bargaining and jury trials, rather than
studying each of them separately.
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Chapter 3
The Testable Implications of
Zero-sum Games
1
3.1 Introduction
Suppose two players choose joint actions from a finite set of alternatives. As outside ob-
servers, we witness the joint choice behavior, but we may not know the exact payoffs leading
the players to such group choices. By only observing joint choice behavior, we may ask
whether people play Nash equilibrium, and, if they do, what type of games they play.
This paper derives falsifiable conditions of joint choice behavior from equilibrium play of
a zero-sum game, or a game of conflicting interests. That is, we study additional behavioral
implications of a game being zero-sum, in addition to the hypothesis of Nash equilibrium
play. Instead of assuming a specific pattern of joint behavior, this study requires only weak
rationality axioms: complete and transitive preferences at the individual level, and Nash
equilibrium play at the collective level.
The main motivation of this exercise is that we want to be able to refute the notion that
two agents are in “direct competition,” and detect whether or not there could be “gains
from cooperation,” without knowing the exact payoffs. However, its applications are not
limited to cases where we only observe joint choice behavior. Even when we observe the
exact monetary returns (e.g., a laboratory experiment), the observed monetary returns may
1This chapter is published as a research paper in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 48, Issue
1, January 2012, Pages 39-46.
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differ from utility payoffs which players perceive. For example, if each subject cares about
her monetary return relative to her opponent’s return, the joint behavior may follow Nash
equilibrium behavior of a zero-sum game rather than the original game. This is because a
two-person game with symmetric monetary returns becomes a symmetric zero-sum game
with respect to relative monetary returns.2 Based on the observed joint choice behavior,
we can test whether subjects play the original game or the zero-sum game induced by their
relative monetary returns.
Sprumont (2000) assumes that econometricians are given a choice correspondence de-
fined on product sets of individual actions. The question is when the observed joint behavior
is consistent with Nash equilibrium play, assuming players are rational and they play games
simultaneously. Sprumont proves that the observed joint behavior is Nash rationalizable if
and only if it satisfies Persistent under Restriction and Persistent under Expansion axioms,
which are similar to classical axioms of choice theory (see, e.g., Moulin (1985)). We retain
Sprumont’s basic abstract setup and ask, “Is the choice correspondence Nash-rationalizable
with a certain game category, specifically, zero-sum games?”
As an introductory example, Figure 1 shows how Nash-rationalizable choice behavior
may not be rationalizable by a zero-sum game. In this example, player 1 conceivably choose
either U or D and player 2 may choose L or R. Following classical choice theory, we may
observe how players choose when choice sets are restricted. Figure 3.1 shows all the possible
product subsets of {U,D} × {L,R} from which two players choose their joint actions. For
each product subset, (∗) is the action profile chosen by the players. We can verify that the
joint choice behavior exhibited in Figure 1 is consistent with Nash equilibrium behavior of
a coordination game in which coordinating to (U,L) or (D,R) gives a higher payoff to both
players.
This choice correspondence, however, does not follow Nash equilibrium behavior for any
zero-sum game. We observe that (U,L) is chosen from {(U,L), (D,L)} and (D,R) is chosen
from {(D,L), (D,R)}. Assuming that the choices are Nash equilibria of a zero-sum game,
these choices imply that for player 1, (U,L) is preferred to (D,L); for player 2, (D,R) is
preferred to (D,L), which indicates player 1 prefers (D,L) to (D,R). On the other hand,
2See, e.g., Duersch, Oechssler, and Schipper (2011).
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Figure 3.1: Nash-rationalizable but not by zero-sum games
(D,R) is chosen from {(D,R), (U,R)} and (U,L) is chosen from {(U,L), (U,R)}. For player
1, (D,R) is preferred to (U,R); for player 2, (U,L) is preferred to (U,R), which implies
player 1 prefers (U,R) to (U,L). As a result, the preference of player 1 forms a cycle, which
implies that all possible joint actions are indeed indifferent for player 1 (and thus for player
2 by the fact that the game is zero-sum). Therefore, we would expect to see all strategy
profiles chosen.
This example shows that once we have two choices on the diagonal in a table of joint
actions, the other two pairs of actions must also be chosen in order for the joint choices
to follow Nash equilibrium behavior for a zero-sum game. When choice behavior forms
a product subset for each game table, we say that the choice behavior is interchangeable.
Although it is easy to identify that interchangeability is necessary, whether the condition is
sufficient is not as straightforward.
Our main theorem shows that this interchangeability of joint choice behavior is indeed
the only additional condition that distinguishes the testable implications of zero-sum games
from those of general non-cooperative games. It is worth pointing out two assumptions be-
hind the theorem. First, we restrict Nash rationalizability to pure strategy Nash equilibria.
Second, we assume complete observations, where choices are observed from all product sets
of individual actions.
This paper follows a broad range of revealed preference theory. Since Samuelson (1938),
there have been numerous papers on revealed preference theory in various settings. In the
context of collective choice, Wilson (1970) and Plott (1974) study cooperative games and
find that the Weak Axiom implies the solution concept proposed by von Neumann and Mor-
genstern. More recently, Echenique and Ivanov (2011) and Chambers and Echenique (2011)
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study the testable implications of collective decision making such as household behavior and
bargaining over money.
The testable implications of game theoretic models have grown only recently relative to
the history and popularity of game theory. Peleg and Tijs (1996) and Sprumont (2000) find
conditions of joint choice behaviors being consistent with Nash equilibria, as the correspond-
ing games are reduced or expanded. Galambos (2009) weakens the complete observation
assumption, and Demuynck and Lauwers (2009) study joint choices over lotteries. The two
approaches adopt Richter (1971)’s congruence axiom, and find that the modified versions
of the congruence axiom are necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash rationalizability.
Ray and Zhou (2001), and Ray and Snyder (2003) consider extensive form games, and find
conditions such that sequential choices are rationalizable by a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium. Xu and Zhou (2007) characterize conditions under which choices are rationalizable
by game trees when the choice process is not observable.
In the context of more concrete games, Forges and Minelli (2009) apply their main result
to market games, in which each player’s budget constraint depends on other players’ actions.
For the model of Cournot competition, Carvajal, Deb, Fenske, and Quah (2010) consider
the case of observing a finite set of prices and quantities, and Cherchye, Demuynck, and
De Rock (2011) consider the case of observing price and quantity functions defined over
exogenous variables. Both studies characterize conditions under which their observed data
are consistent with the model of Cournot competition.
3.2 Model and Main Theorem
There are two players, 1 and 2. Let A1 and A2 be finite sets of actions that players 1 and
2 may conceivably choose. A := A1 × A2 is the set of all possible joint actions. Following
the classical revealed preference approach, suppose we observe choices from B := B1 × B2
in which B1 ⊂ A1 and B2 ⊂ A2 are the sets of available actions for player 1 and 2. In this
model, all choices from each B ⊂ A can be summarized as a choice correspondence.
Definition 1. Let A := {B = B1 ×B2|∅ 6= B ⊂ A} be the set of all nonempty product sets
included in A. A joint choice correspondence f assigns to each B ∈ A a nonempty set
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f(B) ⊂ B.
In the case where at most one player has more than one available action in B, we say
that B is a line. Depending on the player, the line is either in a column or a row - the
former when player 1 has choices, the latter when player 2 has choices. In addition, we call
a product subset B ∈ A a feasible set. For any B′′ ⊂ B and B′′ ∈ A, we call B′′ a feasible
subset of B. For any B,B
′ ∈ A, define B∨B′ as the set of all possible pairs of actions from
Bi and B
′
i (i = 1, 2). That is,
B ∨B′ :=
∏
i=1,2
(Bi ∪B′i)
Suppose we wish to test whether a choice correspondence is rational or not. First, we
shall assume that each player is individually rational. That is, each player has a preference
relation over joint actions, and these relations are complete and transitive.3 We call such
relations weak orders. In addition, we wish to test if the players are collectively rational.
In terms of collectively rationality, we assume that players play a Nash equilibrium. The
following definition is our notion of rationalizability of collective choice behavior.
Definition 2. A joint choice correspondence f is Nash-rationalizable if there are two
weak orders 1,2 on A such that for each B ∈ A, f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash
equilibria of the game (B,1,2).4
Sprumont (2000) introduces the following conditions for Nash-rationalizability. These
conditions are extended versions of Sen’s α, β, and γ in individual choice theory (see, e.g.,
Moulin (1985)).5 When a feasible set is restricted to a line, the first condition coincides
with Sen’s α and β, and the second condition coincides with Sen’s γ.
Definition 3. A joint choice correspondence over A is:
• Persistent under Contraction (PC):
3 A relation  is called complete if for all joint choices a, b ∈ A, it follows that a  b or b  a, and is
called transitive if for all a, b, c ∈ A for which a  b and b  c, it follows that a  c.
4 In other words, if (b1, b2) ∈ f(B), then (b1, b2) 1 (b′1, b2) and (b1, b2) 2 (b1, b′2) for every (b′1, b2) ∈ B
and (b1, b
′
2) ∈ B.
5Although Moulin (1985) calls these conditions Chernoff and Expansion, Sen’s α, β, and γ are more
conventional terminologies in individual choice theory. See, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks (1994).
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(PC1) : For all B,B
′ ∈ A with B′ ⊂ B, f(B) ∩B′ ⊂ f(B′).
(PC2) : Moreover, if B is a line, B′ ⊂ B and f(B) ∩B′ 6= ∅ implies f(B′) ⊂ f(B).
• Persistent under Expansion (PE): For all B,B′ ∈ A, f(B)∩ f(B′) ⊂ f(B ∨B′).
With these two conditions, Sprumont (2000) establishes the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1. A joint choice correspondence f is Nash-rationalizable if and only if it
satisfies (PC) and (PE).
Using this model of Nash-rationalizability, we restrict the set of available rationalizing
games from the set of all non-cooperative games to include only zero-sum games, or games
of conflicting interests. Under the conditions of zero-sum games, the preferences of two
players are opposed. Therefore, while a general non-cooperative game consists of two weak
orders, zero-sum games require only a single weak order.
Definition 4. Let  be a weak order over A, and  is the inverse relation of .6 The
game defined by (A,,) is called a two-person zero-sum game. We say that a joint
choice correspondence f is Nash-rationalizable by a zero-sum game if there is a weak
order  on A such that for each B ∈ A, f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash equilibria
of the game (B,,).
As demonstrated in Example 1, not all Nash-rationalizable joint choice correspondences
are Nash-rationalizable by a zero-sum game. In the example, we needed one additional
condition to fill the gap in the product space of the two distinct choices. We formally state
this condition in the following definition.
Definition 5 (Interchangeability (INT)). A joint choice correspondence f over A is in-
terchangeable if for all B ∈ A and all b, b′ ∈ f(B), {b} ∨ {b′} ⊂ f(B).
It is well-known that any pair of equilibrium strategies of a zero-sum game, one for each
player, is an equilibrium strategy profile (see, e.g., Luce and Raiffa (1989)). Provided that
6 Let  be a binary relation over A. We define the inverse relation  as
for all a, b ∈ A for which a  b, b  a.
The inverse relation of a weak order is also a weak order. The proof is immediate by definition.
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players face a zero-sum game, and observed joint actions follow the Nash-equilibria of the
corresponding games, the choice correspondence must be interchangeable. Our contribution
is showing that interchangeability is indeed the only additional behavioral implication which
distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games. We summarize this
result as the following main theorem.
Theorem 3.2.2. A joint choice correspondence is Nash-rationalizable by a zero-sum game
if and only if it satisfies (PC), (PE), and (INT).
3.3 Discussion
Our model assumes the existence of a joint choice for all B ∈ A. Accordingly, verify-
ing whether a joint choice correspondence is Nash-rationalizable means assuming that all
feasible sets have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Although a small literature provides
conditions of zero-sum games having pure strategy Nash equilibria (Shapley, 1964; Radzik,
1991; Duersch, Oechssler, and Schipper, forthcoming), the characterization of conditions
that are both necessary and sufficient remains an open question. We may avoid this exis-
tence issue by investigating either mixed strategies or correlated strategies. However, these
strategies introduce other difficulties since observed joint choices do not directly represent
underlying preferences.
Our model also requires observed choices from all feasible sets. We may weaken this
requirement by assuming incomplete observations, where a choice correspondence is defined
on A′ ⊂ A. In classical choice theory, Richter (1971) shows that a choice correspondence
with incomplete observations is rationalizable by a weak order if and only if it is congruent.
Galambos (2009) generalizes Richter’s congruence condition, and shows that the generalized
congruence condition is necessary and sufficient for Nash-rationalizability with incomplete
observations.
Unfortunately, interchangeability together with individual-level congruent choices is not
sufficient for Nash-rationalizability by a zero-sum game. For example, suppose A′ is the set
of B := {U,M} × {L,C,R}, B′ := {U,M,D} × {C,R}, and all lines in B and B′. Suppose
f(B) = {(M,R)} and f(B′) = {(U,C)}, and assume that choices in each line satisfy (PE)
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and (PC). The choices are congruent in terms of Galambos (2009), and therefore, Nash-
rationalizable. However, the choices are not Nash-rationalizable by a zero-sum game. From
{U,M}×{C,R}, (U,C) and (M,R) are the only choices consistent with the choices in each
line, but this observation violates interchangeability.7
7 Alternatively, we may consider a congruent joint choice correspondence f : A′ ⇒ A, where A′ ⊂ A is a
set of observed games. We define a binary relation  on A by: for a = (a1, a2), b = (b1, b2) ∈ A,
a  b if and only if there exists B ∈ A′ such that a, b ∈ B, and
either a2 = b2 and a ∈ f(B), or a1 = b1 and b ∈ f(B).
If there is a finite sequence c, d, . . . , e such that a  c  d · · ·  e  b, then we write aT b. We say that a
joint choice correspondence f is congruent, if for all a, b ∈ A and all B ∈ A′,
aT b, a ∈ B, and b ∈ f(B) =⇒ a ∈ f(B).
Assuming that a joint choice correspondence is congruent is, however, almost the same as assuming its
Nash-rationalizability by a zero-sum game. In particular, when A′ = A, the assumption implies that the
relation  is consistent (see Definition 6). Most of the proof in this paper is devoted to showing that  is
consistent (see Section C.1).
63
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1: Large
Matching
First in Appendix A.1, we summarize definitions and related theorems of asymptotic statis-
tics. We prove Theorem 1 for the case of λ = 0 in Appendix A.2, and for the case of
0 < λ < 1 in Appendix A.7. The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix A.4. Lastly in
Appendix A.5, we provide additional simulation results of effects of limited acceptability
assumption on the proportion of unmatched agents.
A.1 Asymptotic Statistics (Serfling, 1980)
Let X1, X2, . . . and X be random variables on a probability space (Ω,A, P ). We say that
Xn converges in probability to X if
lim
n→∞P (|Xn −X| < ) = 1, every  > 0.
This is written Xn
p−→ X.
For r > 0, we say that Xn converges in the r
th mean (or in the Lr-norm) to X if
lim
n→∞E (|Xn −X|
r) = 0.
This is written Xn
Lr−→ X.
Theorem A.1.1. If Xn
Lr−→ X, then Xn p−→ X.
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Theorem A.1.2. Suppose that Xn
p−→ X, |Xn| ≤ |Y | with probability 1 (for all n), and
E (|Y |r) <∞. Then, Xn L
r−→ X.
Remark 1. In this paper, most random variables represent proportions, which are bounded
above by 1 with probability 1. As such, convergence in probability and convergence in the
rth mean are equivalent.
Theorem A.1.3. Let X1,X2, . . . , and X be random k-vectors defined on a probability
space, and let g be a vector-valued Borel function defined on Rk. If g is continuous with
PX-probability 1, then
Xn
p−→ X =⇒ g(Xn) p−→ g(X).
In particular, if Xn
p−→ X and Yn p−→ Y , then Xn + Yn p−→ X + Y and XnYn p−→ XY .
Given a univariate distribution function F and 0 < q < 1, we define qth quantile ξq as
ξq := inf{x : F (x) ≥ q}.
Consider an i.i.d sequence 〈Xi〉 with distribution function F . For each sample of size n,
{X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, a corresponding empirical distribution function Fn is constructed as
Fn(x) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
1 {Xi ≤ x} , −∞ < x <∞.
The empirical qth quantile ξˆq:n is defined as the q
th quantile of the empirical distri-
bution function. That is
ξˆq:n := inf{x : Fn(x) ≥ q}.
For each x, Fn(x) is a random variable, and therefore, ξˆq:n is also a random variable.
Theorem A.1.4. Suppose that qth quantile ξq is the unique solution x of F (x−) ≤ q ≤
F (x). Then, for every 0 < q < 1 and  > 0,
P
(∣∣∣ξˆq:n − ξq∣∣∣ > ) ≤ 2e−2nλ2
for all n, where λ1, = F (ξq + )− q, λ2, = q − F (ξq − ), and λ = min{λ1,, λ2,}.
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For each sample of size n, {X1, X2, . . . , Xn}, the ordered sample values
X1:n ≤ X2:n ≤ · · · ≤ Xn:n
are called the order statistics.
In view of
Xk:n = ξˆk/n:n, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, (A.1)
we will carry out proofs in terms of empirical quantiles, even when variables are defined as
order statistics.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 (λ = 0)
Let ζ = [ζf,w] be an i.i.d sample from a continuous distribution Γ
W with support [0, u¯], and
η = [ηf,w] be an i.i.d sample from a continuous distribution Γ
F with support [0, v¯].1
For  > 0 and for each 〈F,W, u, v〉, we define
BF (;u, v) := F\AF (;u, v) = {f ∈ F | ∆(f ;u, v) ≥ } ,
and prove that
E
[∣∣BF (;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 0, as n→∞. (A.2)
We define the set of firms whose utilities from the worst stable matching are significantly
below the upper bound u¯, which we shall write as
B¯(;u, v) := {f ∈ F |uµW (f) ≤ u¯− } .
Note from uµF (f) ≤ u¯ that
uµF (f)− uµW (f) ≤ u¯− uµW (f),
1 We use ΓW , instead of ΓF , to represent the distribution of utilities of firms, interpreting it as the
distribution of private-values of workers. This notation will be consistent with the additional notation GW
representing the distribution of workers’ common-values. By the same reason, we use ΓF to denote the
distribution of utilities of workers, or private-values of firms.
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and thus
BF (;u, v) ⊂ B¯(;u, v).
Therefore, (A.2) follows immediately from the following proposition.
Proposition A.2.1. For every  > 0,
E
[∣∣B¯(;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
We divide the proof of Proposition A.2.1 into two lemmas. For every market instance
〈F,W, u, v〉, we let RµW (f) be the rank number of firm f ’s worker-optimal stable matching
partner: e.g. RµW (f) = 1 if f matches with its most preferred worker. We first observe
that for most firms, the rank number of worker-optimal matching partner normalized by n
converges to 0. The second lemma shows that the corresponding utility level must become
close to the upper bound u¯ as the market becomes large.
Lemma A.2.2. For γ > 0, let
B¯q(γ;u, v) :=
{
f ∈ F | RµW (f)
n
≥ γ
}
=
{
f ∈ F | 1− RµW (f)
n
≤ 1− γ
}
.
Then, for every sequence 〈γn〉 such that γn → 0 and (log n) · γn →∞,
E
[∣∣B¯q(γn;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. For every instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and for every sequence 〈γn〉 satisfying the conditions,
1
n
γn
∣∣B¯q(γn;u, v)∣∣ ≤ 1
n
∑
f∈B¯q(γn;u,v)
RµW (f)
n
≤ 1
n
∑
f∈Fn
RµW (f)
n
.
We use Theorem 2 in Pittel (1989) showing that
∑
f∈Fn RµW (f)
n2 log−1 n
p−→ 1. (A.3)
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Applying (A.3), we shall write
∣∣B¯q(γn;U, V )∣∣
n
≤
∑
f∈Fn RµW (f)
n2
1
γn
=
∑
f∈Fn RµW (f)
n2 log−1 n
1
log n · γn
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
We obtain Lemma A.2.2 since
|B¯q(γn;U,V )|
n is bounded above by 1 with probability 1 for
all n so that convergence in probability implies convergence in mean (Theorem A.1.2).
Lemma A.2.3. For any γ > 0, let
B¯′(, 1− γ;u, v) :=
{
f ∈ F | ξˆf1−γ;n ≤ u¯− 
}
,
where ξˆf1−γ;n is the realized value of the empirical (1− γ)th quantile of Uf = 〈Uf,w〉w∈Wn.
Then, for every  > 0 and sequence 〈γn〉 such that γn → 0 and (log n) · γn →∞,
E
[∣∣B¯′(, 1− γn;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. For each n, let fn ∈ Fn and consider the resulting sequence 〈fn〉∞n=1. Note that
E
[ |B¯′(, 1− γn;U, V )|
n
]
=
1
n
∑
f∈Fn
E
[
1
{
ξˆf1−γn;n ≤ u¯− 
}]
= E
[
1
{
ξˆfn1−γn;n ≤ u¯− 
}]
= P
(
ξˆfn1−γn;n ≤ u¯− 
)
.
Thus, it is enough to show that
P
(
ξˆfn1−γn;n ≤ u¯− 
)
→ 0, as n→∞.
Take any q from the interval
(
ΓW (u¯− ), 1) such that qth quantile ξq is the unique
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solution x of ΓW (x−) ≤ q ≤ ΓW (x).2 For any large n, we have 1− γn > q, and thus
ξˆfn1−γn;n ≥ ξˆfnq;n.
Therefore, we shall write
P
(
ξˆfn1−γn;n ≤ u¯− 
)
≤ P
(
ξˆfnq;n ≤ u¯− 
)
= P
(∣∣∣ξˆfnq;n − ξq∣∣∣ ≥ ξq − (u¯− )) ,
which converges to 0 by Theorem A.1.4.
We complete the proof of Proposition A.2.1 using the following observation. For each
〈F,W, u, v〉 and for every sequence 〈γn〉 such that γn → 0 and (log n) · γn →∞,
B¯(;u, v) =
(
B¯(;u, v) ∩ B¯q(γn;u, v)
) ∪ (B¯(;u, v) ∩ (F\B¯q(γn;u, v)))
⊂ B¯q(γn;u, v) ∪
(
B¯(;u, v) ∩ (F\B¯q(γn;u, v)
)
.
Each f in F\B¯q(γn;u, v) matches in µW with a worker of a normalized rank less than
γn. Nevertheless if f obtains utility less than u¯ −  in µW (i.e. f ∈ B¯(;u, v)), then the
realized empirical (1− γn)th quantile of his utilities is below u¯− .
That is,
B¯(;u, v) ∩ F\B¯q(γn;u, v) ⊂ B¯′(, 1− γn;u, v),
and therefore
B¯(;u, v) ⊂ B¯q(γn;u, v) ∪ B¯′(, 1− γn;u, v).
We proved in Lemma A.2.2 and A.2.3 that both
|B¯q(γn;U,V )|
n and
|B¯′(,1−γn;U,V )|
n converge
to 0 in mean, which completes the proof.
2 There exists such a q. For every q in
(
ΓW (u¯− ), 1), we have xq in (u¯ − , u¯) such that ΓW (xq) = q
by Intermediate Value Theorem. Suppose toward contradiction that every q has two distinct xq and x¯q in
(u¯− , u¯) such that ΓW (xq) = ΓW (x¯q) = q. Since ΓW (·) is a distribution, every q then has a closed interval
[xq, x¯q] such that Γ
W (x) = q for all x ∈ [xq, x¯q]. Moreover, if q 6= q′, then [xq, x¯q] and [xq′ , x¯q′ ] are disjoint.
There are uncountable number of elements in
(
ΓW (u¯− ), 1), whereas there are at most countable number
of closed disjoint intervals in (u¯− , u¯).
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 1 (0 < λ < 1).
To simplify notations, we compress λ and 1− λ, and consider utilities defined as
Uf,w = U
o
w + ζf,w and Vf,w = V
o
f + ηf,w.
We do not lose generality since we can regard common-values and private-values as the ones
already multiplied by λ and 1− λ, respectively.
Let Uon and V
o
n be i.i.d samples of size n from distributions G
W and GF , respectively.
GW and GF have strictly positive density functions on supports in R+. ζ = [ζf,w] is an
i.i.d sample from a continuous distribution ΓW with support [0, u¯], and η = [ηf,w] is an i.i.d
sample from a continuous distribution ΓF with support [0, v¯].3
We define
BF (;u, v) := F\AF (;u, v) = {f ∈ F | ∆(f ;u, v) ≥ }
and prove that |B
F (;U,V )|
n converges to 0 in probability, which is equivalent to proving
convergence to 0 in mean (Theorem A.1.2). That is, we fix  > 0 and K ∈ N, and prove
that
P
( |BF (;U, V )|
n
>
9
K
)
→ 0, as n→∞.
First, we partition the supports of the common-value distributions into K intervals.
Then for each market instance, in particular for each realized profile of common-values, we
group firms and workers into two versions of a finite number of tiers, where agents in the
same tier have similar common-values. We first find that tier-k firms are most likely to
achieve a utility level higher than an arbitrary  less than the maximal utility achievable
from workers in tier-(k + 3) (Proposition A.7.1).4 For the proof, we use techniques from a
3 When λ > 0, we can relax this assumption such that each pair of ζf,w and ηf,w is an i.i.d sample from
a continuous joint distribution with a bounded support in R2+.
4 In Section 1.4, we showed with a market with tiers that firms in tier-t are most likely to achieve a utility
level higher than an arbitrary  less than the maximal utility from a worker in tier-(k+1). In the model with
tiers, each tier has a distinct tier-specific common-value, so there is a clear-cut distinction between tier-k
and tier-(k + 1) specific values. In the general model (without tiers), however, there is no such distinction
in common-values between adjacent tiers. The highest common-value of workers in tier-(k + 1) can be
arbitrarily close to the lowest common-value of workers in tier-k. This leads us to use the maximal utility
from a worker in tier-(k+3) rather than tier-(k+1) as an asymptotic lower bound on utilities of tier-k firms.
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theory of random bipartite graphs.
Once we find an asymptotic lower bound on utilities of firms in each tier, we find an
asymptotic upper bound on utilities of firms in a tier, say k, by referencing to the asymptotic
lower bounds on utilities of workers in tiers higher than k (Proposition A.7.2). As workers
in higher tiers achieve high utilities, they are most likely to match with firms in high tiers,
rather than firms in tier-k. Accordingly, the utilities of tier-k firms are asymptotically
bounded above by the maximal utility that they can achieve by matching with workers in
tiers near k.
As we finely partition the supports of the common-value distributions, the differences
in common-values between adjacent tiers become small. Then, the asymptotic lower bound
on utilities of tier-k firms will become close to the maximal utility achievable from workers
in tier-k. In addition, the asymptotic upper bound also becomes close to the same level,
since the maximal utility achievable from workers in tiers near k will also become close to
the maximal utility achievable from workers in tier-k.
We divide the proof into three subsections. First, in Subsection A.7.2, we construct two
tier structures from each profile of realized common-values. Then in Subsection A.7.3, we
define three events related to the tier structures, and show that the all three events occur
with a probability converging to 1 as the market becomes large. The real proof begins in
subsection A.7.4. During the proof, we shall focus on the market instances where realized
firms’ or workers’ common-values are all distinct. GF and GW are continuous, ensuring
that realized common-values are all distinct with probability 1.
A.3.1 Tier-Grouping
We use the following notations.
1. ξFq and ξ
W
q : q
th quantile of GF and GW .
2. ξˆFq;n and ξˆ
W
q;n: empirical q
th quantile of samples of size n from distributions GF and
GW , respectively. We also use ξˆFq;n and ξˆ
W
q;n to denote their realizations.
Since realized common-values uon = 〈uow〉w∈Wn and von = 〈vof 〉f∈Fn are all distinct with
probability 1, we index firms and workers from i = 1 to n in the order of their common-
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values: i.e.
vofi > v
o
fj
and uowi > u
o
wj , if i < j.
Then, Uowi;n and V
o
fi;n
represent ith highest values of n order statistics from GW and GF .
Note that Uowi;n = ξˆ
W
(1− i−1
n
);n
by the relationship between order statistics and empirical
quantiles (see Equation (A.1)).
We partition the support of GW into
IW1 := (ξ
W
1− 1
K
,∞]
IW2 := (ξ
W
1− 2
K
, ξW
1− 1
K
]
...
IWk := (ξ
W
1− k
K
, ξW
1− k−1
K
]
...
IWK := [0, ξ
W
1
K
].
We define the set of workers in tier-k (with respect to workers’ common-values) as
Wk(u) :=
{
w | uow ∈ IWk
}
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
and define the set of firms in tier-k (with respect to workers’ common-values) as
Fk(u) := {fi ∈ Fn | wi ∈Wk(u)}.
We will use the following notations.
1. lk(u) := |Fk(u)| = |Wk(u)|: The size of tier-k (with respect to workers’ common-
values).
2. uok := ξ
W
1− k
K
: The threshold level of tier-k and tier-(k + 1) workers’ common-values.
Note, w ∈Wk(u) if and only if uok < uow ≤ uok−1.
Remark 2. The set of tier-k workers is defined with respect to workers’ common-values,
which is a random sample. Therefore, Wk(U) is random, and so is Fk(U). In particular,
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the size of tier-k, lk(U), is random; whereas, u
o
k is a constant.
In parallel, we partition the support of GF into
IF1 := (ξ
F
1− 1
K
,∞]
IF2 := (ξ
F
1− 2
K
, ξF
1− 1
K
]
...
IFk := (ξ
F
1− k
K
, ξF
1− k−1
K
]
...
IFK := [0, ξ
F
1
K
].
We define the set of firms in tier-k (with respect to firms’ common-values) as
Fk(v) :=
{
f | vof ∈ IFk
}
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
and define the set of workers in tier-k (with respect to firms’ common-values) as
Wk(v) := {wi ∈Wn | fi ∈ Fk(v)}.
Accordingly, we use the following notations.
1. lk(v) := |Fk(v)| = |Wk(v)|: The size of tier-k (with respect to firms’ common-values).
2. vok := ξ
F
1− k
K
: The threshold level of tier-k and tier-(k+1) firms’ common-values. Note,
f ∈ Fk(u) if and only if vok < vof ≤ vok−1.
Remark 3. Tiers with respect to workers’ common-values are in general not the same
as tiers with respect to firms’ common-values. In particular, we are most likely to have
lk(u) 6= lk(v).
Throughout the proof, we mainly use tiers defined with respect to workers’ common-
values. However, we need both tier structures in the last part of the proof. We simply write
“tier-k” to denote tier-k with respect to workers’ common-values, and use “(w.r.t firm)
tier-k” to denote tier-k with respect to firms’ common-values.
73
A.3.2 High-Probability Events
We introduce three events and show that the events occur with probabilities converging to
1 as the market becomes large. We provide proofs for completeness, but the main ideas
are simply from the (weak) law of large numbers. In the next section, we will leave the
probability that the following events do not occur as a remainder term converging to zero,
and focus on the probabilities conditioned that the following events all occur.
A.3.2.1 No vanishing tiers
Event 1 (E1). Let K¯ > K. For all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K,
lk(U)
n
>
1
K¯
.
Proof. By definition,
lk(U)
n
:=
1
n
∑
w∈Wn
1{Uow ∈ IWk },
which converges to 1K in probability by the (weak) law of large numbers.
A.3.2.2 Distinct common-values of the firms in non-adjacent tiers.
Let ˜ > 0 be such that for any v, v′ ∈ [0, ξF1−1/K ] and |v − v′| ≤ ˜,
|GF (v)−GF (v′)| < 1
3K
.
There exists such an ˜ since GF is uniformly continuous on [0, ξF1−1/K ].
Event 2 (E2). For every k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 2,
min
f∈Fk(U)
f ′∈Fk+2(U)
|V of − V of ′ | > ˜.
Proof. Fix k ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K − 2 and realized u. For every wi ∈Wk(u) and wj ∈Wk+2(u),
uowi > u
o
k = ξ
W
1− k
K
, and uowj ≤ uok+1 = ξW1− k+1
K
. (A.4)
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For any q ∈ (0, 1), ξˆWq;n p−→ ξWq (Theorem A.1.4), from which the following inequalities
hold with probability converging to 1 as n→∞.
ξW
1− k
K
> ξˆW
1− k
K
− 1
4K
and ξW
1− k+1
K
< ξˆW
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
. (A.5)
Considering (A.21) and the relation between order statistics and empirical quantiles
(Equation (A.1)), if (A.22) holds, we have
1− k
K
− 1
4K
< min
wi∈Wk(u)
(
1− i− 1
n
)
= min
fi∈Fk(u)
(
1− i− 1
n
)
and
1− k + 1
K
+
1
4K
> max
wj∈Wk+2(u)
(
1− j − 1
n
)
= max
fj∈Fk+2(u)
(
1− j − 1
n
)
.
Then for every fi ∈ Fk(u) and fj ∈ Fk+2(u),
vofi > ξˆ
F
1− k
K
− 1
4K
and vofj < ξˆ
F
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
.
Therefore,
P
(
inf
fi∈Fk(U)
fj∈Fk+2(U)
∣∣∣V ofi − V ofj ∣∣∣ ≤ ˜) ≤ P (∣∣∣ξˆF1− k
K
− 1
4K
− ξˆF
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
∣∣∣ ≤ ˜)+Rn
≤ P
(∣∣∣GF (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
4K
)−GF (ξˆF
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
)
∣∣∣ < 1
3K
)
+Rn,(A.6)
where Rn corresponds to the probability that (A.22) is violated: i.e. Rn → 0. The last
inequality is by the definition of ˜.
Note that
GF (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
4K
)−GF (ξˆF
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
)
p−→ 1
2K
by Theorem A.1.4 and continuity of GF (Theorem A.1.3). As a result, the right hand side
of (A.23) converges to 0.
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A.3.2.3 Similarity between tiers w.r.t workers’ common-values and tiers w.r.t
firms’ common-values
The following event is the case that all firms in tier-k with respect to workers’ common-
values are in a tier near k with respect to firms’ common-values, and vice versa.
Event 3 (E3). For every k = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,K,
Fk(U) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Fk′(V ) and Wk(V ) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Wk′(U).
5
Proof. We prove the first part and omit the proof of the second part.
For each realized (u, v), we have
{uow|w ∈Wk(u)} ⊂
(
uok, u
o
k−1
]
=
(
ξW
1− k
K
, ξW
1− k−1
K
]
. (A.7)
Suppose (
ξW
1− k
K
, ξW
1− k−1
K
]
⊂
(
ξˆW
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, ξˆW
1− k−1
K
+ 1
2K
]
, (A.8)
and (
ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 1
2K
]
⊂
(
ξF
1− k+1
K
, ξF
1− k−2
K
]
. (A.9)
If (A.25) hold, then (A.24) implies that for every tier-k worker wi, we have
uowi ∈
(
ξˆW
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, ξˆW
1− k−1
K
+ 1
2K
]
,
and thus,
1− i− 1
n
∈
(
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, 1− k − 1
K
+
1
2K
]
.
Then for any tier-k firm fi, we have
vofi ∈
(
ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 1
2K
]
,
5 We simply assume that F0(V ), F0(V ), WK+1(U), and WK+1(U) are empty sets.
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which implies that {
vof | f ∈ Fk(u)
} ⊂ (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 1
2K
]
.
Consequently if both (A.25) and (A.26) hold, then
{
vof | f ∈ Fk(u)
} ⊂ (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
2K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 1
2K
]
⊂
(
ξF
1− k+1
K
, ξF
1− k−2
K
]
=
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
IFk′ .
In other words,
Fk(u) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Fk′(v).
(A.25) and (A.26) occur with probability converging to 1 (Theorem A.1.4), and thus
the event E3 also occurs with probability converging to 1.
A.3.3 Proof of the Theorem 1
We choose K large enough that
max
1≤k≤K−1
∣∣uok − uok+1∣∣ ≡ max
1≤k≤K−1
∣∣∣ξW
1− k
K
− ξW
1− k+1
K
∣∣∣ < 
9
.6 (A.10)
We divide the proof into two propositions. The first proposition finds an asymptotic
lower bound on utilities of firms in each tier, using techniques from the theory of random
bipartite graphs. Similarly, we have a proposition for an asymptotic lower bound on utilities
of workers in each tier. The second proposition derives an asymptotic upper bound on
utilities of firms in each tier, by referencing the lower bounds on utilities of workers in
higher tiers. The Theorem 1 follows from the fact that the lower bound and the upper
bound are close to each other.
6 We can always satisfy the condition since GW has a strictly positive density function.
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Proposition A.3.1. For each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and for each k¯ = 1, 2, . . . ,K− 2, define
BˆFk¯ (;u, v) :=
{
f ∈ Fk¯(u) : uµW (f) ≤ uok¯+2 + u¯− 
}
.7
Then for any  > 0,
|BˆF
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. For each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and for each k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, let F≤k(u) :=
⋃
k′≤k Fk′(u)
and F<k(u) :=
⋃
k′<k Fk′(u). Similarly, we define W≤k(u) and W<k(u).
Take any k¯ from {1, 2, . . . ,K−2}. We construct a bipartite graph with Fk¯(u)∪W≤k¯+2(u)
as a partitioned set of nodes. (see Section 3 for the related definitions.) Two vertices
f ∈ Fk¯(u) and w ∈W≤k¯+2(u) are joined by an edge if and only if
ζf,w ≤ u¯−  or ηf,w ≤ v¯ − ˜,
where ˜ is the value taken before, while defining E2.
Let W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) be the set of workers in tiers up to k¯ + 2 who are not matched with
firms in tiers up to k¯ + 1 in µW . That is,
W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) :=
{
w ∈W≤k¯+2(u) |µW (w) /∈ F≤k¯+1(u)
}
.
We now show that if E2 holds, then
BˆFk¯ (;u, v) ∪ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v)
is a biclique.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that a pair of f ∈ BˆF
k¯
(;u, v) and w ∈ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) is
not joined by an edge: i.e.
ζf,w > u¯−  and ηf,w > v¯ − ˜.
7 Note that uok¯+2 + u¯ is the maximal utility level a firm can achieve by matching with a worker in
tier-(k¯ + 3).
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Then, we first have
uf,w = u
o
w + ζf,w > u
o
k¯+2 + ζf,w > u
o
k¯+2 + u¯− , (A.11)
and also have
vf,w = v
o
f + ηf,w ≥ min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ + ηf,w > min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ + v¯ − ˜.8
Conditioned on E2, we can proceed further and obtain
vf,w > min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ + v¯ −
(
min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ − max
f ′′∈Fk¯+2(u)
vof ′′
)
= max
f ′′∈Fk¯+2(u)
vof ′′ + v¯. (A.12)
On the other hand, f ∈ BˆF
k¯
(;u, v) implies that
uµW (f) ≤ uok¯+2 + u¯− ,
and w ∈ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) implies that
vµW (w) ≤ max
f ′′∈Fk¯+2(u)
vof ′′ + v¯,
since a worker can obtain utility higher than maxf ′′∈Fk¯+2(u) v
o
f ′′ + v¯ only by matching with
a firm in F≤k¯+1(u).
Then, (A.28) and (A.29) implies that (f, w) would have blocked µW , contradicting that
µW is stable. Therefore,
BˆFk¯ (;u, v) ∪ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v).
is a biclique, which is not necessarily balanced.
We now control the size of BˆF
k¯
(;U, V ) by referencing Theorem 3. Let uo and vo be
realized common-values such that events E1 and E2 hold. Then, the remaining randomness
8 We should not replace minf ′∈Fk¯(u) v
o
f ′ with v
o
k¯. Fk¯(u) is defined with respect to workers’ common-values,
rather than firms’ common-values.
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of U and V is from ζ and η. Consider a random bipartite graph with Fk¯(U) ∪W≤k¯+2(U)
as a bi-partitioned set of nodes, where each pair of f ∈ Fk¯(U) and w ∈W≤k¯+2(U) is joined
by an edge if and only if
ζf,w ≤ u¯−  or ηf,w ≤ v¯ − ˜.
In other words, every pair is joined by an edge independently with probability
p() = 1− (1− ΓW (u¯− )) · (1− ΓF (v¯ − ˜)) .
We write β(n) := 2 · log(l≤k¯+2(U))/ log 1p() , and show that
P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| ≤ β(n)
)
→ 1 as n→∞.9
First, observe that W¯≤k¯+2(U, V ) is the size of at least lk¯+2(U). Among l≤k¯+2(U) workers
in tiers up to k¯+2 at most l≤k¯+1(U) are matched with firms in tiers up to k¯+1. In addition,
lk¯+2(U) > β(n) with large n, since E1 holds. Therefore, with large n, we shall write
P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| ≤ β(n)
)
= P
(
min
{
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )|, |W¯≤k¯+2(U, V )|
}
≤ β(n)
)
. (A.13)
Let α(U, V )× α(U, V ) be the size of a maximum balance biclique of the random graph
G
(
Fk¯(U) ∪W≤k¯+2(U) , p()
)
.
Since every realized BˆF
k¯
(;u, v)∪W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) is a biclique, it contains a balanced biclique
of the size equals to
min
{
|BˆFk¯ (;u, v)| , |W¯≤k¯+2(u, v)|
}
.
Therefore,
P
(
min
{
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )|, |W¯≤k¯+2(U, V )|
}
≤ β(n)
)
≥ P (α(U, V ) ≤ β(n)) . (A.14)
9 Note that we fixed common-values as a realization uo and vo such that the events E1 and E2 occur.
Thus for now, the tier-structure is deterministic, and β(n) is, in turn, a deterministic sequence.
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Applying Theorem 3 to (A.14) and using (A.13),
P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| ≤ β(n)
)
≥ P (α(U, V ) ≤ β(n))→ 1. (A.15)
Lastly, we consider random utilities U and V , in which common-values are yet realized.
For every ′ > 0,
P
(
|BˆF
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
> ′
)
= P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| > ′ · n
)
≤ P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| > β(n) | E1, E2
)
+Rn, with large n,
where Rn is the probability that either E1 or E2 does not hold: i.e. Rn → 0. The inequality is
from the fact that ′ ·n > β(n) with large n. We complete the proof by applying (A.15).
We also obtain the counterpart proposition of Proposition A.7.1 in terms of tiers defined
with respect to firms’ common-values.
Proposition A.7.1∗ For each k¯ = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 2, define
BˆWk¯ (;u, v) :=
{
w ∈Wk¯(v)|vµF (w) ≤ vok¯+2 + v¯ − 
}
.
Then for any  > 0,
|BˆW
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. We omit the proof since it is analogous to the proof of Proposition A.7.1.
For each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and for each k¯ = 1, 2, . . . ,K, we define
BFk¯ (;u, v) := {f ∈ Fk¯(u)|∆(f ;u, v) ≥ }.
Proposition A.3.2. If k¯ = 7, 8, . . . ,K − 2, then for any  > 0,
|BF
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
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Proof. In Proposition A.7.1∗ with k = 1, 2, . . . ,K − 3, we replace  with
k := v
o
k+2 − vok+3,
and write
BˆWk (k;u, v) =
{
w ∈Wk(v)|vµF (w) ≤ vok+3 + v¯
}
.10
Then,
|BˆWk (k;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞. (A.16)
Note that a worker receives utility higher than vok+3 + v¯ only by matching with a firm
in (w.r.t firm) tiers up to k + 3.11 Thus for k = 5, 6, . . . ,K,
{w ∈W≤k−4(V ) : µ(w) ∈ Fk(V )} ⊂
k−4⋃
k′=1
BˆWk′ (k′ ;U, V ). (A.17)
If event E3 holds, we can translate (A.34) into an expression with tiers w.r.t workers’
common-values. That is, for k = 7, 8, . . . ,K,
{w ∈W≤k−6(U) : µF (w) ∈ Fk(U)} ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
{w ∈W≤k−6(U) : µF (w) ∈ Fk′(V )}
⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
{w ∈W≤k−5(V ) : µF (w) ∈ Fk′(V )}
⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
{w ∈W≤k′−4(V ) : µF (w) ∈ Fk′(V )}
where the first and second inequalities are from E3.
By applying (A.34), we obtain
{w ∈W≤k−6(U) : µF (w) ∈ Fk(U)} ⊂
k−3⋃
k′=1
BˆWk′ (k′ ;U, V ).
10 Recall that vok is a constant, defined as v
o
k := ξ
F
1− k
K
.
11 Recall that f ∈ Fk(v) if and only if vok < vof ≤ vok−1. Thus, if f ∈ F>k+3(v) then vof ≤ vok+3.
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It follows that
|{f ∈ Fk(U) : µF (f) ∈W≤k−6(U)}|
n
p−→ 0, (A.18)
because for every  > 0,
P
( |{f ∈ Fk(U) : µF (f) ∈W≤k−6(U)}|
n
> 
)
≤ P
(
k−3∑
k′=1
|BˆWk′ (k′ ;U, V )|
n
> 
)
+Rn,
where Rn is the probability that E3 does not hold: i.e. Rn → 0. The right hand side
converges to 0 by (A.33).
We complete the proof of Proposition A.7.2 by proving the following claim. Proposi-
tion A.7.1 and (A.35) show that the normalized sizes of two sets on the right hand side of
(A.36) converge to 0 in probability.
Claim A.3.1. For k¯ = 7, 8, . . . ,K − 2 and each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉,
BFk¯ (;u, v) ⊂ BˆFk¯ (/9;u, v) ∪
{
f ∈ Fk¯(u)|µF (f) ∈W≤k¯−6(u)
}
. (A.19)
Proof of Claim A.7.1. If a firm f ∈ Fk¯(u) is not in BˆFk¯ (/9;u, v), then
uµW (f) > u
o
k¯+2 + u¯− /9,
and if the firm f is not in
{
f ∈ Fk¯(u)|µF (f) ∈W≤k¯−6(u)
}
, then
uµF (f) ≤ uok¯−6 + u¯.
Therefore, using (A.27) we obtain
uµF (f)− uµW (f) ≤ uok¯−6 − uok¯+2 + /9 < ,
and thus f is not in BF
k¯
(;u, v).
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Lastly, we complete the proof of Theorem 1 by the following inequalities.
P
( |BF (;U, V )|
n
>
9
K
)
= P
 ∑
1≤k≤K
|BFk (;U, V )|
n
>
9
K

< P
 ∑
7≤k≤K−2
|BFk (;U, V )|
n
+
∑
k=1,...,6,K−1,K
lk(U)
n
>
9
K
 .
The last probability converges to 0. For each k = 7, . . . ,K − 2, the proportion |BFk (;U,V )|n
converges to 0 in probability (Proposition A.7.2). For each k = 1, . . . , 6,K − 1,K, the
proportion lk(U)n converges to
1
K in probability by the (weak) law of large numbers.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
For each  > 0, we first define
BFE (;u, v) := F\AFE(;u, v) = {f ∈ F | ∆E(f ;u, v) ≥ } ,
and show that
E
[∣∣BFE (;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 0 as n→∞.
For each n, let fn ∈ Fn and consider the resulting sequence 〈fn〉∞n=1. For any  > 0,
E
[ |BFE (;U, V )|
n
]
= E
[
1{fn ∈ BFE (;U, V )}
]
= P (∆E(fn;U, V ) ≥ ) .
Thus if ∆E(fn;U, V )
p−→ 0, then for every , |BFE (,U,V )|n converges to zero in mean,
thereby completing the proof.
Claim A.4.1.
∆E(fn;U, V )
p−→ 0, as n→∞.
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Proof. For every  > 0,
P (∆(fn;U, V ) ≥ ) = E [1{∆(fn;U, V ) ≥ }]
= E
[ |F\AF (;U, V )|
n
]
.
The last term converges to 0 by Theorem 1, and thus ∆(fn;U, V )
p−→ 0.
Let u¯o and u¯ be upper bounds of common-value distribution and private-value distribu-
tion of workers, respectively. Then, ∆(fn;U, V ) is bounded above by λ u¯
o + (1 − λ)u¯ with
probability 1. We obtain by Theorem A.1.2 that
lim
n→∞E[∆E(fn;U, V )] = limn→∞E [E [∆(fn;U, V )|Πfn ]] = limn→∞E [∆(fn;U, V )] = 0.
The Claim A.4.1 follows by Theorem A.1.1.
A.5 Additional Simulations on the Proportion of Unmatched
Agents
The simulation results in Section 1.1.4 show that the short preference condition assumed
in Roth and Peranson (1999), Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), and Kojima and Pathak
(2009) may leave most agents in a large market unmatched in stable matchings. It is worth
noting that random preferences in the previous simulations were generated by the setup of
our model, rather than the previous studies’ model. That is, the previous simulations do
not directly represent features of previous models. In this section, we show the increasing
proportions of unmatched agents with simulations based on the previous studies’ model.
Let L be the maximum number of firms that each worker considers acceptable. We gen-
erate random preferences following the previous model, in particular Immorlica and Mah-
dian (2005). Immorlica and Mahdian studied one-to-one matching markets with generally
distributed random preferences. For each market size n, a market is given two underlying
distributions, one for firms and the other for workers, called popularity distributions.12 A
12 Immorlica and Mahdian (2005) construct random preferences only for workers: firms’ preferences are
arbitrarily given. In our simulation, we also generate firms’ preferences randomly, rather than assuming
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worker’s preference list is constructed by sequentially sampling L firms from the popularity
distribution without replacement. The firm chosen first is the most preferred, and the next
chosen firm becomes the second most preferred. We similarly construct firms’ preferences,
except that firms’ preferences are of length n: i.e., all workers are acceptable.
We use two classes of popularity distributions.
1. Normalized geometric distribution
For each market size n, we define the normalized geometric distribution as:
PDF : pk =
(1− q)k∑n
k′=1(1− q)k′
, (0 ≤ q < 1, k = 1, 2, . . . , n).
Consider a pair of firms, fk1 and fk2 (k1 < k2 ≤ n). For each worker, the probability
of choosing fk1 before fk2 , conditioned on at least one of the firms chosen, equals to
(1− q)k1
(1− q)k1 + (1− q)k2 =
1
1 + (1− q)k2−k1 .
which is independent of the market size n. If q = 0, we have the uniform popular-
ity distribution over firms, so all firms have an equal chance of being chosen before
another. As q becomes close to 1, more popular firms have higher chances of be-
ing chosen before other firms, which generates a commonality of preferences among
workers.
2. Normalized log-normal distribution
Let F ( · ;µ, σ) be the cumulative distribution function of a log-normal distribution.
For each market size n, we define the normalized log-normal distribution as:
PDF : pk =
F ( k ;µ, σ)− F ( k − 1 ;µ, σ)
F (n ;µ, σ)
, (µ, σ ∈ R, k = 1, 2, . . . , n).
For each µ, as σ increases, firms have similar probabilities to be chosen. This generates
a weaker commonality of preferences among workers.
particular preferences. Accordingly, we can measure the general likely proportions of unmatched agents.
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(a) Normalized geometric distribution
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(b) Normalized log-normal distribution
Figure A.1: Proportions of unmatched agents in stable matchings.
Figure A.1 shows that the proportion of unmatched agents in stable matchings increases
as a market becomes large. Each graph represents the proportion of unmatched agents,
when workers consider 30 most preferred firms acceptable. The proportions are averaged
over 10 repetitions.
A.6 An Extended Model
We extend the model to allow that (i) the number of firms may differ from the number
workers and (ii) some workers (or firms) may not be acceptable to some firms (or workers).
Accordingly, firms (or workers) may remain unmatched in a stable matching. Moreover, we
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allow that (iii) private values for each pair of a firm and a worker are possibly correlated.
Theorem 1 in the main paper holds in this extended model as well.
Let F be the set of n firms and W be the set of m workers. Utilities are represented by
n×m random matrices U = [Uf,w] and V = [Vf,w]. When a firm f and a worker w match
with one another, the firm f receives utility Uf,w and the worker w receives utility Vf,w.
For each pair (f, w), utilities are defined as
Uf,w = λ U
o
w + (1− λ) ζf,w and
Vf,w = λ V
o
f + (1− λ) ηf,w (0 < λ ≤ 1).
We call Uow and V
o
f common-values, and ζf,w and ηf,w private-values.
13
Common-values are defined as random vectors
Uo := 〈Uow〉w∈W and V o := 〈V of 〉f∈F .
〈Uow〉w∈W is an i.i.d sample of size m from a distribution with a positive density function
on a bounded support in R. 〈V of 〉f∈F is defined similarly.
Independent private-values are defined as two n×m random matrices
ζ := [ζf,w] and η := [ηf,w].
Each pair (ζf,w, ηf,w) is randomly drawn from a joint distribution on a bounded support
in R2. We normalize utilities such that firms and workers remaining unmatched receive 0
utility.
A random market is defined as a tuple 〈F,W,U, V 〉. We denote realized matrices of U
and V by u and v. A market instance is then denoted by 〈F,W, u, v〉. With probability 1,
the market has all distinct utilities, none of which equals to 0. As such, for each 〈F,W, u, v〉,
we can derive a strict preference list f as
f= w,w′, . . . , f, . . . , w′′
13Note that we exclude the pure private value case (λ = 0).
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if and only if
uf,w > uf,w′ > · · · > 0 > · · · > uf,w′′ .
Take any α ∈ (0,∞), and consider a sequence mn such that mnn converges to α. We study
properties of stable matchings in the sequence of random markets 〈Fn,Wmn , Un×mn , Vn×mn〉∞n=1.
We often omit the indexes n and mn, or simply write n and m.
Given a market instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and a matching µ, we let uµ(·) and vµ(·) denote
utilities from the matching: i.e. uµ(f) := uf,µ(f) and vµ(w) := vµ(w),w. For each f ∈ F , we
define ∆(f ;u, v) as the difference between utilities from firm-optimal and worker-optimal
stable matchings: i.e.
∆(f ;u, v) := uµF (f)− uµW (f).
For every  > 0, we have the set of firms whose utilities are within  of one another for all
stable matchings, which is denoted by
AF (;u, v) := {f ∈ F | ∆(f ;u, v) < } .
Theorem A.6.1. For every  > 0,
E
[∣∣AF (;U, V )∣∣
n
]
→ 1, as n→∞.
We have similar notations and a theorem for workers, which are omitted here.
The intuition of Theorem A.6.1 is from the fact that the set of unmatched firms and
workers is the same for all stable matchings (McVitie and Wilson (1970)). Firms and
workers who remain unmatched have no difference in utilities from all stable matchings.
Firms and workers who are matched in stable matchings have small differences in utilities
by Theorem 1 in the main paper.
A.7 Proof of Theorem A.6.1
We prove the theorem when 0 < λ < 1. If λ = 1, assortative matching forms a unique
stable matching, and Theorem 1 follows immediately.
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We first simplify the notations by compressing λ and 1 − λ and considering utilities
defined as
Uf,w = U
o
w + ζf,w and Vf,w = V
o
f + ηf,w.
We do not lose generality since we can regard common-values and private-values as the ones
already multiplied by λ and 1− λ, respectively.
Let Uo := 〈Uow〉w∈W be an i.i.d sample of size m from a distribution GW , and V o :=
〈V of 〉f∈F be an i.i.d sample of size n from a distribution GF . GW and GF have strictly
positive density functions on R. Each pair (ζf,w, ηf,w) is randomly drawn from a joint
distribution Γ with a support bounded above by (u¯, v¯).
We define
BF (;u, v) := F\AF (;u, v) = {f ∈ F | ∆(f ;u, v) ≥ }
and prove that |B
F (;U,V )|
n converges to 0 in probability, which is equivalent to proving
convergence to 0 in the mean (Theorem A.1.2). That is, we fix  > 0 and K ∈ N, and prove
that
P
( |BF (;U, V )|
n
>
14
K
)
→ 0, as n→∞.
A.7.1 Preliminary Notations
1. ξFq (or ξ
W
q ) : q
th quantile of GF (or GW ).
2. ξˆFq;n: empirical q
th quantile of a sample of size n from GF . We also use ξˆFq;n to denote
its realization.
3. ξˆWq;m: empirical q
th quantile of a sample of size m from GW . We also use ξˆWq;m to denote
its realization.
Since common-values are all distinct with probability 1, we index firms and workers in
the order of their common-values: i.e.
vofi > v
o
fj
and uowi > u
o
wj , if i < j.
Then, Uowi;m (or V
o
fi;n
) represents the ith highest value of m (or n) order statistics from GW
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(or GF ). Note that Uowi;m = ξˆ
W
(1− i−1m );m
and V ofi;n = ξˆ
F
(1− i−1n );n
by the relationship between
order statistics and empirical quantiles (see Appendix A.1).
Some firms may remain unmatched in stable matchings due to unequal populations of
firms and workers, or because some firms (or workers) are not acceptable to some workers
(or firms). Especially if a firm has a common value less than u¯, all workers consider the
firm unacceptable. Roughly, GW (−u¯) is the proportion of workers who are not acceptable
to any firm, and GF (−v¯) is the proportion of firms which are not acceptable to any worker.
Accordingly, we denote an asymptotic upper bound of the proportion of firms matched in
stable matchings by
β := min{α(1−GW (−u¯)), 1−GF (−v¯)}.
A.7.2 Tier-Grouping
We partition R into
IW1 := (ξ
W
1− 1
αK
,∞)
IW2 := (ξ
W
1− 2
αK
, ξW
1− 1
αK
]
. . .
IWk := (ξ
W
1− k
αK
, ξW
1− k−1
αK
]
. . .
IWK′ := (ξ
W
1− K′
αK
, ξW
1−K′−1
αK
]
IWK′+1 := (−∞, ξW1− K′
αK
],
where K ′ = dβKe.14
For each 〈F,W, u, v〉, we define the set of workers in tier-k (with respect to workers’
14 K′ is the smallest integer which is greater than or equal to βK. If 1− K′
αK
≤ 0, we let ξW
1− K′
αK
equals to
the infimum of the support of GW .
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common-values) as
Wk(u) :=
{
w | uow ∈ IWk
}
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ + 1
and define the set of firms in tier-k (with respect to workers’ common-values) as
Fk(u) := {fi ∈ F | wi ∈Wk(u)} for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′, and
FK′+1(u) := F\
K′⋃
k=1
Fk(u).
Note that FK′+1(u) may include firms with indexes larger than the number of workers.
Similarly, we partition R into
IF1 := (ξ
F
1− 1
K
,∞)
IF2 := (ξ
F
1− 2
K
, ξF
1− 1
K
]
. . .
IFk := (ξ
F
1− k
K
, ξF
1− k−1
K
]
. . .
IFK′ := (ξ
F
1−K′
K
, ξF
1−K′−1
K
]
IFK′+1 := (−∞, ξF1−K′
K
].
where K ′ = dβKe.
We define the set of firms in tier-k (with respect to firms’ common-values) as
Fk(v) :=
{
f | vof ∈ IFk
}
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′,K ′ + 1
and define the set of workers in tier-k (with respect to firms’ common-values) as
Wk(v) := {wi ∈W | fi ∈ Fk(v)} for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′, and
WK′+1(v) := W\
K′⋃
k=1
Wk(v).
92
Note that WK′+1(v) may include workers with indexes larger than the number of firms.
We use the following notations.
1. uok := ξ
W
1− k
αK
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′: The threshold level of tier-k and tier-(k+1) workers’
common-values. That is, w ∈Wk(u) if and only if uok < uow ≤ uok−1.
2. vok := ξ
F
1− k
K
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′: The threshold level of tier-k and tier-(k + 1) firms’
common-values. That is, f ∈ Fk(v) if and only if vok < vof ≤ vok−1.
Remark 4. 1. The set of tier-k workers (with respect to workers’ common-values) is
defined with a random sample. Therefore, Wk(U) is random, and so is Fk(U); whereas,
uok is a constant. Similarly, Fk(V ) and Wk(V ) are random; whereas, v
o
k is a constant.
2. Tiers with respect to workers’ common-values are in general not the same as tiers with
respect to firms’ common-values. In particular, we are most likely to have |Fk(U)| 6=
|Fk(V )|.
Throughout the proof, we mainly use tiers defined with respect to workers’ common-
values. However, we need both tier structures in the last part of the proof. We simply write
“tier-k” to denote tier-k with respect to workers’ common-values, and use “(w.r.t firm)
tier-k” to denote tier-k with respect to firms’ common-values.
A.7.3 High-Probability Events
We introduce three events and show that the events occur with probabilities converging to
1 as the market becomes large. We provide proofs for completeness, but the main ideas
are simply from the (weak) law of large numbers. In the next section, we will leave the
probability that the following events do not occur as a remainder term converging to zero,
and focus on the cases where the following events all occur.
A.7.3.1 No vanishing tier and an equal number of firms and workers in each
tier.
Event 4 (E1). 1. For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′, the sets Fk(U), Wk(U), Fk(V ), and Wk(V ) are
all non empty.
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2. For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 1,
|Fk(U)| = |Wk(U)| and |Fk(V )| = |Wk(V )|.
Proof. The second part immediately follows from the first part. For instance, FK′(U) 6= ∅
implies that the total number of firms is larger than the number of workers in tier up to
K ′ − 1. By definition of tiers with respect to workers’ common-values, we have |Fk(U)| =
|Wk(U)| for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 1.
We only prove that FK′(U) and WK′(U) are non empty with probability converging to
one as the market becomes large. Proofs for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 1 are almost analogous, and
we omit here.
Note that
1− K
′ − 1
αK
> 1− βK
αK
≥ 0,
which implies that for each w ∈W ,
P
(
uow ∈ IWK′
)
= GW
(
ξW
1−K′−1
αK
)
−GW
(
ξW
1− K′
αK
)
> 0.
As such, WK′(U) = ∅ occurs with probability converging to 0 as the market becomes large.
When WK′(U) is not empty, FK′(U) remains empty only if the total number of firms is
no more than the number of workers in tiers up to K ′ − 1. That is,
1 ≤ 1
n
K′−1∑
k=1
|Wk(U)|. (A.20)
Note that
1
n
K′−1∑
k=1
|Wk(U)| = m
n
· 1
m
m∑
k=1
1{Uow ≥ uoK′−1}
p−→ α · K
′ − 1
αK
=
dβKe
K
− 1
K
≤ 1− 1
K
.
The convergence in probability is by the (weak) law of large numbers and Theorem A.1.3.
Therefore, the inequality (A.20) holds with probability converging to zero, and thus FK′(U)
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is not empty with probability converging to 1.
A.7.3.2 Distinct common-values of the agents in non-adjacent tiers.
Let ˜ > 0 be such that for any v, v′ ∈ R,
|v − v′| ≤ ˜ =⇒ |GF (v)−GF (v′)| < 1
3K
,
and for any u, u′ ∈ R,
|u− u′| ≤ ˜ =⇒ |GW (u)−GW (u′)| < 1
3αK
.
There exists such an ˜ since GF and GW are continuous on their bounded supports, so
uniformly continuous.
Event 5 (E2). For every k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 2,
min
f∈Fk(U)
f ′∈Fk+2(U)
|V of − V of ′ | > ˜ and min
w∈Wk(V )
w′∈Wk+2(V )
|Uow − Uow′ | > ˜.
Proof. We prove only the first part. Fix a realized matrix u such that E1 holds. For any
k ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 2 and for any wi ∈Wk(u) and wj ∈Wk+2(u),
uowi > u
o
k = ξ
W
1− k
αK
and uowj ≤ uok+1 = ξW1− k+1
αK
. (A.21)
For any q ∈ (0, 1), ξˆWq;m p−→ ξWq (Theorem A.1.4), from which the following inequalities
hold with probability converging to 1.
ξW
1− k
αK
> ξˆW
1− k
αK
− 1
8αK
and ξW
1− k+1
αK
< ξˆW
1− k+1
αK
+ 1
8αK
. (A.22)
Considering (A.21) and the relation between order statistics and empirical quantiles (see
Appendix A.1), if (A.22) holds, we have
1− k
αK
− 1
8αK
< min
wi∈Wk(u)
(
1− i− 1
m
)
= min
fi∈Fk(u)
(
1− i− 1
m
)
,
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which implies that
1− k
K
− 1
8K
< min
fi∈Fk(u)
(
1− α(i− 1)
m
)
< min
fi∈Fk(u)
(
1− i− 1
n
+
1
8K
)
with large n.
In addition, we have
1− k + 1
K
+
1
8K
> max
wj∈Wk+2(u)
(
1− α(j − 1)
m
)
= max
fj∈Fk+2(u)
(
1− α(j − 1)
m
)
,
which implies that
1− k + 1
K
+
1
4K
> max
fj∈Fk+2(u)
(
1− j − 1
n
)
with large n.
As such for every fi ∈ Fk(u) and fj ∈ Fk+2(u),
vofi > ξˆ
F
1− k
K
− 1
4K
and vofj < ξˆ
F
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
.
Therefore,
P
(
inf
fi∈Fk(U)
fj∈Fk+2(U)
∣∣V ofi − V ofj ∣∣ ≤ ˜) ≤ P (∣∣ξˆF1− k
K
− 1
4K
− ξˆF
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
∣∣ ≤ ˜)+Rn
≤ P
(∣∣GF (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
4K
)−GF (ξˆF
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
)
∣∣ < 1
3K
)
+Rn,(A.23)
where Rn corresponds to the probability that either E1 does not hold or (A.22) is violated:
i.e. Rn → 0. The last inequality is by the definition of ˜.
Note that
GF (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 1
4K
)−GF (ξˆF
1− k+1
K
+ 1
4K
)
p−→ 1
2K
by Theorem A.1.4 and continuity of GF (Theorem A.1.3). As a result, the right hand side
of (A.23) converges to 0.
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A.7.3.3 Similarity between tiers w.r.t workers’ common-values and tiers w.r.t
firms’ common-values
Event 6 (E3). For every k = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,K ′ + 1,
Fk(U) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Fk′(V ) and Wk(V ) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Wk′(U).
15
Proof. We prove the first part for k = 1, . . . ,K ′ under the condition that E1 holds.16
For each realized (u, v), we have
{uow|w ∈Wk(u)} ⊂
(
uok, u
o
k−1
]
=
(
ξW
1− k
αK
, ξW
1− k−1
αK
]
. (A.24)
Suppose (
ξW
1− k
αK
, ξW
1− k−1
αK
]
⊂
(
ξˆW
1− k
αK
− 1
3αK
, ξˆW
1− k−1
αK
+ 1
3αK
]
, (A.25)
and (
ξˆF
1− k
K
− 2
3K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 2
3K
]
⊂
(
ξF
1− k+1
K
, ξF
1− k−2
K
]
. (A.26)
If (A.25) hold, then (A.24) implies that for every tier-k worker wi, we have
uowi ∈
(
ξˆW
1− k
αK
− 1
3αK
, ξˆW
1− k−1
αK
+ 1
3αK
]
,
and thus,
1− i− 1
m
∈
(
1− k
αK
− 1
3αK
, 1− k − 1
αK
+
1
3αK
]
,
which implies that
1− i− 1
n
∈
(
1− k
K
− 2
3K
, 1− k − 1
K
+
2
3K
]
with large n.
15 We define F0(V ), W0(V ), WK′+2(U), and WK′+2(U) as empty sets.
16 For k = 1, 2, we need to modify the proof by replacing the intervals such as (ξW
1− k
αK
, ξW
1− k−1
αK
] with
(ξW
1− k
αK
,∞) and (ξF
1− k+1
K
, ξF
1− k−2
K
] with (ξF
1− k+1
K
,∞). We omit the modifications since they are trivial and
tedious.
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Then for any tier-k firm fi, we have
vofi ∈
(
ξˆF
1− k
K
− 2
3K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 2
3K
]
,
which implies that {
vof | f ∈ Fk(u)
} ⊂ (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 2
3K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 2
3K
]
.
Consequently if both (A.25) and (A.26) hold, then
{
vof | f ∈ Fk(u)
} ⊂ (ξˆF
1− k
K
− 2
3K
, ξˆF
1− k−1
K
+ 2
3K
]
⊂
(
ξF
1− k+1
K
, ξF
1− k−2
K
]
=
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
IFk′ .
In other words,
Fk(u) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Fk′(v).
Inequalities (A.25) and (A.26), and E1 occur with probability converging to 1 (Theo-
rem A.1.4), and thus the event E3 for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ also occurs with probability converging
to 1.
Lastly for k = K ′ + 1,
FK′+1(U) ⊂ FK′(V ) ∪ FK′+1(V )
occurs with probability converging to 1, since the event occurs whenever
Fk(V ) ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
Fk′(U) for all k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
′ − 1
holds.
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A.7.4 Proof of Theorem 1
We choose K large enough that
max
1≤k≤K′−2
∣∣uok − uok+1∣∣ ≡ max
1≤k≤K′−2
∣∣∣ξW
1− k
αK
− ξW
1− k+1
αK
∣∣∣ < 
9
.17 (A.27)
The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by the following inequalities.
P
( |BF (;U, V )|
n
>
14
K
)
= P
 ∑
1≤k≤K′+1
|BFk (;U, V )|
n
>
14
K

< P
 ∑
7≤k≤K′−3
|BFk (;U, V )|
n
+
∑
k=1,...,6,
K′−2,K′−1,K′
Fk(U)
n
+
|BFK′+1(;U, V )|
n
>
14
K
 .
We show that the last term converges to 0. We first prove that for each k = 7, . . . ,K ′−3, the
proportion
|BFk (;U,V )|
n converges to 0 in probability (Proposition A.7.2). The proof identifies
asymptotic upper and lower bounds of utilities from all stable matchings and shows that
the two bounds are close to each other. We then prove that
|BF
K′+1(;U,V )|
n is asymptotically
bounded above by 4K (Proposition A.7.3). The proof shows that most tier-K
′ + 1 firms
remain unmatched in stable matchings, and thus have no difference in utilities. Lastly,
for each k = 1, . . . , 6,K ′ − 2,K ′ − 1,K ′, the proportion Fk(U)n converges to at most 1K in
probability by the (weak) law of large numbers.
A.7.4.1 For k = 7, . . . ,K ′ − 3, |BFk (;U,V )|n
p−→ 0.
We first identify an asymptotic lower bound on utilities of firms in each tier, using tech-
niques from the theory of random bipartite graphs (Proposition A.7.1). Similarly, we find
an asymptotic lower bound on utilities of workers in each tier (Proposition A.7.1∗). The
asymptotic lower bound on utilities of workers induces an asymptotic upper bound on util-
ities of firms in each tier. Lastly, we complete the proof by showing that the asymptotic
lower and upper bounds are close to each other (Proposition A.7.2).
17 We can always satisfy the condition since GW has a strictly positive density function on a bounded
support.
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Proposition A.7.1. For each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and for each k¯ = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′−3, define
BˆFk¯ (;u, v) :=
{
f ∈ Fk¯(u) : uµW (f) ≤ uok¯+2 + u¯− 
}
.18
Then for any  > 0,
|BˆF
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. For each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉 and for each k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ + 1, let F≤k(u) :=⋃
k′≤k Fk′(u) and F<k(u) :=
⋃
k′<k Fk′(u). We similarly define W≤k(u) and W<k(u).
Take any k¯ from {1, 2, . . . ,K ′−3}. We construct a bipartite graph with Fk¯(u)∪W≤k¯+2(u)
as a bi-partitioned set of nodes. Two vertices f ∈ Fk¯(u) and w ∈ W≤k¯+2(u) are joined by
an edge if and only if
ζf,w ≤ u¯−  or ηf,w ≤ v¯ − ˜,
where ˜ is the value taken before, while defining E2.
Let W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) be the set of workers in tiers up to k¯ + 2 who are not matched with
firms in tiers up to k¯ + 1 in µW . That is,
W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) :=
{
w ∈W≤k¯+2(u) |µW (w) /∈ F≤k¯+1(u)
}
.
We now show that if E2 holds, then
BˆFk¯ (;u, v) ∪ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v)
is a biclique.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that a pair of f ∈ BˆF
k¯
(;u, v) and w ∈ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) is
not joined by an edge: i.e.
ζf,w > u¯−  and ηf,w > v¯ − ˜.
18 Note that uok¯+2 + u¯ is the maximal utility that a firm can achieve by being matched with a worker in
tier-(k¯ + 3).
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Then, we have
uf,w = u
o
w + ζf,w > u
o
k¯+2 + ζf,w > u
o
k¯+2 + u¯− , (A.28)
and
vf,w = v
o
f + ηf,w ≥ min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ + ηf,w > min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ + v¯ − ˜.19
Conditioned on E2, we can proceed further and obtain
vf,w > min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ + v¯ −
(
min
f ′∈Fk¯(u)
vof ′ − max
f ′′∈Fk¯+2(u)
vof ′′
)
= max
f ′′∈Fk¯+2(u)
vof ′′ + v¯. (A.29)
On the other hand, f ∈ BˆF
k¯
(;u, v) implies that
uµW (f) ≤ uok¯+2 + u¯− ,
and w ∈ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) implies that
vµW (w) ≤ max
f ′′∈Fk¯+2(u)
vof ′′ + v¯,
since a worker can obtain utility higher than maxf ′′∈Fk¯+2(u) v
o
f ′′ + v¯ only by matching with
a firm in F≤k¯+1(u).
Equations (A.28) and (A.29) imply that (f, w) would have blocked µW , contradicting
that µW is stable. Therefore,
BˆFk¯ (;u, v) ∪ W¯≤k¯+2(u, v).
is a biclique, which is not necessarily balanced.
We now control the size of BˆF
k¯
(;U, V ) by referencing Theorem 3. Let uo and vo be
realized common-values such that events E1 and E2 hold. Then, the remaining randomness
19 We should not replace minf ′∈Fk¯(u) v
o
f ′ with v
o
k¯. Fk¯(u) is defined with respect to workers’ common-values,
rather than firms’ common-values.
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of U and V is from ζ and η. Consider a random bipartite graph with Fk¯(U) ∪W≤k¯+2(U)
as a bi-partitioned set of nodes, where each pair of f ∈ Fk¯(U) and w ∈W≤k¯+2(U) is joined
by an edge if and only if
ζf,w ≤ u¯−  or ηf,w ≤ v¯ − ˜.
In other words, every pair is joined by an edge independently with probability p() =
1− Γ(u¯− , v¯ − ˜).
We write β(n) := 2 · log(|W≤k¯+2(U)|)/ log 1p() and show that
P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| ≤ β(n)
)
→ 1 as n→∞. (A.30)
Consider that
P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| ≤ β(n)
)
≥ P
(
min{|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )|, |W¯≤k¯+2(U, V )|} ≤ β(n)
)
−P (|W¯≤k¯+2(U, V )| ≤ β(n)) .
We show that the two terms on the right hand side converge respectively to 1 and 0 in
probability.
Let α(U, V )× α(U, V ) be the size of a maximum balance biclique of the random graph
G
(
Fk¯(U) ∪W≤k¯+2(U) , p()
)
.
Since every realized BˆF
k¯
(;u, v)∪W¯≤k¯+2(u, v) is a biclique, it contains a balanced biclique
of the size equals to
min
{
|BˆFk¯ (;u, v)| , |W¯≤k¯+2(u, v)|
}
.
Therefore,
P
(
min
{
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )|, |W¯≤k¯+2(U, V )|
}
≤ β(n)
)
≥ P (α(U, V ) ≤ β(n))→ 1, (A.31)
where the convergence is from Theorem 3.
On the other hand, observe that W¯≤k¯+2(U, V ) is the size of at least |Wk¯+2(U)|. Among
workers in tiers up to k¯+ 2 at most |W≤k¯+1(U)| are matched with firms in tiers up to k¯+ 1.
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In addition,
|Wk¯+2(U)|
n converges to
1
K by the (weak) law of large numbers. Therefore,
P
(|W¯≤k¯+2(U, V )| ≤ β(n))→ 0. (A.32)
Equations (A.31) and (A.32) imply that (A.30) holds.
Lastly, we consider random utilities U and V , in which common-values are yet realized.
For every ′ > 0,
P
(
|BˆF
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
> ′
)
= P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| > ′ · n
)
≤ P
(
|BˆFk¯ (;U, V )| > β(n) | E1, E2, β(n) ≤ ′n
)
+Rn, with large n,
where Rn is the probability that either E1 or E2 does not hold, or β(n) ≤ ′n is violated:
i.e. Rn → 0. We complete the proof by applying (A.30).
We also obtain the counterpart proposition of Proposition A.7.1 in terms of tiers defined
with respect to firms’ common-values.
Proposition A.7.1∗ For each k¯ = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 3, define
BˆWk¯ (;u, v) :=
{
w ∈Wk¯(v)|vµF (w) ≤ vok¯+2 + v¯ − 
}
.
Then for any  > 0,
|BˆW
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. We omit the proof since it is analogous to the proof of Proposition A.7.1.
For each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉, we define
BFk¯ (;u, v) := {f ∈ Fk¯(u)|∆(f ;u, v) ≥ } for k¯ = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ + 1.
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Proposition A.7.2. If k¯ = 7, 8, . . . ,K ′ − 3, then for any  > 0,
|BF
k¯
(;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. In Proposition A.7.1∗, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K ′ − 3, let
k := v
o
k+2 − vok+3,
and write
BˆWk (k;u, v) =
{
w ∈Wk(v)|vµF (w) ≤ vok+3 + v¯
}
.20
By Proposition A.7.1∗,
|BˆWk (k;U, V )|
n
p−→ 0 as n→∞. (A.33)
Note that a worker receives utility higher than vok+3 + v¯ only by matching with a firm
in (w.r.t firm) tiers up to k + 3.21 Thus for k = 5, 6, . . . ,K ′ + 1,
{w ∈W≤k−4(V ) : µ(w) ∈ Fk(V )} ⊂
k−4⋃
k′=1
BˆWk′ (k′ ;U, V ). (A.34)
If event E3 holds, we can translate (A.34) into an expression with tiers w.r.t workers’
common-values. That is, for k = 7, 8, . . . ,K ′ + 1,
{w ∈W≤k−6(U) : µF (w) ∈ Fk(U)} ⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
{w ∈W≤k−6(U) : µF (w) ∈ Fk′(V )}
⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
{w ∈W≤k−5(V ) : µF (w) ∈ Fk′(V )}
⊂
k+1⋃
k′=k−1
{w ∈W≤k′−4(V ) : µF (w) ∈ Fk′(V )}
where the first and second inequalities are from E3.
20 Recall that vok is a constant, defined as v
o
k := ξ
F
1− k
K
.
21 Recall that f ∈ Fk(v) if and only if vok < vof ≤ vok−1. Thus, if f ∈ F>k+3(v) then vof ≤ vok+3.
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By applying (A.34), we obtain
{w ∈W≤k−6(U) : µF (w) ∈ Fk(U)} ⊂
k−3⋃
k′=1
BˆWk′ (k′ ;U, V ).
It follows that
|{f ∈ Fk(U) : µF (f) ∈W≤k−6(U)}|
n
p−→ 0, (A.35)
because for every  > 0,
P
( |{f ∈ Fk(U) : µF (f) ∈W≤k−6(U)}|
n
> 
)
≤ P
(
k−3∑
k′=1
|BˆWk′ (k′ ;U, V )|
n
> 
)
+Rn,
where Rn is the probability that E3 does not hold: i.e. Rn → 0. The right hand side
converges to 0 by (A.33).
We complete the proof of Proposition A.7.2 by proving the following claim. Proposi-
tion A.7.1 and (A.35) show that the normalized sizes of two sets on the right hand side of
(A.36) converge to 0 in probability.
Claim A.7.1. For k¯ = 7, 8, . . . ,K ′ − 3 and each instance 〈F,W, u, v〉,
BFk¯ (;u, v) ⊂ BˆFk¯ (/9;u, v) ∪
{
f ∈ Fk¯(u)|µF (f) ∈W≤k¯−6(u)
}
. (A.36)
Proof of Claim A.7.1. If a firm f ∈ Fk¯(u) is not in BˆFk¯ (/9;u, v), then
uµW (f) > u
o
k¯+2 + u¯− /9,
and if the firm f is not in
{
f ∈ Fk¯(u)|µF (f) ∈W≤k¯−6(u)
}
, then
uµF (f) ≤ uok¯−6 + u¯.
Therefore, using (A.27) we obtain
uµF (f)− uµW (f) ≤ uok¯−6 − uok¯+2 + /9 < ,
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and thus f is not in BF
k¯
(;u, v).
A.7.4.2 Firms in tier K ′ + 1
We show that most firms in tier-(K ′+1) remain unmatched in stable matchings. Unmatched
firms’ utilities from µF and µW are clearly less than  difference from each other.
Proposition A.7.3.
P
(
|BFK′+1(;U, V )|
n
>
4
K
)
→ 0 as n→∞.
Proof. We divide the proof into two cases.
Case 1. β = 1−GF (−v¯): only a small proportion of firms in tier K ′+ 1 are acceptable to
workers.
For each 〈F,W, u, v〉, if E3 holds,
FK′+1(u) ⊂ FK′(v) ∪ FK′+1(v).
If f ∈ FK′+1(v),
vof ≤ ξF1−K′
K
= ξF
1− dβKe
K
≤ ξF1−β = −v¯.22
That is, if there is a firm in tier-K ′+1, the firm is unacceptable to all workers regard-
less of the firm’s private values to the workers. The firm remains unmatched in all
stable matchings and have no difference in utilities from stable matchings. Therefore,
conditioned on E3,
|BFK′+1(;U, V )|
n
≤ |FK′(V )|
n
.
Proposition A.7.3 holds from the following convergence result.
|FK′(V )|
n
p−→ βK − (dβKe − 1)
K
as n→∞.
22 Note that f ∈ FK′+1(v) implies 1− K′K > 0 and GF (−v¯) > 0, which we used to derive the inequalities.
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Case 2. β = α(1−GW (−u¯)): firms in tier-(K ′+1) see only a small proportion of acceptable
workers available.
For each market 〈F,W, u, v〉, if w ∈WK′+1(u),
uow ≤ ξW1− dβKe
αK
≤ ξW
1− β
α
= −u¯.23
That is, workers in WK′+1(u) are unacceptable to all firms. Therefore, the total
number of matched workers in stable matchings is no more than the total number of
workers in tiers up to K ′: i.e.
|{w ∈W |µW (w) ∈ F}| ≤
K′∑
k=1
|Wk(U)|,
which implies that
|{f ∈ F |µW (f) ∈W}| ≤
K′∑
k=1
|Wk(U)|.
As such, we have
|{f ∈ FK′+1(U)|µW (f) ∈W}| = |{f ∈ F |µW (f) ∈W}| −
K′∑
k=1
|{f ∈ Fk(U)|µW (f) ∈W}|
≤
K′∑
k=1
|Wk(U)| −
K′∑
k=1
|{f ∈ Fk(U)|µW (f) ∈W}|.
Conditioned on E1,
|{f ∈ FK′+1(U)|µW (f) ∈W}| ≤
K′−3∑
k=1
(|Fk(U)| − |{f ∈ Fk(U)|µW (f) ∈W}|) +
K′∑
k=K′−2
|Wk(U)|
=
K′−3∑
k=1
|{f ∈ Fk(U)|µW (f) /∈W}|+
K′∑
k=K′−2
|Wk(U)|.
23 Note that w ∈WK′+1(u) implies 1− K′K > 0 and GW (−u¯) > 0, which we used to derive the inequalities.
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With a small ′ > 0,
|BFK′+1(;U, V )|
n
≤ |{f ∈ FK′+1(U)|µW (f) ∈W}|
n
≤
K′−3∑
k=1
|BˆFk (′;U, V )|
n
+
K′∑
k=K′−2
|Wk(U)|
n
p−→ 0 + 3 + (βK − dβKe)
K
,
where the convergence in probability is from Proposition A.7.1 and the (weak) law of
large numbers.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2: Plea
Bargaining
B.1 Existence of a Symmetric Voting Equilibrium.
Let S := {c, a}×{c, a} be the set of pure strategies; ‘c’ represents voting for conviction and
‘a’ for acquittal. A generic strategy s ∈ S is a pair (sg, si) consisting of voting decisions with
signal g and i. Let Σ := ∆({c, a}) ×∆({c, a}). A generic mixed strategy σ = (σg, σi) ∈ Σ
consists of probabilities of conviction voting with signal g and i. Define continuous functions
ug(σ
′
g, σ) or ui(σ
′
i, σ) as a juror’s expected utility when she receives signal g or i respectively
and uses strategy σ′, while all other jurors use strategy σ. Clearly, ug and ui are continuous
in σ′ and σ in our model.
We proceed similarly to the existence proof of Nash equilibrium in Nash (1951). For
each pure strategy s ∈ S, define a continuous function h as
hs(σ) = (hs1(σ), h
s
2(σ)) :=
(
max{ 0 , ug(sg, σ)− ug(σg, σ)} , max{ 0 , ui(si, σ)− ui(σi, σ)}
)
.
For each s ∈ S, define a continuous function as
ys(σ) :=
(
σg:sg + h
s
1(σ)
1 +
∑
t∈{c,a} h
t
1(σ)
,
σg:si + h
s
2(σ)
1 +
∑
t∈{c,a} h
t
2(σ)
)
where σg:sg and σg:si are the probabilities that the mixed strategy σ = (σg, σi) assigns to
each pure strategy sg and si.
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The set of functions ys(·) for all s ∈ S defines a mapping y(·) from the set of mixed
strategy to itself. Similar to the existence proof of Nash equilibrium, a fixed point of y(·) is
a symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (a symmetric equilibrium voting behavior). Since
the set of mixed strategies is compact and convex, y(·) has a fixed point by the Brouwer
fixed point theorem.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2.3.1
For each level of belief pi, we first find all symmetric equilibrium voting behaviors. Then we
compare the jurors’ expected payoffs and take the most efficient symmetric voting behavior.
B.2.1 Finding All Symmetric Equilibrium Voting Behaviors.
Non-responsive equilibrium voting behavior (σg = 1, σi = 1) is an equilibrium
voting behavior for any 1 ≤ kˆ < n. given that other jurors always vote for conviction,
a juror is never pivotal. (Her vote never changes the judicial decisions.) In such a case,
no juror has an incentive to change her voting strategy from (σg = 1, σi = 1). Similarly,
(σg = 0, σi = 0) is an equilibrium voting behavior when 1 < kˆ ≤ n.
(σg = 1, σi = 1) is not an equilibrium when kˆ = n. Given that other jurors always vote
for conviction, being pivotal does not give any additional information. Each juror then fully
relies on her own private signal. If a juror receives an innocent signal, then she votes for
conviction (or acquittal) if and only if
1− p
p
pi
1− pi ≥ (or ≤)
q
1− q .
Note that the evidence innately supports innocent defendants (1−pp < 1 and
pi
1−pi ≤ 1),
and reasonable doubt is in favor of acquittal ( q1−q ≥ 1). A juror receiving an innocent
signal does not have enough evidence to vote for conviction; σi = 1 is not a best response
to (σg = 1, σi = 1).
In a similar fashion, when kˆ = 1, (σg = 0, σi = 0) is an equilibrium voting behavior only
if pi ≤ p¯i(1). Being pivotal does not provide any additional evidence, and a juror compares
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her private signal (g or i), belief (pi), and reasonable doubt (q). If the belief pi is low, even
a guilty signal gives insufficient evidence for conviction voting.
Responsive equilibrium voting behavior A responsive voting behavior has 0 < σg
and σi < 1; otherwise, σg = σi, and it is not responsive. We define rG and rI as conviction
probabilities of guilty and innocent defendants, computed as
rG = pσg + (1− p)σi, rI = (1− p)σg + pσi
When the jury follows responsive voting behavior, it does not always convict nor acquit
defendants (0 < rG, rI < 1). In such a case, voting criteria (2.5) and (2.6), are well defined.
We consider each strategy case and find necessary levels of belief pi consistent with the
strategy as an equilibrium voting behavior. We explicitly compute the equilibria to use
later for selecting the most efficient one.
Case 1 : (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0)
Conviction and acquittal must be indifferent to a juror receiving signal g. That is
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)n−kˆ
p
1− p
pi
1− pi =
q
1− q .
Substituting in rG = p σg and rI = (1− p)σg, we obtain
(
1− pσg
1− (1− p)σg
)n−kˆ( p
1− p
)kˆ pi
1− pi =
q
1− q . (B.1)
Under the unanimity rule (kˆ = n), the first term in LHS is equal to 1, and the
equality holds when pi = p¯i(kˆ). Then, any σg ∈ (0, 1) with σi = 0 is an equilibrium
voting behavior.
Consider a general super-majority rule kˆ (1 ≤ kˆ < n). Since 1−pσg1−(1−p)σg is strictly
decreasing in σg, by plugging σg = 0 and σg = 1 in (B.1), we can verify that p¯i(kˆ) <
pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n) is necessary for (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0) to be an equilibrium voting
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behavior. Moreover, at most one value of σg satisfies the equality. By algebraic
manipulation of (B.1), we find (σg, σi = 0) is an equilibrium voting strategy with
σg(pi) =
ψ1 − 1
(1− p)ψ1 − p where ψ1 =
(
1− p
p
) kˆ
n−kˆ
(
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
) 1
n−kˆ
(B.2)
Case 2 : (σg = 1, σi = 0)
A juror receiving signal g prefers conviction, whereas a juror receiving signal i prefers
acquittal. Substituting in rG = p and rI = 1− p to voting criteria (2.5) and (2.6), we
obtain
(
p
1− p
)2(kˆ−1)−n
≤ q
1− q
1− pi
pi
≤
(
p
1− p
)2kˆ−n
(B.3)
The first inequality is from the criterion with signal i, and the second inequality is
from the criterion with signal g. The above inequality is equivalent to p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤
pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n). When pi is between p¯i(2kˆ−n) and p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n), (σg = 1, σi = 0)
is an equilibrium voting behavior; every juror follows her own signal.
Case 3 : (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1)
Jurors receiving signal i treat conviction and acquittal equally. That is
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)n−kˆ
1− p
p
pi
1− pi =
q
1− q
Substituting in rG = p+ (1− p)σi and rI = (1− p) + pσi, we get
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1 1− pi
pi
=
q
1− q (B.4)
Note that p+(1−p)σi(1−p)+pσi is strictly decreasing in σi. By plugging in σi = 0 and σi = 1, we
can verify that p¯i(2(kˆ − 1) − n) < pi ≤ .5 is necessary if σg = 1 and 0 < σi < 1 is an
equilibrium voting behavior.
For each level of belief pi such that p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi < .5, at most one σi satisfies
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General super-majority rules (1 ≤ kˆ < n) The unanimity rule (kˆ = n)
Non-responsive voting
∀ pi ∈ [0, .5] (σg = σi = 1) ∀ pi ∈ [0, .5] (σg = σi = 0)
pi ∈ [0, .5](kˆ > 1), pi ∈ [0, p¯i(1)](kˆ = 1) (σg = σi = 0)
Responsive voting
p¯i(kˆ) < pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n) (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0) pi = p¯i(n) (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0)
p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) (σg = 1, σi = 0) p¯i(n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(n− 2) (σg = 1, σi = 0)
p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5 (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1) p¯i(2n− 2) < pi ≤ .5 (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1)
Table B.1: Symmetric voting equilibrium behavior in jury trial.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
þ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.
ΣHgLΣHiL
(a) A super-majority rule (kˆ = 8).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
þ
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.
ΣHgLΣHiL
(b) The unanimity rule (kˆ = 12).
Figure B.1: Symmetric equilibrium voting behavior with n = 12, p = 610 , and q =
6
10
the equality. This σi combined with σg = 1 forms a symmetric equilibrium voting
behavior, and σi is determined as
σi(pi) =
p− ψ2(1− p)
pψ2 − (1− p) where ψ2 =
(
p
1− p
)n−kˆ+1
kˆ−1
(
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
) 1
kˆ−1
(B.5)
Table B.1 summarizes all symmetric equilibrium voting behavior. Figure B.1 illustrates
equilibrium voting behaviors with n = 12, p = 610 , and q =
6
10 , when voting rules are kˆ = 8
and kˆ = 12. We used solid lines for σg and dashed lines for σi. For each pi, the pair of
σg and σi forming a strategy profile (σg, σi) share the same thickness. In this example,
we observe all three equilibrium cases, but we may not observe some cases under other
parameter values. For instance, p¯i(2(kˆ − 1) − n), one of the threshold levels of belief, may
not be defined or may be larger than .5. In such a case, (σg = 1, σi = 0) is not an equilibrium
voting behavior for any pi ∈ [0, .5].
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B.2.2 Finding an Efficient Equilibrium Voting Behavior.
For each belief pi, there may be several symmetric equilibrium voting behaviors. If a re-
sponsive equilibrium voting behavior exists, intuitively it must be more efficient than non-
responsive equilibrium voting behavior, because jurors essentially use private signals to form
judgements. We confirm this intuition by comparing responsive equilibrium voting outcomes
with non-responsive equilibrium voting outcomes. If there is no responsive equilibrium vot-
ing behavior for a belief pi, then one of the non-responsive equilibria, (σg = 1, σi = 1) or
(σg = 0, σi = 0), is an efficient equilibrium voting behavior.
Given a belief pi, conviction probabilities, (PG, PI), change the jurors’ expected payoff
by
−q · (1− pi) · PI − (1− q) · pi · (1− PG).
The first term corresponds to mistakenly convicting innocent defendants, and the second
term corresponds to mistakenly acquitting guilty defendants.
Between two non-responsive equilibrium voting behaviors, (σg = σi = 0) and (σg = σi =
1), the former gives a higher jurors’ expected utility than the latter, because q (1 − pi) is
larger than (1− q)pi.
When pi > p¯i(kˆ), there is a responsive equilibrium voting behavior, and responsive voting
is more efficient than (σg = σi = 0) if and only if the conviction probabilities (PG, PI) of
responsive voting satisfy
−q (1− pi) PI − (1− q) pi (1− PG) > −(1− q) pi
which we can rewrite as
PG
PI
=
∑n
j=kˆ
(
n
j
)
rjG(1− rG)n−j∑n
j=kˆ
(
n
j
)
rjI(1− rI)n−j
>
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
. (B.6)
If the above inequality holds as an equality, then responsive voting behavior and (σg =
0, σi = 0) are both equally efficient.
We proceed separately with general super-majority rules and the unanimity rule.
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General super-majority rules (kˆ < n) In order to verify (B.6), first note that k′ > k
and rG > rI > 0 implies
rk
′
G (1− rG)n−k
′
rk
′
I (1− rI)n−k′
>
rkG(1− rG)n−k
rkI (1− rI)n−k
. (B.7)
Also note that
if x, x′ > 0 and y, y′ > 0,
x′
y′
>
x
y
implies
x+ x′
y + y′
>
x
y
. (B.8)
Sequentially applying (B.7) and using (B.8), we obtain
∑n
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkG(1− rG)n−k∑n
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkI (1− rI)n−k
>
rkˆG(1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)n−kˆ
.
Therefore, to prove (B.6), it is enough to show
rkˆG(1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)n−kˆ
≥ q
1− q
1− pi
pi
. (B.9)
We proceed with each case of responsive equilibrium voting behavior.
Case 1 : (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), where p¯i(kˆ) < pi < p¯i(2kˆ − n).
By substituting in rG = pσg and rI = (1− p)σg, the LHS of (B.9) becomes
rkˆG(1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)n−kˆ
=
(
1− pσg
1− (1− p)σg
)n−kˆ( p
1− p
)kˆ
.
The equilibrium restriction (B.1) implies that the RHS of the above expression is
equal to the RHS of (B.9). Thus (B.9) holds under equality.
Case 2 : (σg = 1, σi = 0), where p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n).
Since rG = p and rI = 1− p, the LHS of (B.9) is
rkˆG(1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)n−kˆ
=
(
p
1− p
)2kˆ−n
.
From (B.3), equation (B.9) must be true.
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Case 3 : (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), where p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5.
Note that (B.4) is a necessary equilibrium restriction. Since pi ≤ .5 and p > .5,
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
=
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
By substituting in rG = p+ (1− p)σi, rI = (1− p) + p σi, we obtain
rkˆG(1− rG)n−kˆ
rkˆI (1− rI)n−kˆ
=
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ(1− p
p
)n−kˆ
≥
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
Inequality (B.9) is derived from the above two inequalities.
The unanimity rule (kˆ = n) If the voting rule follows the unanimity rule, then (B.6)
becomes
PG
PI
=
(
rG
rI
)n
>
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
. (B.10)
If the above inequality holds, responsive voting is more efficient than (σg = 0, σi = 0);
if LHS and RHS are equal, both responsive equilibrium voting and (σg = 0, σi = 0) are
equally efficient.
Case 1: (0 < σg < 1, σi = 0), where pi = p¯i(n).
By substituting in rG = pσg and rI = (1− p)σg, the LHS of (B.10) becomes
(
rG
rI
)n
=
(
p
1− p
)n
.
By definition of p¯i(·) and pi = p¯i(n), (B.10) holds as an equality. Thus, both (0 < σg <
1, σi = 0) and (σg = 0, σi = 0) are equally efficient.
Case 2: (σg = 1, σi = 0), where p¯i(2kˆ − n) ≤ pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n).
Since rG = p and rI = 1− p, the LHS of (B.10) is
(
rG
rI
)n
=
(
p
1− p
)n
.
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By definition of p¯i(·), (B.10) holds as an equality when pi = p¯i(2kˆ−n) = p¯i(n); otherwise
if p¯i(n) < pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) then (B.10) holds with a strict inequality. Thus, when
pi = p¯i(n), both (σg = 1, σi = 0) and (σg = 0, σi = 0) are equally efficient; when
p¯i(n) < pi ≤ p¯i(2(kˆ − 1) − n), responsive equilibrium voting (σg = 1, σi = 0) is more
efficient than (σg = σi = 0).
Case 3: (σg = 1, 0 < σi < 1), where p¯i(2(kˆ − 1)− n) < pi ≤ .5.
By substituting in rG = p+ (1− p)σi, rI = (1− p) + p σi, we obtain
(
rG
rI
)n
=
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)n
>
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)n−1 p
1− p =
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
where the last equality is from the voting criterion (B.4). Responsive equilibrium
voting is the most efficient equilibrium voting behavior.
B.3 Other Notions of Equilibrium Refinements.
We use the most efficient equilibrium as an equilibrium refinement, but it is a theoretically
interesting question whether other previously studied refinement concepts are also applica-
ble. It turns out that equilibrium refinement using trembling hand perfection by Austen-
Smith and Feddersen (2005) or weakly un-dominated strategies by Gerardi and Yariv (2007)
does not generate equilibrium voting behavior satisfying natural properties in Proposition
2.3.2. We prove this by showing that, when the voting rule is a super-majority and pi is
small, both σg = σi = 0 and σg = σi = 1 are weakly undominated strategies, and none of
them passes trembling hand perfection.
First, we show that both σg = σi = 0 and σg = σi = 1 are weakly undominated
strategies. Assume that 1 ≤ kˆ < n and pi = p¯i(kˆ)−. We showed in the proof of Proposition
2.3.1 that only σg = σi = 1 and σg = σi = 0 are symmetric equilibria. The level of belief is
low enough that kˆ number of guilty signals give a single dictating juror insufficient evidence
to convict the defendant. However, with slightly more evidence, the juror will have enough
incentive to convict the defendant.
We first consider σg = σi = 0. Suppose that all other jurors except juror j play (σ
′
g, σ
′
i)
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in which σ′g = 1 and
1
2 < σ
′
i < 1. Being pivotal implies that kˆ − 1 other jurors vote for
conviction. Such an event combined with juror j’s guilty signal provides less incentive to
vote for conviction than the event that juror j herself observes kˆ number of guilty signals,
because some other jurors’ conviction votes may come from i signals. The best response for
juror j with signal g is to vote for acquittal. Clearly, the best response when the signal is i
is also to vote for acquittal. Therefore, σg = σi = 0 is not a weakly dominated strategy.
We next consider σg = σi = 1. Suppose that all other jurors except juror j play (σ
′′
g , σ
′′
i )
in which 0 < σ′′g <
1
2 and σ
′′
i = 0. Being pivotal implies that kˆ − 1 other jurors vote for
conviction. Such an event gives more incentive to vote for conviction than the event that
juror j herself observes kˆ number of guilty signals, because some other jurors’ acquittal
votes may come from g signals. The best response for juror j is to vote for conviction
regardless of her own signal. Since σg = σi = 1 is the best response, it is not a weakly
dominated strategy.
On the other hand, neither σg = σi = 0 nor σg = σi = 1 passes trembling hand perfec-
tion. Trembling hand perfection modified to our Bayesian game requires us to construct a
sequence of perturbed games. In each perturbation, players assign strictly positive proba-
bilities to both pure strategies: (σng = 
n
1 , σ
n
i = 
n
2 ) and (σ
n
g = 1 − n3 , σni = n4 ). Trembling
hand perfection requires that the strategy must constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
a corresponding sequence of perturbed games, and the sequence of equilibria must converge
to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the original game, (σg = σi = 0) and (σg = σi = 1),
respectively. However, since guilty signal g gives a strictly higher incentive to vote for con-
viction than a signal i, such a sequence of perturbed games does not exist. In no case is a
juror indifferent between voting for conviction and voting for acquittal with both signals, g
and i. Therefore, neither σg = σi = 0 nor σg = σi = 1 passes trembling hand perfection.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3.2.
The conviction probabilities of guilty defendants and innocent defendants, {(PG, PI)|pi}, are
determined by
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PG =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkG(1− rG)n−k
PI =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkI (1− rI)n−k
where rG = pσg+(1−p)σi and rI = (1−p)σg+pσi, where (σg, σi) is the efficient equilibrium
voting behavior.
When the efficient equilibrium voting behavior is (σg = 0, σi = 0), PG ≥ PI clearly
holds, because the conviction probabilities are all equal to zero. If the efficient equilibrium
voting behavior is responsive, we showed that (B.6) holds and q1−q
1−pi
pi ≥ 1. Thus, PG ≥ PI
(Item 1).
From the closed form solutions of responsive equilibrium voting behavior, we observed
that σg and σi are constant on [0, p¯i(kˆ)] and [p¯i(2kˆ−n), p¯i(2(kˆ−1)−n)], and non-decreasing
in pi on both intervals (p¯i(kˆ), p¯i(2kˆ− n)) and (p¯i(2kˆ− n), .5]. By comparing across intervals,
we can check that σg and σi are non-decreasing in pi over [0, .5]. From the closed form
solutions of efficient equilibrium voting behavior, it is also easy to see that σg and σi are
increasing in kˆ (Item 2).
Lastly, fG(pi) and fI(pi) are non-decreasing in pi, because the conviction probabilities
are strictly increasing in σg and σi, and σg and σi are non-decreasing in pi (Item 3).
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
We first prove the following lemma.1
Lemma B.5.1. Conviction probability of guilty defendants fG(pi) is an upper hemicontin-
uous correspondence in pi with non-empty convex values.
Proof. Note that the efficient equilibrium voting behavior σg and σi are unique for every
pi, except when pi = p¯i(n) and the rule is unanimous, in which efficient equilibrium voting
behavior is any pair of (σi = 0, 0 ≤ σg ≤ 1). Since
∑n
k′=kˆ
(
n
k′
)
rk
′
G (1− rG)n−k
′
is a continuous
1The lemma holds also for fI(pi), but we do not need this observation in proving Proposition 2.4.1.
119
function of σg and σi, fG(pi) is convex valued for all pi (Intermediate Value Theorem).
In addition, closed form solutions of efficient equilibrium voting behavior (σg and σi) are
upper hemicontinuous in pi. Since fG is continuous in σg and σi, fG(pi) inherits upper
hemicontinuity in pi.
Now, suppose θ ≤ PG. It is necessary that θ ∈ [0, θ¯] where θ¯ := sup fG(.5). There exists
a pi such that θ ∈ fG(pi), because fG(pi) is upper hemicontinuous in pi with non-empty convex
values (Intermediate Value Theorem). Suppose by contradiction that θ < PG. Every guilty
defendant pleads guilty, and only innocent defendants may or may not go to trial. In such
a case, jurors reasonably believe that all defendants in trials are innocent (pi = 0), which
consequently leads conviction probability to equal zero. This contradicts θ < PG. θ = PG
must be true (Item 1).
Otherwise, we have θ > PG as a part of an equilibrium outcome. No defendant pleads
guilty, and the jurors’ reasonable beliefs pi will be equal to .5. The conviction probabilities
(PG, PI) must be in {(P ′G, P ′I)|.5} (Item 2).
B.6 Proof of Proposition 2.4.2
B.6.1 Simplifying the prosecutor’s problem
The prosecutor’s problem is described below.
max
θ∈[0,1]
−1
2
q′
(
φIθ + (1− φI)PI
)
− 1
2
(1− q′)
(
φG(1− θ) + (1− φG)(1− PG)
)
(B.11)
such that
(a.1) φG ∈ arg minφ′∈[0,1] φ′θ + (1− φ′)PG
(a.2) φI ∈ arg minφ′∈[0,1] φ′θ + (1− φ′)PI
(b) pi =
 0 if φG = φI = 11−φG
(1−φG)+(1−φI) otherwise.
(c) (PG, PI) ∈ {(P ′C , P ′I)|pi}.
Using Proposition 2.4.1, we simplify the above expressions. To begin with, we can
120
restrict without loss of generality that a prosecutor can offer θ ∈ [0, θ¯], because he can
obtain any utility level from offering θ > θ¯ by offering θ = θ¯; all players perceive the same
ex-ante punishments in both cases. In the former case (offering θ > θ¯), all defendants plead
not guilty and receive (PG, PI) ∈ {(P ′G, P ′I)|.5} conviction probabilities. In the latter case,
some guilty defendants may plead guilty, but the punishment for a guilty plea is equal to
the conviction probability: i.e. the expected punishment from a jury trial. As far as the
ex-ante punishments are the same, the prosecutor and the defendant are indifferent between
pleading guilty and pleading not guilty.
Once the prosecutor offers θ ∈ [0, θ¯], Proposition 2.4.1 ensures that θ = PG ≥ PI .
Pleading decisions of guilty defendants are straightforward; guilty defendants are indifferent
toward pleading guilty or pleading not guilty, thus any φG ∈ [0, 1] is a best response.
Pleading decisions of innocent defendants depend on whether θ = PI or θ > pI . PG = PI
holds only when θ = PG = PI = 0; otherwise, θ = PG > PI . In the former case, any pleading
decision behavior incurs the same expected prosecutor’s utility, −12(1− q′) including when
φI = 1 (no punishment). In the latter case, φI = 1 must be true, since only pleading not
guilty is the best response. In all, when the prosecutor offers θ ∈ [0, θ¯], it is innocuous for
the prosecutor to assume that φI = 1. By applying these observations, we simplify the
prosecutor’s decision as
max
θ∈[0,θ¯]
−1
2
q′PI − 1
2
(1− q′)(1− θ)
such that
(a) φG ∈ [0, 1]
(b) pi =
 0 if φG = 11−φG
2−φG otherwise.
(c) (θ, PI) ∈ {(P ′G, P ′I)|pi}.
It is convenient to define a function P˜I : [0, θ¯]→ [0, 1] as follows.
P˜I(θ) = pI , where ∃ pi, (θ, pI) ∈ {(P ′G, P ′I)|pi}.
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Referencing the proof of Proposition 2.3.1, we can verify that the function P˜I is well-
defined; For every θ ∈ [0, θ¯], the value of P˜I(θ) exists and is unique. There are four cases: (1)
θ = 0, (2) θ ∈ (0, pˆG), (3) θ = pˆG, or (4) θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯], in which pˆG is the conviction probability
of guilty defendants when jurors vote by following their own signals (σg = 1, σi = 0).
If θ = 0, pI must be 0. If θ = pˆG, pI is unique and the value is derived from the voting
strategy (σg = 1, σi = 0). For other cases, recall that the conviction probabilities are defined
as
PG =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkG
(
1− rG
)n−k
, PI =
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
rkI
(
1− rI
)n−k
where rG = pσg + (1−p)σi and rI = (1−p)σg +pσi. When θ ∈ (0, pˆG), σi = 0 and both PG
and PI are strictly increasing in σg. Since PG is continuous in rG which is also continuous
in σg, for any θ ∈ (0, pˆG), there exists a unique σg inducing PG = θ. Such a σg combined
with σi = 0 gives a unique pI such that (θ, pI) ∈ {(P ′G, P ′I)|pi}. A similar procedure applies
when θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯].
Through the above argument, the function P˜I is not only well-defined, but strictly
increasing and continuous on [0, θ¯], and differentiable on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯). Using P˜I , the
prosecutor’s problem becomes
max
θ∈[0,θ¯]
U(θ) := −1
2
q′P˜I(θ)− 1
2
(1− q′)(1− θ). (B.12)
We show that the objective function above is strictly concave. Thus, the First Order
Condition (FOC) will be the necessary and sufficient condition of the maximizer θ∗. We
later use the FOC to prove Proposition 2.4.2.
B.6.2 U(θ) is strictly concave in θ.
Since P˜I is continuous in θ, the objective function is, too. Moreover, P˜I is differentiable
on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯), and U(θ) is a linear combination of θ and P˜I . Thus, U(θ) is also
differentiable with respect to θ on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯). If we show that the derivative of P˜I
is decreasing on (0, pˆG) and (pˆG, θ¯), and the left derivate is greater than the right at pˆG,
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then the concavity of P˜I follows. Since U(θ) is a linear combination of θ and P˜I , concavity
of the objective function directly follows from the concavity of P˜I .
When θ ∈ (0, pˆG), PG and PI are differentiable with respect to σg. The derivative of PG
is
∂PG
∂σg
=
∂
∂σg
n∑
k=kˆ
(
n
k
)
(rG)
k(1− rG)n−k
=
n−1∑
k=kˆ
(
n!
k!(n− k)!kr
k−1
G (1− rG)n−kr′G
− n!
k!(n− k − 1)!r
k
G(n− k)(1− rG)n−k−1r′G
)
+ nrn−1G r
′
G
= n r′G
(
n− 1
kˆ − 1
)
rkˆ−1G (1− rG)n−kˆ (B.13)
Using a similar operation, we obtain
∂PI
∂σg
= n r′I
(
n− 1
kˆ − 1
)
rkˆ−1I (1− rI)n−kˆ (B.14)
Therefore,
∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
=
∂PI/∂σg
∂PG/∂σg
=
r′I r
kˆ−1
I (1− rI)n−kˆ
r′G r
kˆ−1
G (1− rG)n−kˆ
. (B.15)
Since rG = pσg and rI = (1− p)σg, (B.15) becomes
(
1− p
p
)kˆ(1− (1− p)σg
1− pσg
)n−kˆ
. (B.16)
As θ increases in (0, pˆG), the corresponding σg increases, and the above derivative strictly
decreases. Therefore, ∂P˜I(θ)∂θ is decreasing in θ ∈ (0, pˆG).
When θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯), σg is fixed equal to 1 and only σi varies. Similar to (B.13) and (B.14),
we obtain
∂P˜I(θ)
∂θ
=
∂PI/∂σi
∂PG/∂σi
=
r′I r
kˆ−1
I (1− rI)n−kˆ
r′G r
kˆ−1
G (1− rG)n−kˆ
. (B.17)
By substituting in rG = p+ (1− p)σi and rI = (1− p) + pσi, we obtain
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(
(1− p) + pσi
p+ (1− p)σi
)kˆ−1( p
1− p
)n−kˆ+1
. (B.18)
Again, as θ increases in (pˆG, θ¯), the corresponding σi increases, and the above derivative
decreases. Therefore, ∂P˜I(θ)∂θ is decreasing in θ ∈ (pˆG, θ¯)
Lastly, at θ = pˆG, the left derivative is greater than the right derivative, because the
limit of (B.16) as σg goes to 1 is greater than the limit of (B.18) as σi goes to 0. This
concludes that P˜I is strictly concave in θ, and thus the objective function in (B.12) is also
strictly concave in θ.
B.6.3 First Order Condition
Since the prosecutor’s objective function is strictly concave in θ, the FOC gives the necessary
and sufficient condition of optimizer θ∗. Instead of finding the closed form solution, we use
the FOC and prove Proposition 2.4.2. We proceed for each case of the optimizer θ∗.
Interior Solutions
(0 < θ∗ < pˆG) : Using (B.16), FOC of (B.12) becomes
(
p
1− p
)kˆ( 1− pσg
1− (1− p)σg
)n−kˆ
=
q′
1− q′ .
Recall that a juror receiving a guilty signal uses a mixed strategy at this level of
conviction probability for guilty defendants. (Equation (B.2) holds.) We obtain
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
=
q′
1− q′
(pˆG < θ
∗ < θ¯) : Using (B.18), FOC of (B.12) becomes
(
p+ (1− p)σi
(1− p) + pσi
)kˆ−1(1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
=
q′
1− q′ .
Recall that a juror receiving an innocent signal uses a mixed strategy at this level of
conviction probability for guilty defendants. (Equation (B.5) holds.) We obtain
124
q
1− q
1− pi
pi
=
q′
1− q′
Boundary Solutions
(θ∗ = pˆG) : The prosecutor offers this punishment for a guilty plea, when
lim
θ↓pˆG
∂U(θ)
∂θ
≤ 0 ≤ lim
θ↑pˆG
∂U(θ)
∂θ
Replacing (B.16) and (B.18) for ∂P˜I(θ)∂θ , we can rewrite the above inequalities as
(
(1− p) + pσi
p+ (1− p)σi
)kˆ−1( p
1− p
)n−kˆ+1
≤ 1− q
′
q′
≤
(
1− p
p
)kˆ(1− (1− p)σg
1− pσg
)n−kˆ
,
or (
p
1− p
)2(kˆ−1)−n
≤ q
′
1− q′ ≤
(
p
1− p
)2kˆ−n
Compared with (B.3), when the prosecutor chooses θ∗ = pˆG, the jurors’ voting be-
havior with pi and q is exactly the same as the voting behavior when jurors’ belief is
equal to .5 and reasonable doubt is equal to q′.
(θ∗ = 0) : The right derivative at θ = 0 must be less than or equal to 0. By applying (B.16)
to the derivative of the objective function in (B.12) and taking σg → 0, we obtain
(
p
1− p
)kˆ
≤ q
′
1− q′ .
Note that θ∗ induces the equilibrium voting behavior σg = σi = 0. This strategy
profile becomes an efficient equilibrium voting behavior when the RHS of (B.1) is
greater than or equal to the LHS, which implies
(
p
1− p
)kˆ
≤ q
1− q
1− pi
pi
.
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By comparing the above two inequalities, we observe that the equilibrium voting
behavior is the same as the voting behavior when jurors’ beliefs are equal to .5 and
reasonable doubt is equal to q′.
(θ∗ = θ¯) : The left derivative at θ = θ¯ must be non-negative. Applying (B.18) to the
derivative of U(θ), we must obtain
lim
θ↑θ¯
∂U(θ)
∂θ
≥ 0
or (
p+ (1− p)σ¯i
(1− p) + pσ¯i
)kˆ−1(1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
≥ q
′
1− q′
where σ¯i with σg = 1 is an equilibrium voting behavior with the belief pi = .5.
Note that in this situation, a juror receiving an innocent signal is indifferent between
conviction and acquittal. Thus (B.4) becomes
(
p+ (1− p)σ¯i
(1− p) + pσ¯i
)kˆ−1(1− p
p
)n−kˆ+1
=
q
1− q .
Thus, q1−q ≥ q
′
1−q′ , or q ≥ q′.
When q ≥ q′, the prosecutor offers θ∗ = θ¯, and all defendants plead not guilty (pi = .5).
Jurors vote with threshold q1−q , which is the same as the threshold in the jury model
without plea bargaining. Although we have restricted the prosecutor’s strategy space
to [0, θ¯], any θ∗ higher than θ¯ induces the same prosecutor’s equilibrium expected
utility as θ∗ = θ¯.
Proposition 2.4.2 summarizes these results of FOC.
B.6.4 Proof of Corollary 5
First, note that efficient equilibrium voting behavior is responsive if pi > p¯i(kˆ). Since p¯i(l)
is strictly decreasing in l, the efficient equilibrium voting behaviors are responsive for all
pi > 0 as n→∞.
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Given pi, p, and a voting rule (kˆ = n), efficient equilibrium voting leads the con-
viction probabilities to converge to 1 −
(
(1−q)(1−p)pi
qp(1−pi)
) 1−p
2p−1
for guilty defendants, and to(
(1−q)(1−p)pi
qp(1−pi)
) p
2p−1
for innocent defendants. These convergence results directly follow Propo-
sition 2 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). (Our parameter values satisfy all conditions
assumed in their Propositions.)
For general super-majority rules, regardless of the jury size n, we have pi1−pi = 1 (if
q > q′) or 1−qq
pi
1−pi =
1−q′
q′ (if q ≤ q′). As we replace 1−qq pi1−pi = 1−q˜q˜ where q˜ = max{q, q′},
the conviction probabilities for guilty defendants and innocent defendants directly follow
Proposition 3 in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998); the conviction probability for guilty
defendants converges to 1 and for innocent defendants converges to 0.
Lastly from Proposition 2.4.1 in this paper, we can relate the ex-ante punishments, one
for guilty defendants and another for innocent defendants, to the conviction probabilities
in jury trials.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3: Zero-sum
Games
We prove the main theorem.
The necessity of (PC), (PE), and (INT) Suppose a joint choice correspondence f
is Nash-rationalizable by a zero-sum game (A,,). The necessity of (PC) and (PE)
is obvious from the definition of Nash equilibrium. To show the necessity of (INT), let
B = B1 × B2 ∈ A and b = (b1, b2), b′ = (b′1, b′2) ∈ f(B). Note that b1, b′1 ∈ B1 and
b2, b
′
2 ∈ B2, which implies that (b1, b′2) and (b′1, b2) are also in B.
Since (b1, b2) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (B,,),
i) player 1 prefers (b1, b2) to (b
′
1, b2): i.e. (b1, b2)  (b′1, b2), and
ii) player 2 prefers (b1, b2) to (b1, b
′
2): i.e. (b1, b2)  (b1, b′2), or equivalently (b1, b′2) 
(b1, b2).
In addition, since (b′1, b′2) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (B,,),
iii) player 1 prefers (b′1, b′2) to (b1, b′2): i.e. (b′1, b′2)  (b1, b′2), and
iv) player 2 prefers (b′1, b′2) to (b′1, b2): i.e. (b′1, b′2)  (b′1, b2), or equivalently (b′1, b2) 
(b′1, b′2).
By transitivity of , from (i) and (iv) we obtain (b1, b2)  (b′1, b2)  (b′1, b′2), and from
(ii) and (iii) we obtain (b′1, b′2)  (b1, b′2)  (b1, b2). Therefore, (b1, b2), (b′1, b2), (b1, b′2), and
(b′1, b′2) are all indifferent for player 1 and player 2.
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In this situation, (b′1, b2) is a Nash equilibrium of the game (B,,): for any b′′1 ∈ B1,
since (b1, b2) is a Nash equilibrium, we have (b1, b2)  (b′′1, b2), and thus (b′1, b2)  (b′′1, b2);
from player 2’s viewpoint, for any b′′2 ∈ B2, since (b′1, b′2) is a Nash equilibrium, we have
(b′1, b′2)  (b′1, b′′2), and thus (b′1, b2)  (b′1, b′′2). Similarly, (b1, b′2) is also a Nash equilibrium
of the game (B,,). In all, {b}∨{b′} is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria of the game
(B,,), and therefore a subset of f(B).
The sufficiency of (PC), (PE), and (INT) To prove sufficiency, we construct a pref-
erence  over A, with which for all B ∈ A, f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash equilibria
of (B,,).
In individual choice theory, given a finite alternative set X and a choice correspondence
g, Sen (1971) defines base relation R∗ as
xR∗y if and only if x ∈ g({x, y}).
Similarly, we define two relations ∗ and ∗∗ as follows: for any a = (a1, a2), b =
(b1, b2) ∈ A,
a ∗ b if and only if a2 = b2 and a ∈ f({a1, b1} × {a2}),
a ∗∗ b if and only if a1 = b1 and b ∈ f({a1} × {a2, b2})
Note that ∗ and ∗∗ are disjoint, and ∗∗ is defined “inversely” from the convention
of individual choice theory. Finally, let  be the union of ∗ and ∗∗. We arrange player
1’s conceivable actions in a column and player 2’s actions in a row, thereby constructing a
table of joint actions. Then, in each line (PC) is equivalent to Sen’s α and β, and ∗ and
∗∗ are defined as analogous with the base relation. ∗ represents the base relation in each
column, and ∗∗ represents the base relation in each row, except ∗∗ is defined inversely. In
such case, Sen (1971) shows that ∗ is a weak order in each column, and ∗∗ is an inverse
relation of a weak order in each row; therefore, the union  is a weak order in both columns
and rows. Note that  is not yet defined on any pair of joint actions across the lines. In
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order to construct a complete relation over A, we need some preliminary definitions.
Definition 6 (Consistency). Let R be a relation over X = {x1, x2, . . . , xl, . . . } and P be the
strict counterpart of R. A sequence x1Rx2R · · ·RxlPx1 is called a PR-cycle (or a cycle).
If a relation does not have any cycle, we say that it is consistent.
Definition 7 (Extension). Given any arbitrary binary relation R over X, if a binary rela-
tion R′ over X is such that
xRy implies xR
′
y
xPy implies xP
′
y
then R
′
is called an extension of R.
In the following proof, we show using interchangeability that  is consistent (Sec-
tion C.1). Then, we show using (PE) and (PC) that any weak order extension of 
Nash-rationalizes the joint choice correspondence by a zero-sum game (Section C.2).
C.1  is consistent.
By means of contradiction, suppose that there exists {a1, · · · , aN} ⊂ A such that a1  a2 
· · ·  aN  a1. Since  is the union of two disjoint sets, ∗ and ∗∗,  is either ∗ or ∗∗
depending on whether {ai, aj} is in a column or a row.
Hereafter, we restrict our attention to cycles of an even length of at least 4 where
the links in the cycle alternate between ∗∗ and ∗. This restriction does not lead to a
loss of generality. First, we only need to consider cycles that alternate because any cycle
containing consecutive ∗ or ∗∗ can be reduced by means of transitivity to a shorter cycle
without consecutive ∗ or ∗∗. In addition, there is no cycle with a length of 2 such as
a1 ∗ a2 ∗∗ a1. By definition of ∗, a12 = a22, and by definition of ∗∗, a11 = a21, which
together imply that a1 = a2. Then, we have a1 ∗∗ a1. We can also rule out cycles of odd
lengths, since we can shorten any cycle of a odd length by transitivity to a cycle of an even
length. For instance, the cycle a ∗∗ b ∗ c ∗∗ d ∗ e ∗∗ a of length 5 can be reduced to
the cycle b ∗ c ∗∗ d ∗ e ∗∗ b of length 4. We also restrict attention to the case where
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the cycle begins with ∗∗. The case where the cycle begins with ∗ is omitted, but can be
proved in a similar way.
First, we prove that there is no cycle of length 4. Suppose a ∗∗ b ∗ c ∗∗ d ∗ a. By
definition, we have a1 = b1, b2 = c2, c1 = d1 and d2 = a2. Then {a, b, c, d} makes feasible
sets as depicted in Figure C.1. In part (i) of the figure, each dashed arrow corresponds to
either ∗ or ∗∗ and the solid arrow corresponds to d ∗ a. The tail of each arrow is the
element from the left hand side of the preference relation.
(i) (ii) (iii)
a b
cd
a b*
c
a
cd*
Figure C.1: A cycle of length 4
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Figure C.1 illustrate the choice correspondence generating ∗ and
∗∗ for each feasible set. Note that b ∈ f({a, b}) ∩ f({b, c}), and d ∈ f({a, d}) ∩ f({c, d}).1
Then (PE) implies that b ∈ f({a, b, c, d}) and d ∈ f({a, b, c, d}). Since f is interchangeable,
and since a1 = b1 and a2 = d2, a = (b1, d2) must also be chosen; i.e., a ∈ f({a, b, c, d}).
Likewise, c = (d1, b2) implies c ∈ f({a, b, c, d}). Finally, (PC) implies that a ∈ f({a, d}),
which contradicts d ∗ a. So, there cannot be any cycle with length 4.
Now, let us make the induction hypothesis that there is no cycle of length 2(n−1) where
n ≥ 3. Given this hypothesis, we prove that there is no cycle of length 2n.
By reordering the list of individual actions for player 1 and for player 2 from a cycle
a1  a2  · · · a2n  a1, we can generate the table of joint actions in Figure C.2. Here, the
dashed arrows and the solid arrow represent the links in the cycle as in Figure C.1.
The proof by induction argument requires the following steps. Step 1 to 3 gives prefer-
ences shown in Figure C.7, and Step 4 shows other preferences as reflected in Figure C.9-(ii).
Step 5 shows the contradiction of these preferences identified in Step 1 to 3 and Step 4.
1Again for player 2, ∗∗ is defined inversely from the convention of base relation. Accordingly, arrows in
the figures inversely represent player 2’s revealed preference.
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a1
e
        
               a2n-4         c1
           d        a2n-3      a2n-2
a2n          ...            b2   b1      a2n-1
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure C.2: A cycle of length 2n (n ≥ 3)
Step 1: Consider the feasible set {a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b1}. In addition to the known
preferences from the cycle, we can verify f({a2n−3, b1}) and f({b1, a2n−1}). The four cases
in Figure C.3 below contain all possible cases of f({a2n−3, b1}) and f({b1, a2n−1}). In
these two feasible sets, it must not be the case that either a2n−3 ∈ f({a2n−3, b1}) and
a2n−1 ∈ f({b1, a2n−1}) (fig (i)), or b1 ∈ f({a2n−3, b1}) and b1 ∈ f({b1, a2n−1}) (fig (ii)).
(i.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
(ii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
(iii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
(iv.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
Figure C.3: A part of the cycle with length 2n
In case (i), a2n−4 ∗ b1 by transitivity of ∗ in the left column, and b1 ∗∗ a2n
by transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom row. These two preferences induce the cycle a1 
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· · ·  a2n−4  b1  a2n  a1 which has length 2(n − 1), a contradiction. In case (ii),
b1 ∈ f({a2n−3, b1}) ∩ f({b1, a2n−1}) and a2n−2 ∈ f({a2n−3, a2n−2}) ∩ f({a2n−2, a2n−1}).
(PE) induces that a2n−2 and b1 are in f({a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b1}); interchangeability of f
implies that all four joint actions are in f({a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b1}). Therefore, we have an
indifference relation ∼ in {a2n−3, b1} and {b1, a2n−1}, which gives a special case of (i).
Excluding case (i) and (ii), either (iii) or (iv) must be true. We will prove that the
induction step is true in case (iii). The proof in case (iv) is omitted here as it can be shown
with exactly the same approach as that taken in case (iii).
(i.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
(ii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
(iii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
(iv.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c
Figure C.4: Verifying more preferences
Step 2: Figure C.4 contains every possible case of f({a2n−4, c1}) and f({c1, a2n−2}). Us-
ing the same argument used for the case (i) and (ii) of f({a2n−3, b1}) and f({b1, a2n−1})
in Step 1, we can rule out the cases of (i) and (ii) in Figure C.4. In addition, case (iii),
{a2n−4} = f({a2n−4, c1}) and {c1} = f({c1, a2n−2}), is not possible either. This can be
shown first by observing b1 ∗ a2n−4. If it is not the case, completeness of ∗ in the left
column gives a2n−4 ∗ b1 which, combined with b1 ∗∗ a2n by transitivity of ∗∗ in the
bottom row, induces the cycle a1 ∗∗ · · · ∗∗ a2n−4 ∗ b1 ∗∗ a2n ∗ a1 whose length is
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2(n− 1).
Once (iii) and b1 ∗ a2n−4 are obtained (see Figure C.5), we consider the set of joint
actions {a2n−4, c1, b1, a2n−1}. Any choice from this feasible set violates the (PC) in one
feasible subset of {a2n−4, c1, b1, a2n−1}. Suppose c1 ∈ f({a2n−4, c1, b1, a2n−1}), then c /∈
f({a2n−4, c1}) violates (PC). Likewise any joint action in {a2n−4, c1, b1, a2n−1} is not a
choice. Thus case (iv), {c1} = f({a2n−4, c1}) and {a2n−2} = f({c1, a2n−2}), must be true.
(iii.)
         a2n-3 a2n-2
    a2n                b1 a2n-1  
a2n-4           c1
Figure C.5: Ruling out the case (iii)
Step 3: Considering f({a2n−5, d}) and f({d, a2n−3}), we can rule out the cases of either
a2n−5 ∈ f({a2n−5, d}) and a2n−3 ∈ f({d, a2n−3}), or d ∈ f({a2n−5, d}) and d ∈ f({d, a2n−3})
by the same argument used for f({a2n−3, b1}) & f({b1, a2n−1}) and f({a2n−4, c}) & f({c, a2n−2})
in the previous steps. Accordingly, we only have cases of either {a2n−5} = f({a2n−5, d})
and {d} = f({d, a2n−3}), or {d} = f({a2n−5, d}) and {a2n−3} = f({d, a2n−3}); case (i) or
case (ii) in Figure C.6, respectively. Case (i) is ruled out because once we have a2n−5 ∗ d,
it must be that a2n−2 ∗∗ d. If this is not true, then d ∗∗ a2n−2, which induces one of the
following cases.
1. If the cycle has length 6 (a2n−5 is a1 and there is no # in fig(i)), b2 is equal to a2n.
Thus we have a2n−1 ∗∗ b2 and b2 ∗ d by transitivity of ∗. As a result, d ∗∗ a2n−2
makes a cycle with length 4, d ∗∗ a2n−2 ∗ a2n−1 ∗∗ b2 ∗ d, which contradicts the
induction hypothesis.
2. If the cycle has length 8 or more (there is a2n−6 , ‘#’ in the fig (i), which is not a1),
a2n−6 ∗ d ∗∗ a2n−2 by transitivity of ∗ and ∗∗ in the left column and the middle
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a2n-5       a2n-4 c1
  d       a2n-3      a2n-2
  b2           b1            a2n-1 
#
a2n-5       a2n-4 c1
  d       a2n-3      a2n-2
  b2           b1            a2n-1 
(i.) (ii.)
Figure C.6: Verifying more preferences.
row. These preferences shorten the cycle, which contradicts the induction hypothesis.
Therefore, a2n−2 ∗∗ dmust be true in case (i). Regardless of what is in f({a2n−5, d, c1, a2n−2}),
it violates (PC). For instance, if d ∈ f({a2n−5, d, c1, a2n−2}) then it must be d ∈ f({a2n−5, d}),
which violates a2n−5 ∗ d. Consequently, case (ii) in Figure C.6 must be the option.
By applying Step 2 and 3 sequentially, we can verify more preferences. Figure C.7
summarizes the result of this process. In the following proof, Step 4 is necessary only for
a cycle whose length is at least 8. For a cycle with length 6, we already know all the
preferences that we will verify in Step 4.
a1
e
        
               a2n-4         c1
           d        a2n-3      a2n-2
a2n          ...       b3           b2   b1      a2n-1
.
.
.
.
.
.
c2
Figure C.7: Preferences verified in Step 2 and 3
Step 4: Denote the joint action (a2n−11 , a
2(n−k)−1) as bm and the joint action (a2(n−m−1)1 , a
2(n−m)
2 )
as cm, where k = 1, 2, . . . , n−2. Figure C.7 shows where bm and cm (1 ≤ m ≤ n−2) are lo-
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cated. Let τ be a function from {b1, b2, . . . , bn−2} to A such that τ(bm) = (a2n−(2m+1)1 , bm2 ).
Figures C.8, C.9, and C.10 show how the function values are located in the feasible set
table. (τ(bm) takes its place on the stairway of which bm is at the bottom.) We prove the
following claim.
Claim C.1.1. For any bm (1 ≤ m ≤ n− 2), bm  τ(bm) and bm  a2n−1
Proof. We prove by induction. Note that we already proved in Step 2 that this claim holds
for b1.
Induction 1: The claim holds for b2. That is, b2 ∗ τ(b2) (or a2n−5) and b2 ∗∗ a2n−1.
(i.)
(ii.) (iii.)
     d     a2n-3          a2n-2
   a2n      b2            b1            a2n-1  
τ(b2)        a2n-4 c1
     d     a2n-3          a2n-2
   a2n      b2            b1            a2n-1  
τ(b2)        a2n-4 c1
     d     a2n-3          a2n-2
   a2n      b2            b1            a2n-1  
τ(b2)        a2n-4 c1
Figure C.8: Verifying more preferences involving b2
Proof. Considering feasible sets, {τ(b2), b2} and {b2, a2n−1} (see Figure C.8), it is not
the case that τ(b2) ∈ f({τ(b2), b2}) and a2n−1 ∈ f({b2, a2n−5}) (case (i)). Otherwise,
it shortens the cycle with a2n−5 = τ(b2) ∗ b2 ∗∗ a2n. (We used transitivity in
the bottom row.) Therefore, by completeness in each line, we should have either
a2n−1 ∗∗ b2 or b2 ∗ τ(b2). In the former case, in order not to have a cycle of
length 6, which includes {τ(b2), a2n−4, a2n−3, a2n−2, a2n−1, b2}, f must give τ(b2) ∗ b2
(fig (ii)). In the latter case, in order not to have a cycle of length 6, f must give
b2 ∗∗ a2n−1 (fig (iii)). However, case (ii) is ruled out by considering the feasible
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set, {τ(b2), c1, b2, a2n−1}. To demonstrate this, note that a2n−1 ∗ c1. Otherwise,
τ(b2) ∗∗ c1 ∗ a2n−1 shortens the cycle. If case (ii) is true, then any choice from
{τ(b2), c1, b2, a2n−1} violates (PC). For example, if τ(b2) ∈ f({τ(b2), c1, b2, a2n−1}),
then it must be true that τ(b2) ∈ f({τ(b2), c1}). This contradicts τ(b2) ∗∗ c1. (Note
again that ∗∗ is defined inversely.) Therefore, (iii) must be the case in Figure C.8.
Induction 2: If the claim holds for bm−2, it also holds for bm (3 ≤ m ≤ n− 2).
Proof. With the same approach as Induction 1, f should not give τ(bm) ∗ bm and
bm ∗∗ a2n−1; otherwise, we have a shorter cycle including τ(bm) ∗ bm ∗∗ a2n.
Thus, it must be either a2n−1 ∗∗ bm or bm ∗ τ(bm). In the former case, not to have
a cycle, bm ∗ τ(bm) ∗∗ · · · ∗ a2n−1 ∗∗ bm which has length 2m + 2 ≤ 2(n − 1),
it must be true that τ(bm) ∗ bm (case (i) in Figure C.9).2 In the latter case,
not to have a cycle, τ(bm) ∗∗ · · · ∗ a2n−1 ∗ bm ∗ τ(bm) which has length
2m + 2 ≤ 2(n − 1), it must be true that bm ∗∗ a2n−1. (case (ii) in Figure C.9.)
However, case (i) is ruled out. First, observe that bm−2 ∗ cm−1 must be true;
otherwise τ(bm) ∗∗ cm−1 ∗ bm−2 ∗∗ a2n leads to a shorter cycle. In addition,
transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom row gives bm−2 ∗∗ bm. Then, in the feasible set,
{τ(bm), bm, bm−2, cm−1}, any choice violates (PC). Therefore, (ii) must be the case in
f({τ(bm), bm}) and f({bm, a2n−1}).
By induction, bm  τ(bm) and bm  a2n−1 for m = 1, . . . , n− 2. Claim C.1.1 holds.
Step 5: Results from Steps 2 and 3, and results from Step 4 contradict each other.
2 Although we explicitly write the proof only for the case of cycle beginning with ∗∗, every single
step so far could have been reproduced for cases where cycles begin with ∗. Here, we used the induction
hypothesis, “there is no cycle with a length of 2(n− 1),” from the counterpart proof of cycles begining with
∗.
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τ(bm)     cm-1
    ...
 bm   bm-1     bm-2               a2n-1
(i.)
τ(bm)     cm-1
    ...
 bm   bm-1     bm-2               a2n-1
(ii.)
Figure C.9: Verifying preferences involving bm
Proof. If we denote the joint action (τ(bn−2)1, a12) as e (see Figure C.10), then Step 2 and
3 gives e ∗ a1 and e ∗∗ τ(bn−2). We showed in Step 4 that bn−2 ∗ τ(bn−2) and
bn−2 ∗∗ a2n−1. Moreover, it must be true that e ∗ a2n, since otherwise, a2n ∗ e ∗∗ a4
shortens the cycle. On the other hand, bn−2 ∗∗ a2n by transitivity of ∗∗ in the bottom
row. We can observe that any choice from the feasible set, {e, τ(bn−2), a2n, bn−2}, violates
(PC). This contradiction completes the proof of Step 5, thereby completing the proof of
consistency of .
  a1
  a2n      bn-2  ...       a2n-1
  e   τ(bn-2)    a4
.
.
.
.
.
.
Figure C.10: A contradiction
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C.2 Characterizing a rationalizing preference relation.
Claim C.2.1. For all B ∈ A, f(B) coincides with the set of all Nash equilibria of the game
(B,,).
Proof. Take any B = B1 × B2 ∈ A, and let NE(B) be the set of all Nash equilibria of the
game (B,,). First, to show f(B) ⊂ NE(B), we take any b∗ = (b∗1, b∗2) ∈ f(B). Since f
satisfies (PC), b∗ ∈ f(B′) for all B′ ∈ A and B′ ⊂ B. Therefore, for any {b∗, (b1, b∗2)} ⊂ B,
b∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b1, b∗2)}). By the definition of ∗, we have b∗ ∗ (b1, b∗2), which is equal to
b∗  (b1, b∗2). Similarly, for any {b∗, (b∗1, b2)} ⊂ B, b∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b∗1, b2)}). The definition of
∗∗ gives (b∗1, b2) ∗∗ b∗, which is equal to (b∗1, b2)  b∗, or b∗  (b∗1, b2). Since b∗  (b1, b∗2)
and b∗  (b∗1, b2), for all (b1, b∗2) ∈ B and (b∗1, b2) ∈ B, b∗ is a Nash equilibrium of the game
(B,,).
Conversely, if b∗ ∈ NE(B), for any (b1, b∗2) ∈ B, b∗  (b1, b∗2). Since, only ∗, and
not ∗∗, is defined in columns, we have b∗ ∗ (b1, b∗2). The definition of ∗ gives b∗ ∈
f({b∗, (b1, b∗2)}), and (PE) implies b∗ ∈ f(B1 × {b∗2}) (#). b∗ ∈ NE(B) implies b∗  (b∗1, b2)
for all (b∗1, b2) ∈ B (or (b∗1, b2)  b∗). Because we defined only ∗∗, and not ∗, in rows,
we have (b∗1, b2) ∗∗ b∗. The definition of ∗∗ gives b∗ ∈ f({b∗, (b∗1, b2)}) and (PE) induces
b∗ ∈ f({b∗1} ×B2) (##). Lastly, (#), (##), and (PE) imply that b∗ ∈ f(B).
We have shown that  is consistent and f(B) coincides with NE(B) for all B ∈ A.
Suzumura (1976) shows that a consistent relation has a weak order extension. Since the
extension generates additional preferences only between two joint choices which are not in a
line, this extension does not affect the result of Claim C.2.1. Therefore, Claim C.2.1 is still
valid with the weak order extension of . This completes the proof of the main theorem.
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